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his is Old Dominion University’s fifth annual State of the Commonwealth Report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways 
to the university, the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion, its president, John R. Broderick, the Board of Visitors, the Strome 
College of Business or the generous donors who support the activities of the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy.    
While the enthusiasm we have for our work remains high, it has been dampened by the recent passing of George Dragas, the individual most responsible for 
perceiving the need for an annual report on the state of Hampton Roads 20 years ago and procuring the financial support to sustain it. The State of the Region 
Report: Hampton Roads was the progenitor of the State of the Commonwealth Report. George was a very successful businessman, who simultaneously exhibited 
marvelous foresight and a keen sense of civic duty. Without George and his family, there would be no State of the Commonwealth Report and no Dragas Center for 
Economic Analysis and Policy. We are indebted to him.   
The 2019 State of the Commonwealth report is divided into five parts:
Virginia’s Growth Improves in Uncertain Times 
Virginia’s economy is poised to grow for the fifth consecutive year. The 
number of jobs and people employed set new records in the summer of 2019 
and CNBC recently ranked the Commonwealth as the most business-friendly 
state in the country. However, increasing economic uncertainty threatens the 
promise of a bright start to the coming decade. We assess the performance of 
the Virginia economy and ask what the future holds.
Virginia’s Metropolitan Areas: Moving Forward 
Many indicators of economic performance suggest that the Commonwealth’s 
metropolitan areas grew in 2018 and into 2019. Unemployment is below 3% 
across Virginia’s metros, and average wages have risen over the last three 
years. Compared to 2015, the metros are in a better place today but there are 
storm clouds on the horizon.
The Virginia Retirement System: Assessing Its Challenges and 
Charting Its Future 
The Virginia Retirement System (VRS) manages the assets in the 
Commonwealth’s public employee retirement systems. The available evidence 
suggests that the VRS has been well managed and has outperformed many 
other state pension funds. We evaluate the VRS’s performance and suggest 
changes that could enable it to lower its costs even while improving its rate of 
return.
Marijuana in Virginia 
Over 30 states permit the personal use of marijuana for medical purposes 
and more than 10 states have legalized the possession of small amounts for 
personal use. With increasing calls in Virginia for the decriminalization 
or legalization of small amounts of marijuana, we examine who uses the 
substance, who is being arrested for possession or use, and what the revenue 
impact might be if marijuana were legalized in the Commonwealth. 
Federal Spending in the Commonwealth: A Primer 
In fiscal year 2018, federal government awards in Virginia totaled $109 
billion, or $12,866 per Virginian. The Commonwealth’s economy is fueled, for 
better or worse, by spending decisions in the halls of Congress and the White 
House. We explore how the federal government spends money in Virginia and 
highlight procurement spending in the state’s metropolitan areas. We also 
look back at the impact of the Budget Control Act of 2011 on the economies of 
Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads.
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And once the storm is over, you won’t 
remember how you made it through, how you 
managed to survive. You won’t even be sure, 
in fact, whether the storm is really over. But 
one thing is certain. When you come out of 
the storm, you won’t be the same person who 
walked in. That’s what this storm’s all about.




n the aftermath of the Great Recession, 
real (inflation-adjusted) economic growth 
in Virginia rebounded to 2.7% in 2010, 
suggesting to some that we were on the road 
to recovery. Yet, whether due to federal 
budget sequestration, poor private-sector job 
creation or superior economic opportunities 
in other states, the Commonwealth soon fell 
into an economic malaise, neither growing 
nor contracting – merely, it seemed, muddling 
along. Things, however, could have been worse. 
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics, 
commenting on the state of the U.S. and 
European economies in 2014, aptly noted, 
“Malaise is better than a recession, and a 
recession is better than a depression.”1
If where you stand determines what you 
see, then one’s perspective on the state of 
the Virginia economy in 2019 is likely quite 
different than it was in 2014. 2019 will be 
the fifth consecutive year of real economic 
growth. Barring an unforeseen shock, 2019 
also will be the second consecutive year with 
economic growth in excess of 2%. It speaks to 
the Commonwealth’s recent malaise that this is 
unabashed good news.
Several factors that produced the malaise 
simultaneously are responsible for the recent 
surge in economic activity in Virginia. Federal 
spending has risen in the latter half of the 
1  Joseph Stiglitz, “The current economic malaise is the result of 
flawed policies,” The Guardian, Feb. 6, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2014/
feb/06/current-economic-malaise-flawed-policies.
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current decade, fueling economic activity in Northern Virginia and 
Hampton Roads. The Commonwealth has made a concerted effort to 
improve its business climate and recently reclaimed the top position in 
CNBC’s “business friendly” state rankings. Job creation has continued to 
increase, revenues have climbed and unemployment has declined. Virginia, 
it would seem, is poised to enter the third decade of the century from an 
advantageous position.
Increasing economic uncertainty, however, may undermine the 
promise of a bright start to the coming decade. At the national level, 
political uncertainty has (so far) not significantly affected equities 
markets. The impeachment proceedings and the 2020 presidential 
election could change that equation. Trade policy, on the other hand, 
has lowered global merchandise trade volumes and global economic 
growth. Immigration, which has offset the outflow of Virginians to other 
states, is an increasingly contentious issue. Reflecting decisions of the 
Trump administration, the number of international students enrolling 
in American colleges has declined.2 This is one of the reasons why 
headcount college enrollments have declined eight years in a row. This 
may undermine the long-term growth of the Virginia and U.S. economies.3 
While increases in federal spending are typically good news for the 
Commonwealth, these increases have been financed by federal deficit 
spending. The federal government is projected to run trillion-dollar annual 
deficits through the end of the next decade. At what point will investors 
hesitate to lend to an increasingly indebted United States? 
Balancing the recent spate of good news with the growing uncertainties 
of the long term is the primary task we undertake in this chapter. 
We will work toward presenting a clearer picture of the state of the 
Commonwealth and ask what policies might work best for Virginia in 
these uncertain times.
2 Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019, available at: https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gdp-state.
3 Paul Fain, “College Enrollment Declines Continue,” Inside Higher Education (May 30, 2019), www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/05/30/college-enrollment-declines-continue.
4 GDP does not capture the value of household production, likely underestimates the size of the informal economy and may not correlate with “happiness” or other measures of social well-being. 
5 We use the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) to estimate the annual average rate of economic growth. CAGR can be expressed as the following: CAGR = (Final Period/Initial Period)^(1/number of periods-1)-1.
Growth Accelerates, 
But Questions Linger
Gross domestic product (GDP) is the headline measure of economic 
performance in the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
GDP is an estimate of the level of economic output in an area and, when 
examined over time, provides insight into the ebb and flow of economic 
activity. While there is no perfect measure of economic well-being or 
performance, GDP is (for now) commonly used to gauge the success of 
local, state and national economies.4 As with many measures of economic 
activity at the state and local level, state GDP data arrive with a lag. The 
U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis published 
data for the second quarter of 2019 in November 2019. This release not 
only provided advance estimates for the second quarter of 2019, but also 
revised annual estimates for 2014 to 2018 and the first quarter of 2019.
Table 1 presents annual GDP for Virginia in nominal and real 
(inflation-adjusted) dollars from 2008 to 2019. We focus on real GDP, 
as it removes the influence of inflation. While the Virginia economy 
contracted only once in the current decade (2014), the overall rate of 
growth has been underwhelming. From 2008 to 2018, Virginia’s real 
GDP grew at an annual average rate of only 1.1%.5 If we focus on the 
last five years for which we have GDP data (2014 to 2018), the pace of 
economic activity in the Commonwealth ticked upward to 1.7%. 
We forecast that real GDP growth for Virginia will be 2.5% in 2019, 
slightly below that of 2018. If this forecast is accurate, then the 
Commonwealth will have put together two consecutive years of real 
GDP growth in excess of 2%. This would boost the five-year annual 
average growth rate of 1.7% from 2014 to 2018 to 1.8% from 2015 to 
2019. 
5
Graph 1 compares the economic performance of Virginia and the United 
States from 2010 to 2019. Two points stand out. First, for most of the 
current decade, the Commonwealth’s economic performance has lagged 
that of the nation. In 2010, we grew slightly faster than the national 
average. From 2010 to 2018, however, Virginia failed to keep pace 
with the nation. On the other hand (as economists tend to say), the 
Commonwealth’s performance did improve considerably in 2017 and 
2018, approaching that of the nation. We forecast that Virginia’s real 
GDP growth will exceed that of the U.S. in 2019, as the national economy 
appears to be slowing considerably.
TABLE 1 
VIRGINIA’S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND ANNUAL GROWTH 
RATES, 2008-2019*
YEAR NOMINAL GDP REAL GDP
REAL GDP 
GROWTH
2008 $399,032 $425,804 -0.3%
2009 $408,919 $425,584 -0.1%
2010 $422,902 $437,268 2.7%
2011 $432,393 $441,609 1.0%
2012 $444,950 $444,950 0.8%
2013 $455,070 $446,560 0.4%
2014 $463,782 $445,527 -0.2%
2015 $484,628 $454,098 1.9%
2016 $493,866 $455,393 0.3%
2017 $510,425 $463,426 1.8%
2018 $534,449 $476,388 2.8%
2019 $559,568 $488,298 2.5%
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old 
Dominion University. Table SAGDP9N, real GDP by state. Millions of chained 2012 dollars. *2019 represents 
our Virginia forecast.
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GRAPH 1
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL CHANGE IN REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
2010-2019*





Virginia and the United States: Annual Change in Real Gross Domestic Product, 2010-2019* 
 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Table SAGDP9N, real GDP by state. Millions of chained 2012 dollars. *2019 represents 
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The Global Economy 
Taps The Brakes As 
Uncertainty Increases
Virginia’s economic performance improved in 2017 and 2018 and we 
forecast continued growth in 2019. Political and economic uncertainty, 
however, has recently increased and may undermine prospects for future 
growth. Uncertainty makes it harder for businesses to plan, increasing the 
cost of doing business.
One measure of policy uncertainty is displayed in Graph 2. The Economic 
Policy Uncertainty Index attempts to capture newspaper articles about 
economic policy uncertainty, Congressional Budget Office (CBO) measures 
of temporary tax provisions that are set to expire within the next decade 
and the dispersion of the forecasts in the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters.6 Index values greater 
than 100 suggest higher than average economic policy uncertainty, while 
values less than 100 suggest less policy uncertainty.
It should be no surprise that the index increases during periods of 
economic stress and declines during periods of economic expansion. 
Historically, the index increases during and in the aftermath of declines 
in economic activity. During the 2001 recession, the index peaked at 130.6, 
while the peak attributable to the Great Recession did not occur until 
2011.7 2019 was the first year in its history that the index signaled 
increasing uncertainty during a period of economic expansion. Similar 
spikes in uncertainty also occurred in the global and Chinese indices. 
In April 2019, the World Trade Organization (WTO) released its 
preliminary estimate for the growth in global merchandise trade for 
2018. Global trade grew 3%, almost a full percentage point lower than the 
original forecast in 2018 of 3.9%. Global trade volumes declined by 0.3% 
6  More information about the index can be found at: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/methodology.html. For a discussion of the methodology, see Scott Baker, Nicholas Bloom and Steven Davis, “Measuring Economic Policy 
Uncertainty,” NBER Working Paper 21633, October 2015.
7 The National Bureau of Economic Research determined that the 2001 recession was from March 2001 to November 2001. The Great Recession was from December 2007 to June 2009.
8 World Trade Organization, “Latest Trade Trends, 1st Quarter 2019,” Aug. 28, 2019, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update_e/latest_trade_trends_e.pdf.
9 World Trade Organization, “Global trade growth loses momentum as trade tensions persist,” April 2, 2019, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres19_e/pr837_e.htm.
10 European Commission, “European Economic Forecast, Summer 2019 (Interim),” https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip108_en.pdf.
11 Bloomberg, “China seen heading for sub-6% economic growth as tariffs soar,” Sept. 2, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-03/china-s-economy-will-grow-at-5-7-in-2020-oxford-economics-says.
in the fourth quarter of 2018, largely a result of a trade conflict between 
the U.S. and China. In the first quarter of 2019, global merchandise trade 
flows were flat from the fourth quarter of 2018. In year-over-year terms, 
global exports and imports contracted by 2.7% and 3.1%, respectively.8
In April of 2019, the WTO forecasted that trade would grow by 2.6% in 
2019, with the possibility of higher growth if there was a resolution to 
the ongoing trade conflict between the two countries.9 In October 2019, 
however, the WTO significantly revised its global trade forecast 
downward, from 2.6% to 1.2%. 
With the growth in global merchandise trade slowing, it should be no 
surprise that global economic forecasts have been revised downward. In 
the summer of 2019, the EU lowered its 2020 real GDP growth forecast to 
1.4%.10 Several private firms also have reduced their forecasts for Chinese 
real GDP growth in 2020 to below 6%.11
For the United States, expectations for growth in 2019 have softened 
considerably and shifted the Federal Reserve’s policy focus. From the 
first quarter of 2009 through the end of the fourth quarter of 2015, 
the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) did not change its 
target federal funds rate. In essence, the Federal Reserve maintained an 
accommodative monetary policy even though the U.S. economy grew over 
most of the period. As illustrated in Graph 3, the FOMC raised the target 
rate once in 2015 and once again in 2016. In 2017 and 2018, the market 
consensus was the FOMC would continue to raise its target federal funds 
rate and unwind its liabilities accrued during the Great Recession. 
Increasing trade tensions, a slowdown in global growth and declining 
expectations about U.S. economic activity have led to a rapid shift in the 
FOMC’s behavior. The FOMC lowered its target federal funds rate by 25 
basis points in August, September and October of 2019. 
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At the end of 2019, the FOMC’s stance could best be described as “watch, 
wait and react.” In other words, the FOMC is watching the economy 
to see if the rate cuts boosted economic activity. If economic activity 
increases, the FOMC will become less accommodative. On the other hand, 
if economic activity falters, the FOMC may reduce its target federal funds 
rate again in 2020.
Graph 4 illustrates the change in the median forecast among members 
of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors from September 2018 to 
September 2019. Even with a more accommodative monetary policy, 
the most recent median forecast is that real GDP growth will slow to 
approximately 2% in 2020 and 2021, subject to the usual caveats about 
economic shocks and policy uncertainty.  
Our concluding thought is that the increasing uncertainty undermines 
business and consumer confidence. If global growth continues to slow, 
the prospects for 2020 and beyond will certainly dim. While there 
remains the possibility that trade conflicts with China will abate and 
global trade volumes will rebound, there is also a strong likelihood 
that the ongoing trade conflicts will intensify. Forecasting in such an 
environment is exceedingly difficult, given the volatility of information, 
policies and politics. The Commonwealth, in such an environment, 
should be conservative in its expectations for economic growth. 
9
GRAPH 2
ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY INDEX: UNITED STATES, 2000-2019*
Sources: Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Annual averages constructed from weekly data. *2019 data represent the annual average through 
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GRAPH 3
FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE: 
TARGET FEDERAL FUND CHANGE IN BASIS POINTS, UNITED STATES, 2015-2019








Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. 1 basis point is equal to 0.01%. Data current as of Nov. 27, 2019, and 
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Labor Markets Hit 
New Highs
As economic activity in Virginia has improved in the last years of the 
current decade, it should be no surprise that labor market conditions in 
the Commonwealth have improved as well. Graph 5 illustrates how the 
seasonally adjusted civilian labor force and civilian individual employment 
have evolved from January 2005 to October 2019.12 One can clearly see 
the impact of the Great Recession on the size of the labor force and 
individual employment. From its prerecession peak in October 2008, 
the civilian labor force fell by 1.4% to its trough in November 2009. The 
decline in individual employment, however, was more significant. From its 
prerecession peak in July 2008, individual employment fell by 4.6% to its 
bottom in December 2009.
Virginia’s tepid economic performance in the first half of the decade is 
reflected in the labor force data. From December 2009 to December 2015, 
individual employment rose 6.4%, but the labor force only grew by 2.7%. 
The relatively rapid rise in individual employment relative to the labor 
force meant that Virginia’s unemployment rate fell rapidly from a peak of 
7.5% to 4.1% in December 2015 (Graph 6). 
12  The civilian labor force consists of employed persons and unemployed persons. The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines employed persons as “persons who did any work for pay or profit during the survey reference week; persons 
who did at least 15 hours of unpaid work in a family-operated enterprise; and persons who were temporarily absent from their regular jobs because of illness, vacation, bad weather, industrial dispute, or various personal reasons.”  
The BLS classifies persons as unemployed “if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work. Persons who were not working and were waiting to be recalled to a job 
from which they had been temporarily laid off are also included as unemployed.” For more information, see https://www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm.
13  The debate of familial-based versus merit-based immigration is outside the scope of this chapter but a topic worthy of discussion. There is a trend toward merit-based immigration among developed countries, which, in turn, 
appears to affect familial-sponsorship and remittances as noted by Sandar Mukopadhyay and Miaomiao Zou, “Will skill-based immigration policies lead to lower remittances? An analysis of the relations between education, 
sponsorship, and remittances,” Journal of Development Studies, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2019.1585812.
Since 2015, however, the pace of individual employment growth has slowed 
while the size of the labor force has accelerated compared to the earlier 
period. From December 2015 to December 2018, the civilian labor force 
in Virginia grew 3% while individual employment growth slowed to 4.4%. 
Since individual employment continued to grow faster than the labor 
force, the unemployment rate in the Commonwealth continued to decline, 
reaching 2.6% in October 2019. If someone wants a job, there is likely an 
employer in need of an employee to fill a position.
With unemployment nearing historical lows and individual employment 
growth slowing because those who want a job, have a job, how can 
the Commonwealth and the nation continue to grow? One route to 
increasing productivity growth is to spur the flow of inventions and 
innovations emanating from the Commonwealth’s federal laboratories 
and university campuses. Other policy options include offering tax 
incentives for investments in business plants and equipment (including 
repeal of Virginia’s machinery and tools tax) and finding ways to 
increase labor force participation rates. Addressing the urban-rural 
divide in education, broadband access, quality of infrastructure 
and other factors will also require concerted action. Each of 
these possibilities involves heavy economic and political lifting but 
realistically must receive consideration if we are to spur economic 
growth in our current situation.13 
13
GRAPH 5
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND CIVILIAN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2005 TO OCTOBER 2019
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019. Data current as of Nov. 27, 2019, and subject to revision.
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GRAPH 6
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: 
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 2005 TO OCTOBER 2019




Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate: Virginia and the United States, January 2005 to October 2019* 
 
















































































The civilian labor force represents those individuals who are employed or 
who are seeking employment. Disaffected workers who have abandoned 
attempts to secure gainful employment are not included in the labor force, 
and thus not reflected in the employment and unemployment data. Labor 
force participation, which is a percentage of the working-age (16 to 64) 
population that is employed or unemployed and seeking employment, 
typically falls during economic contractions and rises during economic 
expansions. Graph 7 presents labor force participation rates for the U.S. 
and Virginia.
Whether nationally or in Virginia, labor force participation rates 
remain below their prerecession peaks. The long-term decline in 
labor force participation rates represents an economic puzzle, with 
demographic change (baby-boomer retirements), dependence on 
government benefits, structural unemployment (jobs exist, but workers 
are not qualified to fill them) and the opioid crisis all considered as 
potential contributing factors. 
One perspective is that the demand for labor has shifted over the previous 
decades in favor of highly skilled labor and will likely continue in this 
vein over the coming decade.14 While manufacturing’s share of GDP has 
remained relatively steady, manufacturing employment has fallen due 
to significant improvements in worker productivity. Fewer workers can 
produce more output, and this trend is likely to accelerate as automation 
continues to be utilized in the manufacturing and service industries. 
Historically, automation may have eliminated jobs within an industry, 
14 Eleanor Krause and Isabel Sawhill, 2017, “What we know and don’t know about declining labor force participation: A review,” the Brookings Institution.
15  The reservation wage is the lowest wage rate at which an individual is willing to accept employment. Lizhong Peng, Xiaohaio Guo and Chad Meyerhoefer (2018) found that Medicaid expansion has led to a “statistically significant 
decrease in employment of 1.3 percent one year after the Medicaid expansion. This disemployment effect is transitory and appears to primarily occur in low-wage sectors. In particular, employment returns to pre-expansion levels 
within two years.” In other words, immediately after Medicaid expansion, reservation wages appeared to temporarily increase. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25105.
16  https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/mortality-and-morbidity-in-the-21st-century/.
but some workers could retrain and remain within the industry while 
others had to leave the industry altogether. An architect who may have 
previously spent hours producing blueprints with the help of staff can 
now achieve the same work with computer software, reducing the need 
for staff. Robotics has taken over parts of the car manufacturing process, 
increasing worker productivity and output, but also decreasing the demand 
for autoworkers.
The latest wave of automation, some argue, appears to eliminate 
entire industry employment cohorts. Legal firms are increasingly using 
sophisticated software that accelerates the speed of discovery but may also 
displace lawyers. If autonomous long-haul trucks enter the market, the 
livelihood of many truckers comes under significant pressure. For now, it 
is difficult to separate promises and reality, but it does appear we may be 
on the cusp of significant change. If so, automation will be to the benefit 
of consumers and businesses but to the detriment of the workers who now 
must learn new skills for different industries and professions.
Another perspective is that the labor supply is no longer as responsive 
to increases in real earnings as it was in the past. Disaffected workers 
may have high reservation wages due to their ability to cobble together 
cash income with public benefits.15 These workers may also be in poorer 
health as a result of “diseases of despair,” such as substance abuse, and 
are effectively unemployable in many industries.16 A not-so-uncommon 
complaint by employers in manufacturing and transportation industries, 
for example, is that skilled workers are in short supply and many who 
apply for work are disqualified due to substance abuse. This problem 
may only be exacerbated by the increasing number of states that have 
decriminalized or legalized recreational marijuana.
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GRAPH 7
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES: 
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 2005 TO OCTOBER 2019




Labor Force Participation Rates: Virginia and the United States, January 2005 to October 2019 
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One factor that has received much attention is the rise of the “gig 
economy,” or “fauxmation economy.” If one drives for Uber or Lyft, 
delivers groceries for Postmates or DoorDash, finds jobs through 
Thumbtack or engages in a host of other activities, is this considered 
formal work? A 2016 survey of people 21 and older who were not retired 
found that 37% engaged in paid informal work. Even if one excluded those 
survey respondents who engaged solely in renting or selling activities, 20% 
of the respondents engaged in paid, informal work, the survey revealed.17 
For those engaging in informal work, hourly wages were comparable or 
higher to the survey respondents’ former wages in traditional work.
The authors of the 2016 study argued that if informal workers who 
worked at least 20 hours a week were counted as employed, the 
national labor force participation rate in 2015 would have increased 
by 0.5% to 1%. If all informal workers were classified as employed, 
regardless of hours, the labor force participation rate would have 
been two percentage points higher in 2015. As the size of the gig 
economy grows, the gap between measured labor force participation 
and actual labor force participation is likely to widen. This is not just 
a measurement challenge for economists. Our labor laws and policies 
remain rooted in the concept of traditional employment. With an 
increasing number of Virginians and Americans in the gig economy or 
informal employment, policies and regulations must adapt to the new 
normal. 
Labor force participation rates vary across the Commonwealth. Figure 1 
displays these rates by county and independent city in 2018. Labor force 
participation rates were markedly lower in southwestern Virginia, with 
some counties observing participation rates below 50%. The highest labor 
force participation rates are those above 70%, seen in Northern Virginia, 
Richmond and parts of Hampton Roads. 
17  Anat Bracha and Mary A. Burke, “Who counts as employed? Informal work, employment status, and labor market slack,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper Series 16-29, 2016.
FIGURE 1
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY COUNTY AND 
INDEPENDENT CITY: VIRGINIA, 2018
Source: Virginia Employment Commission (2019), “Labor Force Participation Rates,” https://virginiaworks.com/
labor-force-participation-rates/category/labor-force-participation-rates
Figure 2 presents the change in labor force participation rates by county 
and independent city from 2013 to 2018. Over this period, Virginia’s 
average labor force participation rate declined by 5.7%. Fewer than 10 
localities observed an increase in labor force participation rates, with the 
remainder of localities observing declines. Declines occurred not only in 
the western counties but also in Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads. 
Different localities face different challenges. Unemployment is higher 
and labor force participation rates are lower in rural areas of the 
Commonwealth. A lack of economic opportunities, the decreasing 
importance of agriculture and manufacturing in Virginia’s economy 
and the devastating impact of the opioid crisis all play a role here. 
The challenge in these localities is to foster economic development in 
order to reduce unemployment rates and induce disaffected workers to 
return to the labor force.
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FIGURE 2
CHANGE IN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES BY COUNTY 
AND INDEPENDENT CITY, 2013-2018
 Source: Virginia Employment Commission (2019), “Labor Force Participation Rates,” https://virginiaworks.
com/labor-force-participation-rates/category/labor-force-participation-rates
In many urban areas, declines in unemployment rates and the decline 
in labor force participation rates have exacerbated the shortage of 
workers. Moving disaffected workers back into the workforce has a 
host of benefits beyond addressing the need for labor. The challenge 
now is to ask the hard questions about what is to be done.  
There is no magic elixir or “slam-dunk” economic development project 
that will solve these issues. Raising the capabilities of the existing 
and future workforce is a long-run effort that requires investments in 
K-12 schools, community colleges and public universities. Improving 
infrastructure should not just focus on roads. In an increasingly 
connected global economy, counties and cities without reliable, fast 
and cheap internet connections are left behind. These efforts take time 
and patience to bear fruit, so it is best to start sooner than later.
18 Average hourly earnings reflect not only changes in hourly and incentive wage rates, but also variable factors such as overtime and late-shift work. For more information, see https://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/ces-20110307.pdf.
Businesses Continue To Add 
Jobs (Slowly)
As with individual employment, nonfarm payrolls (jobs) continued to 
expand in 2018 and into 2019. Graph 8 illustrates the number of jobs in 
the Commonwealth from January 2005 to October 2019. The seasonally 
adjusted number of jobs in Virginia set a historical record in July 2019. 
On the other hand, the growth in jobs has moderated somewhat in 2019. 
In the first eight months of 2018, year-over-year growth was over 1%. In 
2019, only January saw year-over-year job growth higher than 1%, and 
some months approached 0.5% growth. More jobs, but at a slower rate.
Graph 9 compares the year-over-year change in jobs for Virginia and the 
United States. Virginia’s job growth was as strong as that of the U.S. prior 
to the Great Recession, and the Commonwealth’s economy did not shed as 
many jobs as the nation did during the recession. In the aftermath of the 
Great Recession and budget sequestration, Virginia’s job growth faltered 
when compared to that of the United States. Job growth in Virginia has, 
with few exceptions, been below that of the national average this decade. 
Focusing in on 2019, it appears that year-over-year job growth in the U.S. 
and Virginia is decelerating in the latter half of the year.
Graph 10 presents real average hourly earnings for Virginia and the 
United States for the period January 2007 to October 2019. While real 
average hourly earnings remained higher in Virginia than the nation, the 
gap between the Commonwealth and the U.S. has narrowed in recent 
years. It would appear that even with a tight labor market, workers in 
Virginia (on average) have not seen large increases in their paychecks 
in recent years. If labor markets are tightening in the Commonwealth, 
then we would reasonably expect that earnings would increase and likely 
outpace inflation.18 We are interested in real average hourly earnings 
because real earnings control for the impact of inflation. 
Economists continue to explore the puzzle of why real earnings have 
not risen faster in the current economic expansion. One possible 





and employers have used this development to restrain the growth in 
earnings. The growth of contract and informal employment and the 
decline of unions may also restrain wage growth. Automation plays 
a role here, as well, displacing workers and reducing their ability to 
negotiate for higher wages. Regardless of the reasons, this economic 
expansion has not led to the increases in earnings observed in previous 
periods of economic growth. Is this stagnation in workers’ earnings an 
aberration? We will have to wait a bit longer to get our answer to this 
question.  
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GRAPH 8
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS): 
VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2005 TO OCTOBER 2019




Seasonally Adjusted Nonfarm Payrolls (Jobs): Virginia, January 2005 to October 2019* 
 






















































































YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE IN SEASONALLY ADJUSTED NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS): 
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 2005 TO OCTOBER 2019





Year-Over-Year Change in Seasonally Adjusted Nonfarm Payrolls (Jobs): Virginia and the United States, January 2005 to October 2019 
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GRAPH 10
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED REAL AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS IN 2019 DOLLARS: 
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 2007 TO OCTOBER 2019
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019. The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers is used to obtain real average hourly earnings and is indexed to be 100 in January 2019. Data current as of Nov. 27, 2019, 




Seasonally Adjusted Real Average Hourly Earnings in 2019 Dollars: Virginia and the United States, January 2007 to October 2019 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019. The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers is used to obtain real average hourly earnings and is indexed to be 100 in January 2019. Data current as of Nov. 27, 2019, 
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Sectoral Growth In Virginia
Table 3 reveals that the share of private industries in real GDP grew 
from 80.1% in 2000 to 82.1% in 2018. The increasing contribution of 
private industries to economic activity in the Commonwealth suggests 
that the economy is slowly diversifying.19 
Table 3 also shows the contributions of each sector to real GDP for 2000, 
2010 and 2018. Two sectors – finance, insurance, real estate, rental and 
leasing, and professional and business services – accounted for nearly 40% 
of real GDP in Virginia in 2018. The professional and business services 
sector continued to increase in size, exceeding 20% of real GDP in 2018. 
The share of real GDP contributed by government and government 
enterprises in 2018 was almost 18%, down from 20% in 2000.
From 1997 to 2016, the government and government enterprises sector 
was the largest sector in terms of economic activity in Virginia. However, 
in 2017, the professional and business services sector eclipsed the 
government and government enterprises sector. In 2018, the finance, 
insurance, real estate, rental and leasing sector was approximately the 
same size in terms of economic activity as the government sector. The 
growth of these two sectors once again reflects the reality that changes in 
federal spending reverberate throughout Virginia.
Table 3 sheds light on the growth of professional and business services. 
Within this sector, employment grew rapidly in the professional, scientific 
and technical services sub-sector from 2000 to 2010, though it grew at 
a slower pace from 2010 to 2018. Administrative and support services 
growth slowed a bit from 2000 to 2010 but increased from 2010 to 2018. 
Management of companies and enterprises, while growing absolutely over 
time, has fallen as a percentage of nonfarm employment. One might expect 
this category to grow slower than total nonfarm employment, as these jobs 
tend to be highly skilled and well compensated.
Let’s compare this to the government and government enterprises sector 
as displayed in Table 3. Federal, state and local government employment 
19  We recognize that federal transfer payments to individuals (Social Security), federal payments for medical services (Medicare and Medicaid) and federal contracts to private businesses will increase the sectoral contributions of 
private businesses, even though the origination of this activity is the federal government.
were all higher in 2018 than 2000; however, military employment declined 
significantly over this period. Military employment fell from approximately 
168,000 in 2000 to about 152,000 in 2010, and then to approximately 
136,000 in 2018. The gains in federal, state and local employment offset 
these losses, but the slow growth in overall employment in this sector 
meant that Virginia’s share of total nonfarm jobs fell over the period. 
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TABLE 2
SECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO REAL GDP: 
VIRGINIA, 2000, 2010 AND 2018
SECTOR 2000 2010 2018
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
hunting
0.6% 0.4% 0.4%
Mining, quarrying and oil and gas 
extraction
0.9% 0.6% 0.4%
Utilities 1.7% 1.5% 1.5%
Construction 6.2% 3.5% 3.4%
Manufacturing 11.6% 9.6% 8.8%
Wholesale trade 4.7% 4.3% 4.5%
Retail trade 5.6% 5.1% 5.4%
Transportation and warehousing 2.8% 2.5% 2.5%
Information 3.8% 4.4% 4.3%
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental 
and leasing
16.7% 17.9% 17.8%
Professional and business services 13.0% 18.5% 20.5%
Educational services, health care and 
social assistance
5.9% 7.1% 7.4%
Arts, entertainment, recreation, 
accommodation and food services
3.7% 3.1% 3.0%
Government and government 
enterprises
20.0% 18.9% 17.9%
Addendum: Total private industries 80.1% 81.1% 82.1%
Addendum: Real GDP in millions of 
chained 2012 dollars
$346,161 $437,268 $476,388
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product by State, 2019. Table SAGDP9N Real GDP by State in millions of chained 2012 dollars.
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TABLE 3
SELECTED SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NONFARM EMPLOYMENT: 
VIRGINIA, 2000, 2010 AND 2018
INDUSTRY 2000 2010 2018
PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS SERVICES 16.1% 18.1% 18.5%


















































Addendum: Total nonfarm employment 4,337,959 4,689,327 5,275,447 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (2019). Table SA25N, Total Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS Industry. 
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A Rising Tide Of Federal 
Government Spending, 
Deficits And Debt
The presence of the federal government in Virginia ranges from 
government agencies and departments in Northern Virginia to aircraft 
carriers and military personnel stationed in Hampton Roads. For better 
or worse, Virginia’s economic performance is influenced by decisions about 
the size and scope of the federal government. It should be no surprise that 
a recent analysis by the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government 
(the State University of New York’s public policy research arm) estimated 
that Virginia ranks first for the net benefits it receives from the federal 
government.20
The Rockefeller Institute defined the balance of payments as federal 
spending in each state minus the amount of revenue paid by state residents 
and other economic agents to the federal government. A state with a 
positive balance of payments received more spending than its residents and 
businesses paid in taxes to the federal government (and vice versa). 
Table 6 displays the top five states in terms of the absolute balance of 
payments and per capita balance of payments. For fiscal year 2017, the 
Rockefeller Institute estimated that Virginia received approximately 
$87.2 billion more than its residents and business paid in federal 
taxes, or $10,301 per capita. Virginia’s estimated absolute net benefits 
from the federal government were almost twice that of the next state 
(Florida). On a per capita net payment basis, the Commonwealth 
“earned” almost $1,200 more than the next highest state, Kentucky. 
20 Laura Schultz and Michelle Cummings. “Giving or Getting? New York’s Balance of Payments with the Federal Government: 2019 Report,” Jan. 8, 2019, https://rockinst.org/issue-areas/fiscal-analysis/balance-of-payments-portal/.
21 The federal government defines a contract as an agreement between the federal government and a prime recipient to provide goods and services for a fee.
22 The federal government defines a direct payment as a cash payment made by the federal government to an individual, a private firm or another private institution.
23  The federal government defines a grant as an award of financial assistance from a federal agency to a recipient to carry out a public project or service authorized by a United States law. Unlike loans, grants do not need to be repaid. 
Most grants are awarded to state and local governments.
TABLE 4
TOP FIVE STATES IN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017








1 Virginia $87.2 Virginia $10,301
2 Florida $45.9 Kentucky $9,145
3 Kentucky $40.7 New Mexico $8,692
4 Maryland $36.5 West Virginia $7,283
5 North Carolina $34.5 Alaska $7,048
Source: Laura Schultz and Michelle Cummings, “Giving or Getting? New York’s Balance of Payments with the 
Federal Government: 2019 Report”
An award is defined as money the federal government has promised to 
pay a recipient. Funding may be awarded to a company, organization, 
government or individual. An obligation is a binding agreement between 
the federal government and the recipient of an award to spend the award 
now or in the future.
Contracts21 are typically the largest category of federal spending in 
Virginia, followed by direct payments22 and grants.23 Direct payments 
are typically made to individuals and are largely determined by law. The 
most common direct payment is Social Security. Since the law typically 
sets eligibility and payments that are made directly to individuals, direct 
payments are largely outside the purview of the annual budgeting process 
and are considered mandatory spending. Contracts and grants, on the 
other hand, are typically the result of an annual appropriations bill. 
Unlike mandatory spending, contracts and grants are (for the most part) 
determined on an annual basis and are considered discretionary spending.
27
Table 5 illustrates how federal funds flowed into the Commonwealth 
from FY 2015 to FY 2018. Contract spending continued to be the largest 
category of federal awards in Virginia, followed by direct payments. 
Regarding direct payments, most of these were to individuals; the Social 
Security Administration accounted for over 80% of all federal government 
direct payment expenditures in the Commonwealth in FY 2018. Per capita 
federal awards to the Commonwealth were $12,856 in FY 2018, higher 
than Maryland ($11,868), West Virginia ($9,339) and North Carolina 
($6,973).24
Graph 11 summarizes total federal awards, Department of Defense awards 
and non-DOD awards made to individuals or organizations in Virginia 
from FY 2008 to FY 2018. Total federal awards in Virginia rose by $10.6 
billion from FY 2016 to FY 2017 and $8.9 billion from FY 2017 to FY 
2018. It should be no surprise that the increasing levels of federal awards 
from FY 2016 to FY 2018 were closely correlated with improving economic 
growth in the Commonwealth. 
Of the $108.9 billion in total federal awards in Virginia in FY 2018, 
approximately 54% were for federal contracts ($58.3 billion), up slightly 
from approximately 53% of all federal awards in FY 2017 (Graph 12). Two 
observations emerge from the contract data. First, the level of federal 
contracts peaked in FY 2011 and declined through FY 2015. Total federal 
contract awards started to increase in FY 2016 and almost returned to 
the FY 2011 peak in FY 2018. Second, DOD contract awards declined this 
decade, falling almost 15% from FY 2011 to FY 2018. The most recent 
data suggest that contract awards continued to increase in FY 2019. If so, 
FY 2019 awards and, more specifically, contracts, will exceed the FY 2011 
peak. However, even if this were to occur, the real (inflation-adjusted) 
value of federal contracts in Virginia has declined this decade.
24 USAspending.gov. Data are current as of Oct. 21, 2019, and subject to revision. We note that the FY 2019 data continued to be revised, as the fiscal year concluded on Sept. 30, 2019, and thus are not included in the analysis.
TABLE 5
NOMINAL FEDERAL AWARDS IN VIRGINIA: 
BILLIONS OF NOMINAL DOLLARS, 
FISCAL YEARS 2015-2018*
YEAR FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018
Contracts $48.7 $50.6 $52.9 $58.3
Direct 
payments
$27.8 $29.5 $33.9 $35.4




$0.2 $0.3 $1.7 $1.7
Loans $0.6 $0.01 $0.1 $1.2
Total $87.0 $89.4 $100.0 $108.9
Source: USAspending.gov. Data are current as of Oct. 21, 2019, and subject to revision. *We note that the FY 
2019 data continued to be revised, as the fiscal year concluded on Sept. 30, 2019, and are not included in the 
table. Categories may not sum to the total due to rounding and miscellaneous awards. 
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GRAPH 11
NOMINAL TOTAL FEDERAL, DOD AND NON-DOD AWARDS: 
VIRGINIA, FY 2008 TO FY 2018*
Source: USAspending.gov. Data are current as of Oct. 21, 2019, and subject to revision. *We note that the FY 2019 data continued to be revised, as the fiscal year concluded on Sept. 30, 2019, and are not included in the analysis. 
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PH 1  
Nominal Total Federal, DOD and Non-DOD Awards: Virginia, FY 2008 to FY 2018* 
 
Source: USAspending.gov. Data are current as of Oct. 21, 2019, and subject to revision. *We note that the FY 2019 data continued to be revised, as the fiscal year concluded on Sept. 30, 2019, and are not included in 
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We also need to note that the federal government entered FY 2020 
under a continuing resolution (CR). A CR freezes spending levels (with 
some small variances) to those of the previous fiscal year and typically 
prohibits new program starts. The promised increases in DOD spending 
in FY 2020 require the timely passage of the DOD appropriations bill by 
Congress, else Virginia’s economy may enter 2020 in a weaker position 
than expected.
The recent agreement to extend the debt ceiling to mid-2021 and raise 
the discretionary spending caps, on the surface, is welcome news for 
the Commonwealth. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 set the national 
defense discretionary base budget authority cap at $647 billion for FY 
2019. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 then raised the national defense 
discretionary caps to $667 billion for FY 2020 and $672 for FY 2021.25 
These increases will lead to a rise in DOD expenditures on maintenance, 
operations, personnel and procurement in Virginia, assuming timely 
passage of the requisite appropriations acts. The question is: How long can 
the federal government sustain its current fiscal path? 
Graph 13 displays the Congressional Budget Office’s projections of the 
federal deficits for FY 2019 to FY 2029. Over the last several years, a 
series of bipartisan budget agreements has boosted discretionary spending, 
while mandatory spending has continued to rise as the population ages. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 reduced corporate taxes permanently 
and individual income taxes through the mid-2020s. The cumulative effect 
of these decisions has been a significant erosion of the fiscal position of 
the federal government. If nothing changes, the CBO projects the federal 
government will run trillion-dollar deficits through 2029.
Deficits and debt matter. It’s not a question of whether a recession will 
occur, but when it will occur. A slowing national economy will reduce 
revenue growth and increase demands for public services, swelling the 
federal deficit. At some point, the bill will come due and the federal 
government will have to increase taxes and cut expenditures to right its 
fiscal ship.
25 Congressional Research Service, “The defense budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently asked questions,” Sept. 30, 2019.
Federal spending is a cornerstone of the Virginia economy. As the 
past few years have demonstrated, increases in federal spending 
have helped Virginia’s economy pick up the pace. Yet, Virginia is also 
vulnerable to decisions (and tweets) emanating from Congress and the 
White House. The Commonwealth cannot and should not completely 
transition away from its reliance on federal government spending. 
Instead, it should seek out opportunities to encourage private-sector 




ACTUAL AND PROJECTED FEDERAL DEFICITS, 
FY 2019 TO FY 2029*
Sources: Congressional Budget Office (2019), Update to the Budget and Economic Output: 2018 to 2029, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Federal deficits in nominal dollars. Off-Budget 




Actual and Projected Federal Deficits, FY 2019 to FY 2029* 
 
Sources: Congressional Budget Office (2019), Update to the Budget and Economic Output: 2018 to 2029, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Federal deficits in nominal 
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Troubling Signs In 
Establishment Data
An establishment is the single physical location where business is 
conducted or where services or industrial operations are performed. A 
state’s economic activity is not only reflected in the value of output and the 
number of people employed by businesses, but also in whether the number 
of establishments is growing over time. States displaying robust economic 
growth will display gains in output, employment and establishments. 
States that are performing relatively poorly will display slow growth or 
declines in output, employment and establishments. 
At the start of the century, establishment growth in Virginia reflected 
improving economic performance. From 2000 to 2007, the number of 
establishments in Virginia increased over 14% (Graph 14). As one might 
expect, the number of establishments declined during the Great Recession, 
reaching its nadir in 2011. At the end of 2016 (the most recent data), there 
were still about 1,000 fewer establishments in Virginia than the peak 
observed prior to the Great Recession. 
More troubling is the relative decline of Virginia when compared to the 
United States. Table 6 illustrates that Virginia’s establishment growth was 
faster than that of the nation in previous decades. Not so for the current 
decade. The lackluster performance of the Virginia economy is apparent 
in the slow growth of the number of establishments. Given the recent 
upticks in economic activity in the Commonwealth, it may turn out that 
the number of establishments surged in the state in recent years. We will 
only be able to determine this in the coming years due to significant lags in 
the data.
TABLE 6
ANNUAL AVERAGE ESTABLISHMENT GROWTH, 
















Virginia 1.7% 1.1% 0.6%
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and 
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2019 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
34 VIRGINIA’S GROWTH IMPROVES IN UNCERTAIN TIMES■
Virginia Compared 
To Other States
Comparing Virginia’s economic performance with that of other states 
provides an objective benchmark of how the Commonwealth is doing. Yes, 
Virginia suffered through the blows of the Great Recession and federal 
budget sequestration, but other states could point to similar economic 
shocks. Table 7 illustrates that Virginia’s economic performance, as 
measured by growth in real GDP, fell from 20th in 2010 to a low of 47th in 
2014. Our recent surge in economic activity is reflected in the data, with 
the Commonwealth being ranked 20th in 2017 and 13th in 2018. Last year 
was the first time in over a decade that Virginia ranked among the top 15 
states in terms of economic performance.
What should also be clear from Table 7 is that some states (Alaska, North 
Dakota, Texas) experienced natural resource booms and busts this decade. 
North Dakota provides an illustrative example, with the highest rates of 
growth from 2010 to 2012 and the most significant rates of contraction 
from 2015 to 2017. Federal government spending acts in a similar fashion 
for the Virginia economy. The stagnation of spending in the early part of 
the decade constrained growth in the Commonwealth, while the recent 




ANNUAL REAL GDP GROWTH AND REAL GDP GROWTH RANKINGS: VIRGINIA AND SELECTED STATES, 2010-2018























































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Gross Domestic Product by State, Various Years.” Growth rates of real GDP are in parentheses.
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Of course, Virginia’s improvement in economic performance should not be 
entirely attributed to increases in federal government spending. While no 
measure of business climate is perfect, CNBC annually scores all 50 states 
on more than 60 measures of competitiveness. Although a state’s rank may 
fluctuate year to year, the trend over time is illustrative of whether the 
business climate is improving or deteriorating, relative to other states. 
Table 8 reveals that Virginia consistently ranked among the top three 
states from 2007 to 2012. The Commonwealth then proceeded to slide in 
the rankings, falling to 13th in 2016. As other states aggressively moved 
to improve their business climates, Virginia appeared to be satisfied with 
the status quo. Concerted action to address its business climate helped 
Virginia climb back into the top 10 in 2017 and the Commonwealth 
regained the top position in the rankings in 2019.
TABLE 8






2007 1 Virginia Alaska
2008 2 Texas Alaska
2009 1 Virginia Alaska
2010 2 Texas Alaska
2011 1 Virginia Rhode Island
2012 3 Texas Rhode Island
2013 5 South Dakota Hawaii
2014 8 Georgia Rhode Island
2015 12 Minnesota Hawaii
2016 13 Utah Rhode Island
2017 7 Washington West Virginia
2018 4 Texas Alaska
2019 1 Virginia Rhode Island
Source:  CNBC, “America’s Top States for Business, Various Years” 
Yet, the Commonwealth should not rest on its laurels. In Graph 15, we 
present individual rankings for the top four states in the 2019 CNBC 
index. Lower ranks reflect more desirable rankings. The Commonwealth 
ranked first in the workforce category but was outside the top 10 in the 
other primary categories. This is a change from 2018, when Virginia 
ranked first in infrastructure, first in economy and was in the top 10 in 
workforce and technology. A significant warning sign is the relatively poor 
ranking in the cost of doing business. It is certainly time for Virginia to 
examine its tax structure and determine whether there are taxes, such as 
the Business, Professional and Occupational License Tax (BPOL), which 
have significant variation across localities and could be readily replaced by 
a slight increase in the corporate tax rate.
A familiar story emerges from the CNBC rankings. Long-run 
investments in workforce development and infrastructure are more 
likely to pay off than massive bets on “one-off” projects. These patient 
policies establish the foundation for long-term growth. One only 
needs to look south to the success of the Research Triangle in North 
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Final Thoughts
Virginia is poised to grow for a fifth consecutive year and its growth may 
exceed 2% for the second consecutive year. Improvements in economic 
activity are reflected by growth in the labor force, individual employment, 
jobs and, to a lesser extent, real hourly earnings. The Commonwealth’s 
fiscal situation has continued to improve but, as Virginia Secretary of 
Finance Aubrey Layne noted earlier this year, a recession in the next 12 to 
18 months is “more likely than not.”26
As markets have become increasingly pessimistic about the prospects for 
growth in 2020, it is time for Virginia to take stock. The Commonwealth’s 
labor markets are at (or beyond) full employment and when 
appropriations bills are finally passed, the federal government is likely to 
spend more money in Virginia in FY 2020 than it did in previous fiscal 
years. One might look at the economic data and conclude that Virginia is 
poised to leap into the next decade. Another might look at the same data 
and conclude the leap could be off the proverbial economic cliff into a 
recession.
If there is one thing we can (hopefully) agree upon, it is that we live 
in uncertain times. Equities markets have been roiled by incomplete 
(or false) information about trade talks between China and the United 
States.27 Even though median household income in the nation reached 
almost $62,000 in 2018, income and wealth inequality continued to climb, 
reaching levels not seen in the past 60 years.28 While some will point to 
social media for much of the coarseness of our political discourse,29 history 
suggests that politics have always been personal.
The Commonwealth has performed well in recent years and should 
be commended for improving its business climate. Virginia, however, 
must resist the lures of quick fixes, whether it is casinos to address the 
fiscal shortcomings of local governments or publicly subsidized sports 
stadiums for professional sports franchises.
26  Fadel Allassan, “Virginia finance chief says recession likely: ‘We just need to be prepared,’” Virginia Mercury, Aug. 16, 2019, https://www.virginiamercury.com/2019/08/16/virginia-finance-chief-says-recession-likely-we-just-need-to-
be-prepared/.
27 Sarah Ponczek and Vildana Hajric, “Nonsense market moves have investors ‘exhausted’ by trade talks,” Bloomberg, Oct. 10, 2019.
28 Jacob Knutson, “U.S. income inequality surges to highest level in 50 years,” Axios, Sept. 26, 2019.
29 Jay David Bolter, “Social media are ruining political discourse,” The Atlantic, May 19, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/05/why-social-media-ruining-political-discourse/589108/.
30 Bryan Wendell, “Be Prepared: The origin story behind the Scout motto,” May 9, 2017, https://blog.scoutingmagazine.org/2017/05/08/be-prepared-scout-motto-origin/.
As we have noted, it would be more prudent to improve the regulatory 
climate, reform the tax system and make wise investments in 
infrastructure, rural broadband and K-12 education. These efforts 
will take time to bear fruit but will position Virginia for growth in the 
coming years. Patience is indeed a virtue when it comes to economic 
development. 
A storm is coming, and when we come through it, we will be different. 
How we prepare now for the storm will, in part, determine how 
resilient we are in times of economic trouble. Robert Baden-Powell, 
the founder of the worldwide Boy Scout movement, wrote that the 
motto of the Scouts was “Be Prepared.” When asked what they should 
be prepared for, he famously replied, “Why, for any old thing.”30 






If something could be shown to be and not to 
be at the same time, it would be intermediate 
between what purely is and what in every 
way is not, and that neither knowledge 
nor ignorance would be set over it, but 
something intermediate between ignorance 
and knowledge … and now the thing we call 
opinion has emerged.
– Plato, “The Republic, Book 5”
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D
iscerning the performance of Virginia’s 
metropolitan area economies may 
remind one of an introductory 
philosophy class in college. Much like Plato’s 
prisoners in the cave attempting to use shadows 
and sounds to determine the true nature of 
objects behind them, we must take pieces of 
information and attempt to understand the 
true nature of the metro area economies. While 
dim at first, the picture becomes clearer over 
time.
This decade has indeed challenged observers 
of Virginia’s metropolitan areas. The lingering 
aftermath of the Great Recession was 
multiplied in several metros by federal budget 
sequestration and the subsequent caps on 
federal discretionary spending.1 The evolving 
nature of the Commonwealth’s economy and 
shifts in population have concentrated output 
and population in the “urban crescent” of 
Hampton Roads, Northern Virginia and 
Richmond. If an independent observer in 
2015 opined on the prospects of Virginia’s 
regions, such declarations would likely have 
bent more toward pessimism than optimism. 
As more recent data have become available, 
these opinions would have gradually evolved, 
becoming increasingly, dare we say, hopeful.
1  For the purposes of this chapter, a metropolitan area conforms 
to the Office of Management and Budget’s 2018 delineations of 
metropolitan statistical areas. We do not include the Kingsport-
Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA, MSA in our analysis due to a lack of 
economic data. 
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Many of the economic performance indicators suggest that Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas are enjoying their third (or more) consecutive 
year of economic growth. Recently released data show that Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas grew in real (inflation-adjusted) terms in 2018, 
and individual employment has increased in each of the areas. The 
unemployment rate is below 3% across Virginia’s metros. Average 
wages grew in 2017, 2018 and in the first quarter of 2019. Although 
population growth was uneven across the metros, each was more 
populated in 2018 than in 2010. Putting these pieces of data together 
suggests that Virginia’s metros are generally in a better place than 
they were in 2015. 
Yet, the road ahead is neither straight nor lacking potential hazards. 
Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads are closely tied to the size and 
composition of federal government spending. Even though the federal 
government plans to spend more in 2020 than 2019 (especially on defense), 
the question remains: How long can these increases go on? Residents have 
continued to leave in pursuit of both better economic opportunities and 
quality of life in other states. While these losses are offset in some metro 
areas by international migration, whether the United States continues to 
be a welcoming home to international migrants remains an increasingly 
contentious question. The growing importance of services and the relative 
decline of agriculture and manufacturing in the Virginia economy call 
into question the economic base of some metro areas. These challenges 
await the new Virginia General Assembly and lawmakers at the local 
government level.
To explore how Virginia is faring at the metropolitan level, we examine a 
number of measures of economic performance: median household income, 
poverty, employment, wages and population. Each of these measures is 
available on a more frequent basis than gross domestic product (GDP) and 
they provide a more current picture of the economic activity in each metro 
area. We also present the most recent (but lagged) data for metropolitan 
area GDP. From these measures, we work to construct a clearer picture of 
the health of Virginia’s metro area economies.
2 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Bulletin-18-04.pdf.
3 U.S. Census Bureau (2019), American Community Survey, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about.html.
One difficulty in comparing metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) is that 
different government agencies and departments use different definitions 
for these areas. From the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), for example, 
some data are available for Northern Virginia, which is the Virginia 
portion of the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA. 
Other data from the BLS are only available for the entire Washington-
Arlington-Alexandria MSA. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
provides economic data on the performance of MSAs. However, the 
BLS, BEA and the U.S. Census may use a different basis to define which 
counties and independent cities are in specific MSAs. Individual MSAs 
also see additions and subtractions of counties and cities over time. In 
2018, for example, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) added 
Camden County in North Carolina, and Virginia’s Southampton County and 
city of Franklin to the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA.2 The 
reader should be aware of these geographical differences and exercise 
care when examining data from different sources, even if those sources 
are from the same department or agency.
Uneven Growth 
In Household Incomes
Between the decennial censuses, the U.S. Census Bureau conducts surveys 
of the nation’s population to learn more about where people are living 
and working, and what they are earning, as well as to get answers to a 
host of other questions. The American Community Survey (ACS) is one 
such product, surveying more than 3.5 million Americans each year.3 The 
responses not only inform us of the changing nature of the U.S. population, 
but also are used to distribute hundreds of billions in federal and state 
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dollars each year. Given the substantial lags in data relating to economic 
activity (a subject we touch on later in this chapter) at the metropolitan 
and county levels, we draw upon data from the ACS to see how Virginia’s 
metros have fared so far this decade. 
Table 1 presents real (inflation-adjusted) median household income for 
Virginia and its metropolitan areas. From 2010 to 2018, real median 
household income in the United States increased by 7.2%, reflecting 
improving economic conditions. Over the same period, Virginia’s real 
median household income increased only by 3.6%, mirroring the anemic 
performance of the Commonwealth’s economy in the first half of the 
decade. Four metro areas (Blacksburg, Charlottesville, Lynchburg and 
Winchester) saw gains in real median household income that exceeded the 
national average, and another four exceeded the state average (Richmond, 
Roanoke, Staunton and Washington, D.C.). Only one metro, Hampton 
Roads, saw almost no change in real median household income this decade.
Of interest is the 21% growth in median household income in the 
Winchester MSA. Graph 1 presents real median household income from 
2010 to 2018 for this metro area. What should be readily apparent is 
that real household income in the Winchester metro area has been quite 
volatile. In fact, this area had the highest measure of variability for real 
median household income from 2010 to 2018 among Virginia’s metros, 
suggesting that we should pay more attention to the overall trend rather 
than one specific year.4 
What lessons can be taken from the real median household income 
data? First, the data can be volatile, especially in less populated 
metropolitan areas where sample sizes may be small. Second, almost 
all of Virginia’s metros had increases in real median household income 
this decade, but Virginia and several metro areas lagged the nation. 
This suggests that non-metro areas of Virginia performed poorly 
relative to the state’s metro areas. The variation in household incomes 
also supports the argument that economic development in Virginia
4  We estimate the standard deviation of real median income for each metropolitan area. The standard deviation for the Winchester-Waynesboro MSA was $5,382, significantly higher than the next metro (Blacksburg = $3,638) and 
the larger metro areas, all of which had standard deviations under $2,500.
should take regional variations into account. Improving primary and 
secondary education, expanding access to broadband and continuing 
to make wise investments in infrastructure are necessary to promote 
economic development across the Commonwealth.
TABLE 1
REAL MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS: 
2010, 2018 AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE FROM 2010 TO 2018, 





United States $57,762 $61,937 7.2%
Virginia $70,029 $72,577 3.6%
Blacksburg $46,314 $50,313 8.6%
Charlottesville $65,567 $71,052 8.4%
Harrisonburg $52,155 $53,046 1.7%
Lynchburg $47,608 $51,143 7.4%
Richmond $63,855 $67,703 6.0%
Roanoke $52,595 $55,151 4.9%
Staunton* $49,767 $52,625 5.8%





Winchester $53,815 $65,170 21.1%
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 American Community Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas 
Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. We estimate the real value of median 
household income in 2019 dollars using the BLS’s research price index with a base date of January 2019. For 
more information about the research price index, see https://www.bls.gov/cpi/research-series/home.htm. 
Hampton Roads is the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA and Washington-Arlington-Alexandria is 
the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA. *Data for the Staunton-Waynesboro MSA are for 
2013 instead of 2010, due to data availability.
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GRAPH 1
REAL MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS: 
WINCHESTER METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA, 2010-2018
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 American Community Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. We estimate the real value of median household income in 
2019 dollars using the BLS’s research price index with a base date of January 2019.
GRAPH 1 
Real Median Household Income in the Past 12 Months: Winchester-Waynesboro Metropolitan Statistical Area, 2010-2018 
 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 American Community Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. We estimate the real value of median 





































































Poverty In Virginia’s 
Metro Areas
A growing economy should lead to a reduction in the number of people 
living in poverty. That, in a nutshell, is the argument for policies to 
promote economic growth. The Census Bureau establishes dollar values 
for poverty, which vary by family size and composition. Via the Census and 
ACS surveys, the Census Bureau asks respondents about their income in 
the previous 12 months. If a family’s total income is less than the dollar 
value of the appropriate threshold, then that family and every individual 
in it are classified as being in poverty.5
Table 2 presents estimates of the percentage of persons living in poverty in 
Virginia’s metropolitan areas in 2010 and 2018, as well as the percentage 
of households receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP) benefits (more commonly known as food stamps). In Virginia and 
the U.S., both the number of individuals in poverty and the percentage of 
households receiving food stamp benefits have fallen this decade.
Across Virginia’s metropolitan areas, the picture is somewhat blurry. In 
some metros, the percentage of individuals in poverty increased from 2010 
to 2018. In other areas, the changes in the poverty rate were relatively 
small and within the margin of error (Blacksburg, for example). In still 
other areas, the changes in the poverty rate were sufficiently large to 
conclude that an increase or decrease did occur. 
It should be no surprise that the poverty rate and the percentage 
of households receiving food stamp benefits are highly correlated. 
Surprisingly, though, with the exceptions of Lynchburg and Roanoke, 
the percentage of households receiving food stamps is largely 
unchanged across Virginia’s metropolitan areas. Why? Real incomes 
have not grown dramatically over this economic expansion. More 
Virginians are working now than ever before, but their earnings have 
not risen significantly this decade. 
5  We estimate the number of persons in poverty using the 2018 1-year ACS data. For consistency, we use national estimates from ACS data instead of the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement. For more information, see https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/acs-1year.html.
TABLE 2
POVERTY RATE AND HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING FOOD STAMPS IN 
2010 AND 2018, VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 













United States 15.3% 13.1% 11.9% 11.3%
Virginia 11.1% 10.7% 8.6% 7.9%
Blacksburg 22.2% 22.5% 8.0% 8.4%
Charlottesville 12.3% 13.9% 6.8% 6.4%
Harrisonburg 19.9% 16.4% 7.4% 7.4%
Lynchburg 16.2% 14.6% 13.7% 10.3%
Richmond 11.6% 11.3% 9.8% 9.2%
Roanoke 13.7% 13.4% 10.8% 9.2%
Staunton* 11.3% 12.0% 8.9% 10.2%




8.4% 7.6% 5.9% 6.5%
Winchester 12.5% 12.6% 7.8% 7.9%
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 American Community Survey, and the Dragas Center for Economic 
Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Hampton Roads is the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News 
MSA and Washington-Arlington-Alexandria is the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA. 
*Data for the Staunton-Waynesboro MSA are for 2013 instead of 2010, due to data availability.
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Labor Markets Show Signs 
Of Growth In 2019
Are more people working in Virginia’s metropolitan areas? There are 
two broad measures we can examine to answer this question: individual 
employment and nonfarm payrolls (jobs). Employment data capture 
responses by individuals to the questions of whether they are employed, 
looking for work or have abandoned attempts at finding employment. 
Nonfarm payroll data measure the number of jobs there are in an 
economy. A person who has two jobs would appear once in the employment 
data but twice in the jobs data.6 One of the advantages of labor market 
data is that this information is more current than many other measures of 
economic activity.
Let’s look first at the individual employment data. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) asks people about their employment status. If an 
individual is employed or looking for work, the BLS reports that he or 
she is in the labor force.7 If a metropolitan area economy is growing, this 
should be reflected in the labor force data. 
For most of the current decade, there has not been consistent growth 
in the civilian labor force across Virginia’s metropolitan areas. In 2018, 
the civilian labor force expanded in some metro areas (Charlottesville, 
Richmond, Staunton, Hampton Roads, Northern Virginia and Winchester) 
and contracted in others. The story appears to have changed, however, 
in 2019. Data through October 2019 suggest that there were more people 
working or looking for work in Virginia’s metros than for the same period 
in 2018.
6  The Current Population Survey (CPS) covers households and asks whether an individual was employed or actively seeking employment. The Current Establishment Survey (CES) covers businesses and reports the number of jobs. An 
individual who is employed with two jobs would be counted once in the CPS and twice in the CES.
7  The civilian labor force consists of employed persons and unemployed persons. The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines employed individuals as “persons who did any work for pay or profit during the survey reference week; persons 
who did at least 15 hours of unpaid work in a family-operated enterprise; and persons who were temporarily absent from their regular jobs because of illness, vacation, bad weather, industrial dispute, or various personal reasons.” 
The BLS classifies individuals as unemployed “if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work. Persons who were not working and were waiting to be recalled to a job 
from which they had been temporarily laid off are also included as unemployed.” For more information, see https://www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm.
Graph 2 displays the annual growth in individual employment for 
Virginia’s metropolitan areas for 2017 and 2018. Individual employment 
points to an uptick in economic activity. More people reported that they 
were employed in 2017 than 2016, and likewise in 2018 than 2017. The 
growth in employment, however, has tapered in 2019.
One factor that may have contributed to the slower pace of individual 
employment growth is the relative absence of slack in metropolitan 
area labor markets. Because individual employment has grown faster 
than the civilian labor force, unemployment rates have declined 
across Virginia’s metros over the past year. Graph 3 illustrates that 
by October 2019, unemployment rates had fallen below 3% across 
the metros and several were approaching 2% unemployment. For 
Virginians in the labor force, the prospects of finding a job or moving 
to a new job are quite favorable. The challenge for Virginia businesses 
is to find skilled labor in an environment where almost everyone in the 
labor force is gainfully employed. 
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GRAPH 2
ANNUAL CHANGE IN INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 2017 AND 2018
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GRAPH 3
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, OCTOBER 2018 AND OCTOBER 2019
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, non-seasonally adjusted data, October 2019. Hampton Roads refers to the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA. Northern Virginia refers to the Virginia 
portion of the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA.
GRAPH 3 




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, seasonally adjusted data, November 2019. Hampton Roads refers to the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA. Northern Virginia refers to 
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The slowdown in the growth of individual employment in 2019 echoes the 
challenge of the national and state economies: finding a sufficient number 
of workers to sustain economic growth. Labor force participation rates 
have not recovered from the Great Recession across the Commonwealth. 
As the number of unemployed individuals in the labor force has declined 
(which is good news), the growth in individual employment has faltered 
because disaffected workers have not rejoined the labor force in large 
numbers (which is bad news). The aging of the workforce, a spatial 
mismatch between available workers and opportunities, the impact of the 
opioid crisis and the impact of an expanded social safety net on reservation 
wages8 may inhibit labor force participation. The challenge moving 
forward is how to re-engage these disaffected workers, once again, so that 
they become productive members of society. 
Are There More Jobs In 
Virginia’s Metropolitan 
Areas?
The most accurate estimates of job growth come from the BLS Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). The QCEW captures about 
98% of all wage and salary jobs in the United States, where jobs are 
defined as full- or part-time positions that are covered by state and federal 
unemployment insurance law.9 A drawback of the QCEW is that the data 
arrive with a significant lag, usually five to six months after the end of the 
quarter. 
Table 3 presents job growth for Virginia’s metropolitan areas in 2017 
and 2018. Also shown is the job growth rate for the first quarter of 2019 
compared to the same period in 2018. While the jobs data lack a coherent 
story in 2017, each of Virginia’s metros exhibited job growth in 2018. The 
8  The reservation wage is the lowest wage rate at which an individual is willing to accept employment. Lizhong Peng, Xiaohaio Guo and Chad Meyerhoefer (2018) found that Medicaid expansion has led to a “statistically significant 
decrease in employment of 1.3 percent one year after Medicaid expansion. This disemployment effect is transitory and appears to primarily occur in low-wage sectors. In particular, employment returns to pre-expansion levels within 
two years.” In other words, immediately after Medicaid expansion, reservation wages appeared to temporarily increase. For more information, see https://www.nber.org/papers/w25105.
9 For more information, see https://www.bls.gov/cEw/.
TABLE 3





Blacksburg 0.1% 1.4% 1.2%
Charlottesville 2.2% 1.4% 1.2%
Harrisonburg 1.2% 0.6% 1.6%
Lynchburg 0.7% 0.8% 1.1%
Richmond 1.3% 0.8% 1.2%
Roanoke -0.5% 0.5% 0.3%
Staunton -0.5% 1.4% 2.0%
Hampton Roads 1.1% 1.3% 0.4%





Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2019. Data reflect year-
over-year percentage change, except for 2019 Q1, which represents the percentage change from 2018 Q1. 
Hampton Roads refers to the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA. Northern Virginia refers to the 
Virginia portion of the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA.
first-quarter data for 2019 suggest that the job growth has continued, 
although at a slower pace for some metro areas.
While the QCEW presents the most accurate jobs data, it is, as previously 
noted, subject to considerable lag. We can examine the BLS’s Current 
Establishment Survey (CES), which uses a sample of employers to 
estimate job gains and losses in the United States. While the CES is more 
current than the QCEW, it may be less accurate and subject to significant 
revisions, as it relies on a sample of employers in contrast to the QCEW, 
which captures almost all employers in the country. The BLS, for example, 
recently announced that the preliminary national estimate of nonfarm 
payrolls for March 2019 would be revised downward by 501,000 jobs 
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(-0.3%) in 2020.10 Sometimes these revisions go back several years and can 
lead to different conclusions regarding the health of job markets.
The CES data suggest that job growth has slowed in some metropolitan 
areas in 2019 to the same period last year (Blacksburg, Richmond, 
Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia). In other metros, job growth has 
accelerated in 2019 (Charlottesville, Harrisonburg, Lynchburg, Roanoke, 
Staunton and Winchester).
With over 80% of all metropolitan area jobs and approximately 70% 
of all jobs in the Commonwealth, Northern Virginia, Hampton Roads 
and Richmond typically drive job growth in Virginia. If job growth 
slows in these areas, it will typically slow for the Commonwealth. What 
explanations are there for the apparent slowdown in hiring?
There are two possible explanations for slowing job growth in the 
larger metropolitan areas. First, economic activity may be slowing. 
However, individual employment is growing, job growth was positive in 
the first quarter of 2019 and increases in federal spending should have 
boosted economic activity, especially in Northern Virginia and Hampton 
Roads. Second, as we suggested earlier, job growth may be slowing 
because employers are unable to find qualified employees to fill vacant 
positions. Reports from employers indicate that this may indeed be the 
case. National-level data indicate that voluntary job quits were at a 
postrecession high in July 2019. The number of open positions in the U.S. 
reached a postrecession high in January 2019 and remained near historic 
levels through the summer of 2019. 
The national-level data also reveal more nonfarm job openings 
than unemployed individuals. In other words, there were more open 
positions than people looking for work. In October 2019, there were 
more than 1.2 job openings per unemployed individual in the United 
States. Virginia’s unemployment rate also was 2.7% in October 2019. 
At the metro level in Virginia, unemployment rates are below 3% and 
approaching 2% in some areas. 
10 For more information, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, “CES Preliminary Benchmark Announcement,” Aug. 21, 2019, https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cesprelbmk.htm.
Metropolitan Area Wages
With labor markets having tightened across the Commonwealth, one 
might expect that wage growth has followed suit. Nationally, real wages 
have increased this decade, but at a significantly slower pace when 
compared to earlier economic expansions. The tepid growth in wages for 
many Americans has led to calls for raising the federal minimum wage to 
$15 an hour, expanding the social safety net and increasing taxes on high-
income and high-wealth taxpayers. We ask whether there is evidence of 
wage growth in Virginia’s metropolitan areas.
We turn again to the QCEW to obtain the most accurate estimates of 
wage growth. Table 4 presents growth in total nominal wages from 2016 
through the first quarter of 2019. Several observations emerge from the 
data. First, nominal (not adjusted for inflation) wages have increased over 
time in each of the Commonwealth’s metropolitan areas. Second, wage 
growth appears to be sustained over time in some areas. Average wages 
increased by more than 3% in Charlottesville, Harrisonburg, Lynchburg 
and Winchester in 2017, 2018 and the first quarter of 2019. Even though 
average wages only increased by 0.5% in Blacksburg in the first quarter of 
2019, this is on the heels of a 6.2% increase in 2018.
Overall, the labor market data suggest that economic activity improved 
in Virginia’s metropolitan areas in 2018 and into 2019. More 
Virginians were working or looking for work in the fall of 2019 than 
in the fall of 2018. Unemployment rates across Virginia’s metros 
continued to decline in 2019 and were approaching 2% in several 
metros in October 2019. Total and average wages have shown signs of 
growth, as one might expect with increasingly tight labor markets. The 
challenge now is finding enough skilled workers to sustain economic 
growth into 2020. 
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TABLE 4
GROWTH IN TOTAL NOMINAL WAGES IN VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN 
AREAS, 2016, 2017, 2018 AND 2019 Q1
2016 2017 2018 2019 Q1
Blacksburg 1.2% 2.9% 6.2% 0.5%
Charlottesville 2.0% 6.0% 4.3% 3.3%
Harrisonburg 3.3% 3.1% 4.5% 3.9%
Lynchburg 1.9% 3.8% 3.2% 3.7%
Richmond 2.5% 4.7% 2.7% 1.7%
Roanoke 2.4% 0.9% 3.1% 3.9%
Staunton 3.5% 3.1% 4.7% 3.4%
Hampton Roads 1.2% 3.8% 3.5% 2.2%
Winchester 4.0% 5.1% 4.1% 5.1%
Northern Virginia 2.9% 4.2% 4.3% 1.9%
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2019. Data reflect year-
over-year percentage change, except for 2019 Q1, which represents the percentage change from 2018 Q1. 
Hampton Roads refers to the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA. Northern Virginia refers to the 
Virginia portion of the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA.
Changes In Population
Even though Virginia’s economic performance lagged that of the nation for 
much of the decade, the percentage increase in Virginia’s total population 
was greater than that of the nation. As illustrated in Table 5, from 2010 to 
2018, Virginia’s total population increased by 6.2%, 0.4 percentage points 
more than the United States. As with much of the data in this chapter, the 
picture is less clear at the metropolitan area level.
Population increased more in a number of metros than in the 
Commonwealth as a whole or the nation. Among the smaller metros, 
Charlottesville, Harrisonburg and Winchester grew appreciably faster 
than the state. For the larger metropolitan areas, Richmond and Northern 
Virginia grew faster than the state and nation. Roanoke and Hampton 
Roads were among the slowest-growing metros in the state from 2010 to 
2018.
TABLE 5
TOTAL POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN TOTAL 
POPULATION, VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS, 




United States 309,326,085 327,167,434 5.8%
Virginia 8,023,680 8,517,685 6.2%
Blacksburg 178,501 184,029 3.1%
Charlottesville 218,978 235,232 7.4%
Harrisonburg 125,398 135,277 7.9%
Lynchburg 252,981 263,353 4.1%
Richmond 1,209,896 1,306,172 8.0%
Roanoke 308,593 314,172 1.8%
Staunton 118,311 123,007 4.0%




Winchester 128,675 139,810 8.7%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 Population Estimates. Hampton Roads consists of the Virginia portion of 
the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA and Northern Virginia consists of the Virginia portion of the 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA. We use the 2018 Census geographical delineation files 
to assign counties and independent cities to the Virginia portion of Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia.
Table 6 displays the components of population change for Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas from 2010 to 2018. The U.S. Census Bureau breaks 
population change into two broad components: the natural increase in the 
population and net migration. The natural increase in the population is 
equal to births minus deaths. Net migration consists of domestic migration 
and international migration. For example, if more people move into a metro 
area from other countries than depart the metro area for other countries, 
then net international migration is positive (and vice versa). Turning first 
to the Commonwealth, the natural increase in the population from 2010 
to 2018 was positive, indicating that more Virginians were born than died 
during this period. Even though net domestic migration was negative, it was 
more than compensated by net positive international migration. 
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TABLE 6
COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE, 2010-2018: 











United States 10,714,959 -- 7,694,370 18,409,329
Virginia 314,663 -62,763 263,741 515,641
Blacksburg 1,073 -655 5,387 5,775
Charlottesville 5,332 4,629 6,655 16,531
Harrisonburg 3,846 1,900 4,341 10,056
Lynchburg 1,869 5,237 3,671 10,694
Richmond 37,299 33,664 27,235 98,083
Roanoke -677 649 5,730 5,702
Staunton -134 3,760 918 4,511
Hampton 
Roads
71,855 -61,005 36,759 47,444
Northern 
Virginia
217,172 -43,627 167,095 342,540
Winchester 3,183 6,282 1,889 11,957
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 Population Estimates. Hampton Roads consists of the Virginia portion of 
the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA and Northern Virginia consists of the Virginia portion of the 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA. We use the 2018 Census geographical delineation files 
to assign counties and independent cities to the Virginia portion of Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia. 
The total change in the population includes a residual estimated by the Census Bureau. Data current as of 
Nov. 27, 2019, and subject to revision.
Graph 4 reveals that the annual level of net international migration 
was positive for Virginia from 2010 to 2018. Net international 
migration peaked in 2015 but has declined in each succeeding year. 
It appears that the Commonwealth has been an attractive destination 
for individuals moving from other countries. As illustrated in Table 6, 
international migration has offset domestic outmigration in Northern 
Virginia and partly offset domestic outmigration in Hampton Roads.
More troubling is that net domestic migration for Virginia was 
negative from 2010 to 2018. Examining the annual data in Graph 5, 
we find that net domestic migration was positive from 2010 to 2013. 
From 2014 to 2018, however, more Virginians left for other states 
than residents of other states came to Virginia. Only two metropolitan 
areas, Washington-Arlington-Alexandria and Hampton Roads, 
experienced net domestic outmigration during this period. Let’s take a 
look at the annual data for these two metro areas.
Graph 6 displays the components of population change and the change in 
total population for the Virginia portion of Hampton Roads from 2010 to 
2018. While the Hampton Roads population has grown this decade, the 
annual growth has been paltry. The largest increase in the population 
came in 2012, when it increased by 11,073 (less than 1% of the total 
population). More recently, the natural increase in the population fell from 
its high of 10,133 in 2012 to 6,553 in 2018. 
Turning to migration, international migration has been positive every 
year this decade and domestic migration has been negative every year. 
In two years, international migration was sufficient to offset domestic 
outmigration (2012 and 2014). In the other years, thousands more 
residents of Hampton Roads left for other domestic destinations than 
arrived from international locales. Relatively poor economic performance 
this decade appears to have contributed to the slow rate of population 
growth in Hampton Roads. 
A different story emerges for the Northern Virginia portion of the 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria metropolitan area in Graph 7. The 
natural increase in the population, with the exception of 2010, has been 
above 20,000 individuals annually. While net domestic migration was 
positive from 2010 to 2013, it turned negative in 2014 and has remained 
negative since. The good news is that net international migration has 




NET INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: 
VIRGINIA, 2010-2018
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 Population Estimates
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GRAPH 5
NET DOMESTIC MIGRATION: 
VIRGINIA, 2010-2018
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 Population Estimates
GRAPH 5 



































COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE AND CHANGE IN TOTAL POPULATION: 
VIRGINIA PORTION OF THE HAMPTON ROADS MSA, 2010-2018
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 Population Estimates. Hampton Roads consists of the Virginia portion of the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA. We use the 2018 Census geographical delineation files to assign counties and 
independent cities to Hampton Roads.
GRAPH 6 
Components of Population Change and Change in Total Population: Virginia Portion of the Hampton Roads MSA, 2010-2018 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 Population Estimates. Hampton Roads consists of the Virginia portion of the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA. We use the 2018 Census geographical delineation files to 
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GRAPH 7
COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE AND CHANGE IN TOTAL POPULATION: 
VIRGINIA PORTION OF THE WASHINGTON-ARLINGTON-ALEXANDRIA MSA, 2010-2018
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 Population Estimates. Northern Virginia consists of the Virginia portion of the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA. We use the 2018 Census geographical delineation files to assign 
counties and independent cities to Northern Virginia.
GRAPH 7 
Components of Population Change and Change in Total Population: Virginia Portion of the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria MSA, 2010-2018 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2018 Population Estimates. Northern Virginia consists of the Virginia portion of the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, MSA. We use the 2018 Census geographical 
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Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads present a tale of two metros. 
Northern Virginia’s economic performance, while not stellar, has been 
largely positive this decade. Hampton Roads, until recently, has struggled 
to generate economic growth. Job growth and rising incomes attracted 
international migrants to offset the outflow of residents in Northern 
Virginia and partly offset domestic outmigration in Hampton Roads. The 
challenge for both metro areas is to stem the outflow of residents to other 
locations. For Northern Virginia, this challenge partly rests on the matter 
of the cost of living. For Hampton Roads, the challenge largely rests on the 
region’s ability to generate economic growth in the coming years. 
Real Gross Domestic 
Product: Waiting For 
New Data
Table 7 presents real (inflation-adjusted) rates of growth for gross 
domestic product, a measure of economic activity. The U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) produces the national, 
state, metropolitan area and county estimates of GDP, which provide a 
benchmark for economic activity over time. The metro area estimates, 
especially those for 2018, should be viewed with an abundance 
of caution. Why? The BEA released the “advance” estimates for 
metropolitan-area GDP for 2018 in December 2019. The next revision 
to these estimates will be in December 2020, when the BEA releases 
the advance estimates for 2019 and revises its previous estimates. 
With such a lag, we advise the reader to examine the underlying trends 
and focus less on the estimates for a specific year, which are likely to 
change in the next release. 
The data released in December 2019 suggest that economic growth has 
continued across Virginia’s metros. In fact, 2018 was the first year 
in the decade that all of Virginia’s metros exhibited positive economic 
growth. This good news is tempered by the realization that only the 
Charlottesville metro area has grown at approximately the same rate 
as the nation over the decade. The remaining metros have lagged, some 
considerably, behind the nation’s economic performance.
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TABLE 7
REAL (INFLATION-ADJUSTED) GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: 
YEAR-ON-YEAR RATES OF GROWTH, 2010-2018 
VIRGINIA’S METROPOLITAN AREAS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES
Blacksburg Charlottesville Harrisonburg Lynchburg Richmond Roanoke Staunton
Virginia Beach 
- Norfolk - 
Newport News
Washington 





2010 0.6% 3.9% -1.4% 2.7% 2.4% 1.3% 1.4% 0.1% 4.2% 4.7% 2.7% 2.6%
2011 3.9% 1.1% -1.7% -1.5% 2.9% 0.4% -3.9% -1.1% 2.2% -0.7% 1.0% 1.6%
2012 0.5% 2.9% -0.5% -2.7% 2.2% -0.2% -5.4% -1.1% 0.8% -2.1% 0.8% 2.2%
2013 0.8% -1.5% 1.8% -0.4% 1.9% 1.4% 1.8% 0.6% -0.5% -1.4% 0.4% 1.8%
2014 1.5% 1.6% -0.5% -0.7% -0.5% -0.5% 0.7% -0.9% 0.9% 0.0% -0.2% 2.5%
2015 3.4% 4.3% -0.1% 0.6% 2.2% 2.1% 3.0% 1.7% 2.3% 3.8% 2.0% 2.9%
2016 0.2% 2.3% -0.8% -0.5% 0.0% -2.2% 0.0% -0.6% 2.3% 0.7% 0.4% 1.6%
2017 1.6% 4.4% 3.2% 0.8% 1.9% -0.3% 2.9% 1.1% 1.5% 2.6% 1.8% 2.4%
2018 3.8% 2.2% 1.4% 2.5% 1.9% 2.2% 1.2% 2.2% 2.7% 2.8% 2.6% 2.9%
CAGR 2.0% 2.1% 0.4% -0.3% 1.5% 0.4% 0.0% 0.2% 1.5% 0.7% 1.1% 2.2%




If one were to borrow a title from Charles Dickens, the most recent story 
of Virginia’s metropolitan areas might be “Great Expectations.” While 
the first half of the current decade saw lackluster economic growth at the 
state and regional level, more recent data suggest that there was an uptick 
in economic activity in 2018 and 2019. However, growth is not distributed 
evenly across the metro areas, but the signs, for now, are largely positive.
Increases in defense spending will drive economic growth in Hampton 
Roads and Northern Virginia over the coming months. Many of the 
smaller metropolitan areas are exhibiting signs of robust economic 
activity. More individuals are employed, and jobs are up across Virginia’s 
metros. Unemployment rates are below 3% and workers have seen some 
moderate increases in their pay. The challenge appears to be a lack of 
workers to sustain job growth. Whether higher reservation wages due to 
the social safety net, disability rates, the opioid crisis — or all these factors 
combined — are playing a role in low labor force participation is worthy of 
further discussion.
Each year we ask what the future holds. If Congress is able to pass 
appropriations bills in a timely manner in 2019, then increases in federal 
spending through September 2020 are likely to boost the fortunes of those 
metropolitan areas closely tied to the federal government. Increasing 
uncertainty about these bills and the country’s ongoing trade conflicts are 
dampening prospects for 2020, however, and Virginia’s metros may enter 
the new year facing substantial headwinds. Barring an unexpected shock, 
a reasonable conclusion is that growth will also slow in Virginia and 
among its metro areas in 2020.
Virginia can act to improve regional outcomes. We continue to offer 
the following suggestions. Targeted investments in infrastructure 
are necessary to promote economic development and attract new 
businesses. Improving the quality of education, including investments 
in physical infrastructure, is necessary to produce a workforce that 
can compete in an increasingly globalized economy. 
Virginia’s antiquated tax structure must be reformed to compete with 
neighboring states. Regulatory relief, or at least regulatory clarity, 
is also a necessary component of economic growth. Lastly, regional 
collaboration should not just be a slogan. Virginia should continue 
to promote regional collaborations through efforts like GO Virginia. 
These recommendations may not be new, but until the Commonwealth 
acts, they bear repeating. Here’s hoping that there are those 






The funded status of the VRS plans has 
improved in recent years, in part because of 
strong investment performance.
–  Joint Legislative Audit and Review 
Commission, December 2017
The VRS is actuarially sound.




ublic pension funds for state employees 
should, to paraphrase an old English 
proverb, be seen and not heard. Yet, this 
decade has seen a rising tide of dire warnings 
about state pension funds in the United States. 
The Pew Charitable Trusts estimated that 
at the end of 2018, state pension funds were 
underfunded by an estimated $1.5 trillion and 
that the problem is likely to get worse in the 
coming years.1
Why? Many state pension funds assume that 
they can generate returns far in excess of 
the market. Doing so lessens the demands on 
state and local budgets today but increases the 
unfunded liabilities of the pension funds in the 
future. Not only do some funds assume they 
can beat the market, they may also understate 
their liabilities. When the bill comes due, 
states and localities are going to have to make 
hard choices. Should they increase taxes, 
decrease spending on schools, police and other 
functions, or reduce retirement benefits for 
state and local government employees, or some 
combination of all of the above?
It is natural, therefore, to spend some time 
assessing the circumstances and performance 
of the Virginia Retirement System 
(VRS), which manages the assets in the 
Commonwealth’s public employee retirement 
systems.
1   Pew Charitable Trusts, “The State Pension Funding Gap: 2017,” 




2019 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
62 THE VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM: ASSESSING ITS CHALLENGES AND CHARTING ITS FUTURE■
Our work in this chapter is an independent, noncommissioned, 
noncompensated analysis of specific issues relating to the VRS. The 
available evidence suggests that the VRS has been well managed and has 
outperformed many state pension funds. Fortunately for the members of 
the VRS and the taxpayers of Virginia, the VRS has avoided most of the 
difficulties that have afflicted many other state pension plans.  
Our work benefited immensely from face-to-face conversations with VRS 
officials. We did not always find ourselves in agreement with the views of 
the VRS on all issues, but one must credit the VRS for its willingness to 
engage and to respond to our queries. More public agencies should emulate 
it in this regard.
We suggest four policy changes that would improve the performance of 
the VRS, reduce the likelihood that the Commonwealth will confront 
serious problems in the future and ultimately benefit its participants.2 
One of these changes would have the VRS rely more on low-cost, 
indexed public equity investments instead of paying analysts to actively 
manage the same funds. If the VRS had followed this strategy, we 
estimate it could have earned an additional $3.4 billion on its public 
equity portfolio between 1992 and 2017. There may be additional gains 
from indexing other segments of the VRS portfolio, but we do not deal 
with those possibilities in this chapter.
Some Background
The VRS manages and invests pension funds sent to it by public bodies 
in Virginia. On March 31, 2019, the VRS served more than 722,000 
members, retirees and beneficiaries and held $80.4 billion in net assets. 
VRS payments to recipients included $4.75 billion in retirement benefits 
and another $416 million in other postretirement benefits.3 The VRS 
ranks as the 15th-largest public pension systems in the United States.
Because the VRS is overseen by the Virginia General Assembly, it often 
ends up having to play the financial cards dealt it by legislators. These 
2 A July 9, 2018, audit of the VRS by GRS Retirement Consulting declared the VRS “actuarially sound,” file:///H:/State%20of%20the%20Commonwealth%202018/Pensions/VRS%20Audit%20July%209,%202018.pdf. 
3 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (July 2019), http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt521-2.pdf.
4 Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Annual Report, 2018.
cards historically included inadequate funding by the General Assembly 
of the state’s public employee pension plans. Consequently, the VRS is 
“underfunded”; that is, its current asset holdings, prudently invested, are 
insufficient to produce the income required to meet anticipated future 
obligations. On June 30, 2018, the market value of the assets held by 
the VRS was equal to only 78.1% of its actuarially accrued liabilities.4 
On the plus side, however, the General Assembly has, in recent years, met 
its financial obligations to its pension funds. The General Assembly also 
(wisely, in our view) established an independent board to govern the VRS. 
There is widespread agreement that the independent board has improved 
the management and performance of the VRS, enabled it to attract and 
retain superior personnel, and increased its reputation among lawmakers, 
financial professionals and the public.
The General Assembly determines what kind of public employee 
retirement benefits Virginia offers. In recent years, it has exercised 
its authority to move the Commonwealth away from exclusive reliance 
upon “defined benefit” pension programs (that guarantee participants 
specific future benefits) toward hybrid programs that include both 
defined benefit provisions and “defined contribution” provisions. Under 
defined contribution programs, the Commonwealth places pension 
contributions into accounts that the participants subsequently own. The 
Commonwealth’s financial liability ends there, a circumstance that is not 
true when employees are in defined benefit programs. In the latter case, 
the Commonwealth is obligated to fund previously agreed upon benefits 
over what sometimes can be long time periods.   
Most new VRS participants, except for hazardous duty employees, 
now are automatically enrolled in the hybrid retirement plan. The 
federal government and the private sector moved in this direction some 
years ago. Now, all but a few private-sector employers provide defined 
contribution programs rather than defined benefit programs. While 
defined benefit pension programs contain some attractive features for 
both the Commonwealth and participants, they have become the source of 
significant fiscal stress in numerous states because the financial obligations 
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of the states to employees carry on long into the future. Defined benefit 
plans threaten to bankrupt states, such as Illinois. Hence, moving Virginia 
away from defined benefit pension programs is a change essential to the 
future fiscal stability of the Commonwealth and its local government units.
While each state has its own distinctive pension fund, there are common 
characteristics among these funds. Funds that have encountered financial 
difficulties have done so because of one or more of the following decisions:
1.  Overly generous pension and attached health care provisions 
benefitting public employees,
2.  Generous cost-of-living adjustments that exacerbate funding 
challenges,
3.  Grossly inadequate funding of pension obligations by governors and 
legislatures,
4.  Overly optimistic rate of return assumptions for their investable assets 
that match neither experience nor the likely future, and
5.  Excessive investment of assets in costly actively managed funds that 
have performed poorly relative to the overall market.  
If there is a lesson here, it is that problems in state pension funds 
characteristically are ignored by those in power, build slowly over time 
and then emerge as full-blown crises. Timely action now on the part of the 
Commonwealth can reduce the risk that the VRS might drift into trouble 
in the future. Attempting to address the vulnerabilities of the VRS will be 
more difficult when the next economic recession inevitably appears.
5 Information provided in a communication from the VRS to Old Dominion University’s Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy.
6 Virginia Retirement System, “Actuarial Valuation of Political Subdivisions,” (June 30, 2017).
Virginia’s Public Employee 
Pension Systems
The Commonwealth maintains six different public employee pension 
systems: (1) the system that serves most state government employees, who 
are or were located in 227 state agencies; (2) the system that serves about 
600 special governmental authorities, cities, towns and school divisions; 
(3) the state teachers’ retirement system, which is the largest of the six; 
(4) the state police officers’ retirement system (SPORS); (5) the Virginia 
law officers’ retirement system (VaLORS); and (6) the judicial retirement 
system (JRS). The VRS manages all state pension funds, whose individual 
members (current or prospective retirees) totaled more than 722,000 in 
March 2019.
Graph 1 reports the net asset positions at the end of the 2018 fiscal year 
for each of the major pension systems that comprise the VRS. The VRS 
invests the money sent to it by jurisdictions that range from towns, cities 
and counties to school districts and economic development agencies. The 
combined assets of the different systems are invested jointly. However, 
the VRS only can invest funds that it receives from local government 
bodies. If an employer does not fully fund its contractual obligations to 
its current and former employees, then this is a problem that will accrue 
to the employer instead of the entire VRS system. According to the VRS, 
the average funding level of local government pension systems managed 
by the VRS was 92.2% in summer 2018.5 However, funding levels varied – 
from the town of Haysi in Dickenson County, having assets valued at only 
42.34% of its anticipated obligations; to Loudoun County, at 91.39%; to 
Newport News, at 125.69%.6
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GRAPH 1
EMPLOYERS’ NET PENSION LIABILITY OF THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM  
(BILLIONS OF $)
Source: Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Annual Report (June 30, 2018)
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Income pensioners receive from the VRS comes from two primary 
sources: (1) the financial contributions of workers and employers covered 
by the VRS; and (2) the income earned by the VRS from the assets it 
invests. Nationally, investment earnings typically provide about 61% of 
promised benefits, but were 67% for the VRS in 2016. Higher investment 
income percentages can reflect greater investment success or lower 
contribution levels, or both.7  
Unfunded Liabilities
At first glance, the financial economics associated with pension funds 
are simple. Employers and employees contribute money to a fund that 
invests those funds to support payments to the employees, typically when 
they retire. To the extent that employers make more generous financial 
promises than they can keep to their employees concerning the size and 
duration of their retirement stipends, then employers and their employees 
either must contribute more money, or higher rates of return must be 
earned on the funds being invested on behalf of the employees. In Virginia, 
the benefits VRS participants receive are determined by state statute.
When the funds on hand to deal with anticipated future retirement 
obligations are insufficient to meet those obligations, then this is called 
an unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) in pension fund parlance. 
“Anticipated” is an important modifier in the previous sentence.  Among 
other things, the moneys that must be paid out by pension funds depend 
on the salaries that employees will earn, when employees choose to retire, 
whether they are eligible by statute to claim disability, and how long they 
live. Alas, none of these events can be known with certainty.  
7  National Association of State Retirement Administrators, “Public Pension Plan Investment Return Assumptions” (February 2018), www.nasra.org/files/Issue Briefs/NASRAInvReturnAssumptBrief.pdf, and the Virginia Retirement 
System, “VRS Stress Test and Sensitivity Analysis” (June 2017).
8 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018.
9 https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2019/06/the-state-pension-funding-gap-2017.
Roughly two-thirds of Americans have left the labor force by age 66, and 
half leave the labor force between ages 61 to 65. Retirement ages tended 
to decline in the United States until the economic reverses of the Great 
Recession and changes in Social Security eligibility altered the calculations 
for many individuals. Data from the U.S. Census’ 2018 American 
Community Survey tell us that the average retirement age for Virginians 
was 65.  
The lengthening life span of Americans poses a significant challenge to the 
viability of many state pension funds. The expected life span of a newly 
born baby was 70.8 years in 1970 but had risen to 78.6 by 2017.8 Simply 
put, when pension recipients live longer, a larger asset base is required to 
take care of them.  
Public employee pension funds in most states have UAALs. Graph 2 
reveals that as of June 30, 2018, the VRS had a UAAL in excess of $19.7 
billion. Stated differently, the market value of the VRS’s assets was 
78.1% of its UAAL on that date. The 78.1% funding ratio represented a 
significant increase from the low of 60.1% on June 30, 2009, and a 4.7% 
increase from June 30, 2017. Now is not the time to declare victory, as a 
significant gap remains between assets and liabilities.
Things also could have been much worse. According to the Pew 
Charitable Trusts’ most recent report on state pension funds,9 states 
reported $4.1 trillion in liabilities and $2.9 trillion in assets in 2017. 
On average, states had only 69% of the assets needed to fully fund 
their pension obligations. Kentucky’s funding level was only 34% 
in 2017, and four other states (Colorado, California, Illinois and 
New Jersey) were below 50%. Only eight states had sufficient assets 
to cover 90% of their obligations, while 24 states were below 70% 
funding.
The VRS has not always been actuarially underfunded. From 2000 to 
2002, it possessed assets that exceeded 100% of its estimated future 
actuarial financial obligations. Several developments altered this. First, 
the rates of return earned by the VRS fell. The 16-month meltdown 
2019 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
66 THE VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM: ASSESSING ITS CHALLENGES AND CHARTING ITS FUTURE■
in equity prices that began in October 2007 played a significant role.10 
Second, the VRS reduced its rate of discount two times during the 
succeeding decade (a point we discuss below), and this amplified its 
estimated future obligations. Third, enhanced benefits increased the VRS’s 
obligations. Fourth, the Commonwealth failed to contribute the VRS 
board’s actuarially determined contributions.  
This final point is important. From 1993 to 2018, the General 
Assembly fully funded its own agreed-upon, legally required pension 
contributions to statewide retirement systems only six times (2001, 
2005, 2006, 2016, 2017 and 2018). In 2003, the General Assembly 
made no contribution at all. From 1992 to 2016, the average level of 
annual funding compared to the amount required by statute during 
this period was 72%.11 The modicum of good news is that the General 
Assembly fully funded its contributions in the most recent three years 
and is poised to do so again in 2019. Weakening economic growth and, 
consequently, state revenues, may place this streak in jeopardy in the 
near future.
The VRS reports that if the Commonwealth had made the contributions 
required of it by statute, then the VRS now would have almost 90% of its 
estimated future actuarial financial obligations rather than the current 
79%.12 This is a major reason why the gap between the market value of 
VRS assets and its actuarial accrued liability expanded (as one can see in 
Graph 2) during and after the Great Recession. The pension fund reforms 
begun by the General Assembly in 2010, plus more favorable investment 
results, have begun to redress this situation.
Nationally, there is broad agreement that state expenditures on Medicaid 
and pensions have crowded out expenditures on other items, such as 
education and transportation. The Wall Street Journal reported in 2018 
that the proportion of state and local tax revenues devoted to Medicaid 
and public-sector pensions was the highest in almost 60 years.
10 The S&P 500 Index fell from 1,516.80 on Oct. 12, 2007, to 735.09 on Feb. 13, 2009. 
11 Virginia Retirement System, “VRS Stress Test and Sensitivity Analysis” (June 2017).
12 This statement was included in a communication from the VRS to Old Dominion University’s Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, dated July 6, 2018.
13  Cezary Podkul and Heather Gillers, “Why Are States So Strapped for Cash?  There Are Two Big Reasons,” The Wall Street Journal (March 29, 2018), www.wsj.com/articles/why-are-states-so-strapped-for-cash-there-are-two-big-
reasons-1522255521.
14 Pew Charitable Trusts, “The State Pension Funding Gap 2017,” June 27, 2019.
15 Virginia Retirement System, “VRS Stress Test and Sensitivity Analysis” (December 2018), https://www.varetire.org/Pdf/Publications/VRS-Stress-Test-and-Sensitivity-Analysis-2018.pdf.
Two-thirds of all additional revenues went to fund Medicaid and 
pensions between 2008 and 2016. In 2016, city and state governments 
spent about $105 billion on public employee pensions, dramatically up 
from about $29 billion in 2001.13 
Increasing pension liabilities and funding gaps not only command a 
greater share of public resources (when states are faced with a pension 
crisis), but also time and attention. Facing significant funding gaps, 
pension contributions increased 424% in Illinois, 267% in Kentucky and 
more than 100% in New Jersey from 2007 to 2017.14 Even with these 
increases, pension funding gaps continued to increase in each of these 
states.
The General Assembly recognized this possibility and related public 
employee pension issues when it created the Virginia Commission 
on Employee Retirement Security and Pension Reform in 2016. The 
commission has issued several recommendations consistent with the 
analysis presented in this chapter. The new commission also recommended 
legislation that would codify existing VRS practice to perform and publish 
the results of stress tests that assess the system’s financial viability under 
a variety of economic scenarios. These reports were released in June 
2017 and December 2018.15 Thus, it is fair to say that neither the General 
Assembly nor the VRS has been ignoring the challenges in front of them.  
What is needed now is additional action.  
67
GRAPH 2
MARKET VALUE OF SYSTEM ASSETS AND ACTUARIAL ACCRUED LIABILITY IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS: 
VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 2008-2017
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Evaluating The 
Performance Of The VRS
Public pension funds exist for a variety of reasons, some of which are not 
strictly economic. Management guru Peter Drucker is one of many who 
have argued that pension contributions by employers instill a sense of 
belonging in employees and increase their morale.16 Improved morale may 
increase employee productivity, lower turnover and, ultimately, improve 
the bottom line.     
It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the morale of 
participants in the VRS.  Instead, in evaluating VRS performance, we will 
focus on three variables: (1) the rates of return earned by the VRS on the 
funds entrusted to it; (2) the variability of those rates of return; and (3) 
the cost expended in achieving its performance. In a nutshell, we will ask: 
What is the average rate of return earned by the VRS, how variable has 
been that return and what has been the cost of achieving such? 
One should understand that tradeoffs nearly always exist among the three 
criteria. Usually, it is not possible to increase rates of return on investable 
funds without also assuming additional risk. The other side of this coin is 
that it is very difficult to reduce investment risk without also sacrificing 
some return. Further, some investment strategies are more expensive to 
implement than others. Complicating this relationship is that one may 
not necessarily buy improved performance by paying skilled investment 
advisers to provide advice and counsel. 
It is vital to recognize that an infinite number of return/risk/cost 
combinations exist. No single one of these combinations can be said to 
be absolutely “right” unless one has clearly identified preferences with 
respect to risk and return. For example, is it better to realize an average 
rate of return of 9% that is highly variable, or a 7% average rate of return 
that is quite stable?
Some pension fund choices effectively are predetermined. Suppose a public 
pension fund must earn at least a certain rate of return, say 7%. From the 
16 His views are expressed in “Manage with Courage,” the Drucker Institute (Sept. 28, 2018), www.drucker.institute/news-post/manage-with-courage.
outset, this eliminates a set of conservative investment options. Stability 
of the returns earned on invested funds might also be an important 
criterion. It may be unacceptable for a pension fund to realize an average 
rate of return of 7% over a 10-year period via boom or bust strategies that 
generate 20.0+% rates of return in some years, but -5% rates of return in 
other years.   
VRS management and its board of trustees ultimately choose (perhaps 
implicitly) a desired return/risk/cost combination. Presumably, this choice 
reflects the VRS’s evaluation of accumulated past economic history as well 
as its estimates of future developments. Of course, subsequent economic 
fluctuations may result in the VRS, or any pension fund, experiencing a 
return/risk/cost combination very different from the one it selected.
Retrospectively, however, one can evaluate the results of any investment 
strategy and stack it up against known alternatives. Hindsight continues 
to be wonderful. On occasion, one might discover that identical results 
(say, a 7% certain rate of return) could have been obtained with less 
volatility than actually experienced, or perhaps achieved at a lower cost. 
This knowledge might inform a different set of choices in the future, 
though not necessarily. Consider the significant decline in public equity 
prices that occurred from 2007 to 2009, or the run-up in public equity 
prices that occurred subsequently. These were wrenching, but not 
necessarily unusual events. Making future investment decisions based on 
spells such as these could lead to less than optimal decisions if the same 
circumstances aren’t duplicated in the future. 
After-the-fact analyses of what the VRS or any investor should have 
done – had they known what was going to happen – are revealing, but not 
necessarily definitive, or always subjectively fair. Decision makers must act 
when required to do so and face uncertainty when they choose their course 
of action. On the other hand, if one focuses on choices that might have 
been made, and these alternatives consistently are superior to the choices 
made, then this dissonance is worthy of attention. 
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We argue that the tendency of the VRS to downplay the superior rates 
of return and lower costs of many index funds over the past 10 to 25 
years is a prime example. The VRS argues that the period 2008-2018 
featured unusual economic conditions. Additionally, the VRS points 
out that the performance of the indexed public equity funds often 
has been more volatile than that of the total VRS portfolio. These 
points are legitimate, yet questions remain. Were the costs of actively 
managed funds offset by improved returns and increased stability or 
did the VRS pay too much for too little return relative to index funds?
17  Michael Martz, “Virginia pension contribution rates likely to rise as investment returns decline,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 2019.
18  See “Observations,” http://observationsandnotes.blogspot.com/2009/03/average-annual-stock-market-return.html, for Dow Jones Industrial Average rates of return data.
The Assumed Rate Of Return
How does the VRS know how well its asset portfolio will perform in the 
future and will this be enough for the VRS to meet its obligations? The 
answer is, it doesn’t, but neither does any other pension fund. The world 
is full of uncertainties. We could witness a stock market crash like the 
22.61% single-day decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in 1987, or 
once again experience 17% average mortgage rates as we did in 1981.  
The VRS does not know what is going to happen in the future and 
therefore must make astute, educated assumptions about how asset 
markets are going to behave. Prior to 2010, the VRS assumed it would 
average a 7.5% rate of return. Until October 2019, the VRS assumed 
its assets portfolio would average a 7% rate of return. However, the 
VRS board recently approved lowering a reduction in its assumed 
rate of return to 6.75%. This action is conditional on approval of the 
General Assembly and the governor in 2020.17
The 7% rate of return assumption may have been too generous. True, since 
1900, the average total rate of return (assuming reinvested dividends) on 
the equities in the Dow Jones Industrial Average has been approximately 
9.4% (about 4.8% in price appreciation and 4.6% from reinvested 
dividends). A problem is that this growth has been uneven. The 1965 
closing value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average was 969; it was not until 
1982 that this value was permanently eclipsed. Between 1929 and 2017, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average declined in 21 of these 88 years.18   
The obligations of public pension funds, however, do not diminish or end 
because the stock market has tanked. Consequently, pension funds such 
as the VRS must diversify their asset holdings so they can have greater 
confidence that their assets will generate income even if the stock market 
is in agony. Historically, this usually meant using some funds to invest in 
U.S. government bonds. Assets such as U.S. government bonds are almost 
universally regarded as among the most secure investments in the world.  
Risk of default is extremely low.
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A problem is that bond yields typically reside well below the rates of 
return on investments in equities. Since 10-year U.S. government bond 
yields peaked at 16.81% in September 1981, they generally have declined 
since, and in late summer 2019, the yield on 10-year U.S. government 
bonds hovered around 1.5%.19 Hence, if one desires safety and security, this 
need can be satisfied, but usually one must settle for lower rates of return. 
Graph 3 provides annual average yields on 10-year U.S. government 
bonds over the past 30 years. The vertical distance between these yields 
and the 7% VRS rate of return assumption visually depicts the nature 
of the challenging task confronting the VRS. This challenge is only 
slightly reduced if the VRS’s assumed rate of return is lowered to 6.75%. 
Faced with a long-term decline in yields for U.S. government bonds, the 
VRS must find ways to generate more significant returns. It does so by 
assuming risk, albeit knowledgeably and after due consideration.   
Ultimately, the rates of return earned on investments reflect the sum 
of the real rate of return on capital (for which we will use the 10-year 
U.S. government bond as a proxy) plus a risk premium on the collections 
of assets in which one invests. Larry Summers, the former chair of 
the President’s Council of Economic Advisors and former president of 
Harvard University, notes that real yields on inflation-adjusted 10-year 
U.S. government bonds have declined about 300 basis points over the 
past 10 years. He argues that investors (including pension funds) who 
believe they can earn 7% on a consistent basis are deluded. He opines 
that expected rate of return assumptions made by pension systems should 
be substantially lower today than they have been in the past; that is, 
lower than 7%.20 The recent declines in U.S. government bond yields only 
magnify this conclusion. 
In 2019, a growing consensus emerged in Virginia that the VRS’s 
assumed rate of return of 7% was a “bridge too far,” echoing, to some 
extent, the conclusion of Professor Summers. The VRS’s auditing firm, 
GRS Retirement Consulting, and Commonwealth Secretary of Finance 
19 “Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates,” www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/pages/textview.aspx?data=yield.
20  Summers made these observations at a National Bureau of Economic Research Conference, “New Developments in Long-Term Asset Management,” held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, May 19-20, 2018. His specific comments can be 
found at https://vimeo.com/270659949.
21  Steven Haner, “State Employees Not Funding Their Own Retirement,” Bacon’s Rebellion (July 9, 2018), https://baconsrebellion.com/state-employees-not-funding-own-retirement. Michael Martz, “Virginia Retirement System Hits 7 
Percent Investment Target for Year, But Target Could Change,” Richmond Times-Dispatch (July 9, 2018), www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/virginia-retirement-system-hits-percent-investment-target-for-year-
but/article_e4599466-d4ba-5fe3-830b-e419d3f1c58b.html. Michael Martz, “VRS Raises Investment Return to 7.5 Percent for Last Fiscal Year, Beating Recent Estimate But Still Falling Short of Its Goal,” Richmond Times-Dispatch 
(Aug. 29, 2018), www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/general-assembly/vrs-raises-investment-return-to-percent-for-last-fiscal-year/article_95f05aa9-37a7-5bbb-82c9-7fdc22ef2858.html.
Aubrey Layne noted the need to examine whether the VRS should lower 
its assumed rate of return.21 The adoption of the 6.75% rate of return by 
the VRS board in October 2019 was another step in this direction. Given 
that a lower assumed rate of return will require additional contributions 
from the Commonwealth’s budget, we now await action by the General 
Assembly and Gov. Ralph Northam. 
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GRAPH 3
TEN-YEAR CONSTANT U.S. TREASURY CONSTANT MATURITY RATES: 
ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1988-2019*
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), DGS10. *For 2019, the 10-year U.S. Treasury constant maturity rate is the average of the rate of the monthly rate data through August 2019.
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The Actual Rates Of Return
How well has the VRS performed in terms of the rates of return it has 
earned on its assets? The answer depends on whom one asks and how 
one asks the question. The VRS provides different data and metrics 
over dissimilar time periods than some external authorities, such as the 
Pew Charitable Trusts, whose recent studies of state pension funds have 
captured much attention. Further, one must be careful to differentiate 
between the rates of return earned by the VRS on its public equity 
portfolio and those earned on its entire portfolio of assets, which include 
investments in other types of assets.
In a July 6, 2018, communication to Old Dominion University’s Dragas 
Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, the VRS criticized the Pew 
Trust’s choice of a 2006 to 2015 period as “cherry picking” and in face-
to-face sessions contended that 15- to 25-year time horizons are more 
appropriate. VRS argues “apples and oranges” with respect to Pew’s 
data and says Pew defines its rates of return differently than does the 
VRS.  Regardless, if Larry Summers is on target and the United States 
has entered a period when interest rates and rates of return are going to 
remain below previously accustomed levels, then the rates of return the 
VRS likely can earn will decline. 
Graph 4 shows annualized rates of return reported by the VRS on its total 
assets over a variety of time periods ending on June 30, 2018. These data 
tell us that the VRS often has earned more than the 7% it assumes, but 
also that the last decade was a trying one. The VRS Oversight Report 
dated December 2017 revealed that the VRS earned an average rate of 
return of only 4.9% on its asset portfolio for the 10-year period ending 
Sept. 30, 2017.22 
22 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (December 2017), p. 2, file:///H:/State%20of%20the%20Commonwealth%202018/Pensions/JLARC%20Report%20on%20VRS%20Dec%202017.pdf.
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GRAPH 4
ANNUALIZED RATES OF RETURN EARNED BY THE VRS 
ON ITS ASSET PORTFOLIO FOR PERIODS ENDING JUNE 30, 2018
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The Pew Charitable Trusts, focusing on a different period (2006-2015), 
and perhaps utilizing different definitions, placed the VRS firmly in the 
middle of a 73-pension fund sample with an average rate of return that 
rose to 5.9%. Pew also provides information that allows us to compare the 
performance of the VRS with respect to other public pension funds over 
one-year, five-year and 10-year rates of return periods. Graph 5 displays 
these data, which include a 6.66% rate of return for the VRS between 
2006 and 2015 as compared to a 6.6% average rate of return for 73 public-
sector funds. 
On Sept. 8, 2019, the VRS announced that it had realized a 6.7% rate of 
return for FY 2019. The private equity investment program had an annual 
return of 14%, followed by fixed income at 8.3% and real assets at 7.8%. 
The public equity program, however, only returned 3.9% and the multi-
asset public strategies program lagged with a return of 2.2%. The VRS 
reported that the trust fund ended with approximately $82.3 billion in 
assets.23
The VRS’s rate of return performance improves if one adopts a 25-year 
time horizon rather than the 10-year vantage seen in Graph 5. As noted, 
many at the VRS believe (and we concur) that the past 10 years have been 
atypical and that this helps explain the underwhelming 6.1% rate of return 
for the 10-year period ending June 30, 2018.24 VRS professionals believe 
that the unprecedented, almost decade-long period of monetary easing 
witnessed in the United States after the Great Recession constitutes a 
financial aberration. They contend that quantitative easing favored public 
equity market performance and do not think that a similar investment 
environment is likely to reoccur in the foreseeable future. This is one 
reason why VRS personnel prefer to evaluate their performance looking 
backward for 25 years rather than adopting a 10- or 15-year perspective. 
However, the VRS’s annual reports continue to stress 10-year rates of 
23 Virginia Retirement System, “VRS Realizes 6.7% Return for Fiscal Year 2019,” https://www.varetire.org/news/2019/vrs-realizes-6.7-percent-return-for-fiscal-year-2019.asp.
24 Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Report, 2018, p. 134.
return on its investments (see, for example, the investment section of the 
VRS 2018 annual report). If 25-year rates of return are the coin of the 
realm, then they should be given greater visibility in the VRS reports.
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GRAPH 5
VRS ANNUALIZED RATES OF RETURN: PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS ESTIMATES, 2006-2015
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How Has The VRS Fared 
Compared To The 
Overall Market?
Let’s adopt a 25-year time horizon. Consider the adjusted price per 
share of a specific no-load, low-cost mutual fund that imitates the entire 
U.S. public equity market. Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index Fund 
(VTSMX) grew at an annual average rate of 9.29% between June 1992 and 
June 2017.25 Vanguard reports that the annual cost of VTSMX was 0.14%, 
thus the net cost annual average rate of return was 9.15%. Determining 
the net cost return of the stock market index allows a comparison with 
VRS’s public equity portfolio.
Table 1 compares the performance of Vanguard’s Total Stock Market 
Index Fund with VRS’s Public Equity portfolio from June 1992 to June 
2017.26 Over this period, the annual rate of return of VRS’s public equity 
portfolio was 8.56%, approximately 0.59% less than Vanguard’s Total 
Stock Market Index Fund. One could argue that this is not an equal 
comparison since VRS’s public equity portfolio holds non-U.S. equity 
assets, thus we caveat that our comparison approximates differences in 
rates of return.
Nevertheless, as illustrated in Table 1, Vanguard’s Total Stock Market 
Index Fund outperformed VRS’s public equity portfolio over every 
reported time period from 1992 to 2017. Recent data reinforce this 
observation, as Vanguard’s Index rose 14.7%, compared to 9.7% for 
the VRS public equity portfolio from June 2017 to June 2018. These 
differences are not trivial. 
From 1992 to 2017, the average holdings of VRS’s public equity 
investments were approximately $23.1 billion and we estimate the 
25 The adjusted price per share is from the last business day of June of the respective years. We calculate the compound annual growth rate to obtain the average annual rate of return.
26 We choose this time period to maintain consistency with the annual performance data provided graciously by the VRS for the Total Fund and Public Equity portfolio.
27  Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Reports, Investment Section, Various Years. This is a rough calculation based on the VRS having average public equity holdings of $23.1 billion over the 25-year period. 0.73% 
of $23.1 billion is $168.63 million and 25 years * $168.63 million = $4.22 billion.  
28  Mark Perry, “More evidence that it’s very hard to ‘beat the market’ over time, 95% of finance professionals can’t do it,” AEI Ideas (March 20, 2018), http://www.aei.org/publication/more-evidence-that-its-very-hard-to-beat-the-
market-over-time-95-of-financial-professionals-cant-do-it.
29  The MSCI ACWI Investable Market Index (IMI) says it captures large, mid and small cap representation across developed markets (DM) and emerging markets (EM) countries. With 8,498 constituents, the index is comprehensive, 
covering approximately 99% of the global equity investment opportunity set, www.msci.com/documents/10199/4211cc4b-453d-4b0a-a6a7-51d36472a703.
foregone rate average annual rate of return was 0.59% after taking 
into account expenses.27 The VRS may have foregone $3.4 billion 
in returns by not indexing its public equity investments. We must, 
however, note that this estimate varies significantly year to year. 
We also must recognize that a stock market index fund may be more 
volatile than the VRS would prefer and that there is a recognizable 
tradeoff between risk and reward.
We provide some risk-adjusted analysis in Table 2. The VRS has 
graciously provided us data for a 25-year period, but we must point 
out that this period ends in 2017. The more volatile nature of VTSMX 
returns mitigates some of the differential, but this sum remains a steep 
price to pay for presumed risk aversion because the risk-adjusted rates 
of return on VRS public equity and VTSMX are almost identical. Since 
approximately one-third of all VRS assets are invested in public equity 
(and about 80% of this in domestic stocks), the VTSMX (or a similar) 
index seems an appropriate opportunity cost metric against which the 
VRS should be measured.     
Some might view hedge funds as an alternate way for the VRS to generate 
enhanced returns. However, indexed public equity funds such as those 
offered by Fidelity and Vanguard have outperformed all but a few actively 
managed hedge funds, not just over the past decade, but now over the past 
15 years, including a half decade when monetary easing was not present.28  
Further, this performance differential has held true with respect to many 
kinds of hedge funds: small cap, mid cap and large cap. This diminishes 
the attractiveness of hedge funds.
Some VRS personnel assert that over long periods of time, the cumulative 
return on its assets has been higher than a passively invested 70% 
equities/30% bonds mix, or the S&P 500 or the MSCI ACWI Investable 
Market Index (which captures global equity investments).29 Table 2 
explores this contention based on available data.
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TABLE 1
ANNUAL RATES OF RETURN: 
VANGUARD’S U.S. STOCK MARKET FUND (VTSMX) AND VRS TOTAL FUND AND PUBLIC EQUITY PERFORMANCE, 1992-2017
3 YEARS 5 YEARS 10 YEARS 15 YEARS 20 YEARS 25 YEARS
PERIOD 2014-2017 2012-2017 2007-2017 2002-2017 1997-2017 1992 - 2017
Vanguard VTSMX 
Return (Gross)
10.20% 14.46% 7.69% 9.34% 6.98% 9.29%
Vanguard VTSMX 
Return (Net of Fees)
10.06% 14.32% 7.54% 9.20% 6.84% 9.15%
VRS Public Equity 
Return
6.33% 11.64% 4.54% 7.84% 6.38% 8.56%
Net Difference 3.87% 2.68% 3.0% 1.36% 0.46% 0.59%
Sources: Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Financial Report, Various Years, and VRS communication to the Old Dominion University Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy. Annualized returns for periods ending 
June 30 of the respective years. Daily share price data for VTSMX obtained from Yahoo Finance. The daily adjusted price per share for the last business day of June is used to calculate the compound annual growth rate (CAGR). 
Vanguard reports an expense ratio of 0.14% and this is deducted from the estimated CAGR to obtain a net of fees rate of return.
TABLE 2
COMPARING RATES OF RETURN, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND SHARPE RATIOS  
FOR VARIOUS ASSET GROUPS, 1992-2017




VALUE OF $100 
AFTER 25 YEARS
VRS Total Fund 8.34% 8.84% 0.943 $740.83
VRS Public Equity 8.56% 14.04% 0.610 $779.37
MSCI ACWI IMI Total World 7.19% 11.20% 0.642 $567.36
FUSEX S&P 500 9.07% 15.61% 0.581 $876.26
Passive 70/30 7.65% 10.63% 0.720 $631.46
VTSMX Total U.S. Market 9.29% 15.07% 0.616 $921.53
Sources: VRS data are from the VRS, MSCI and FUSEX, and VTSMX data are from Yahoo Finance. MSCI, FUSEX and VTSMX means and standard deviations are computed on the basis of annual averages rather than annualized 
monthly averages. MSCI data have 0.25% annual expenses deducted, while the comparable deductions are 0.09% for FUSEX, 0.10% for 70/30 and 0.14% for VTSMX. 
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One can see in Table 2 that the 25-year compound average annual rate 
of return on the VRS total fund portfolio trailed that of the other asset 
groups described in Table 2; however, the standard deviation of the VRS’s 
returns over the 25 years was also substantially less than the other asset 
groups. This means that the returns on VRS’s total portfolio were less 
variable than those earned by the other asset groups.Over the 25-year 
(1992-2017) period examined, VRS’s investment strategies resulted in a 
substantially higher modified Sharpe Ratio for its total fund than was true 
for all other asset groups. Sharpe Ratios measure return obtained per unit 
of risk assumed.30 The data in Table 2 reveal retrospectively that the VRS 
has done well in terms of generating return per unit of risk in the realm of 
public equity. This is long-term evidence that VRS investment policies 
have avoided excessively risky investments where public equities are 
concerned. At the same time, the VRS has earned respectable rates of 
return and maintained liquidity so that it can meet the demands of the 
day. 
What is a “good” Sharpe Ratio? The answer depends on the time period 
chosen because opportunities differ significantly in rising markets, as 
opposed to falling markets. Therefore, one cannot look at the VRS’s 0.943 
Sharpe Ratio in Table 2 and make many useful historical comparisons. It 
will suffice to say that the VRS’s allocation of its assets performed well 
per unit of risk it decided to bear during this time period.  
These points acknowledged, the VTSMX fund mimicking the entire U.S. 
stock market rather consistently outperformed the VRS in the public 
equity area and did so with an almost identical Sharpe Ratio. The major 
difference between the two is that the VTSMX generated both higher 
rates of return and higher standard deviations (greater volatility) than 
did VRS public equity. Using hindsight, we can say the VRS would have 
ended up substantially better off at the end of the 25-year period had 
30  The Sharpe Ratio for asset “i” is (Ri – Ci)/σi, where R is the rate of return on the asset, C is a certainty rate of return such as a Treasury bill, and σ is the standard deviation of the return. We omit Ci, a constant across asset classes 
in a specific time period, from our computations in order to underline the notion of units of return per unit of risk.
31 Virginia Retirement System, Popular Annual Financial Report as of June 30, 2018.  
it opted to place significant proportions of its public equity investments 
in VTSMX or similar fund vehicles. This strategy also would have 
enabled the VRS to reduce its investment expenses, which totaled more 
than $457 million in FY 2018.31
We (along with many economists) believe the VRS should index 
substantially larger proportions of its investments. Reports from 
former members of the VRS board reveal that the VRS did index 
most or all its public equity investments between 1994 and 2001. 
Subsequently, a different composition of board members changed the 
investment course of the pension fund. All things considered, this was 
a costly decision – though perhaps understandable. Low-cost, indexed 
investments seldom have strong appeal to those whose livelihoods 
depend in whole or part on fee generation.    
We understand that investment decisions must be made in an 
atmosphere of uncertainty. One doesn’t know what is going to happen 
in the future and for this reason we would be surprised if the economic 
environment in the next 25 years matches what we observed from 
1992 to 2017. Knowing this, one should be circumspect in critiquing 
the investment decisions made by the VRS over the past 25 years. In 
our view, the VRS made thoughtful decisions even though some of its 
decision makers may not have been familiar with the full implications 
of the empirical evidence presented in this chapter. There is room for 
evolution in this regard.
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A Demanding Assignment: 
Risk Versus Return
We again note that there does not exist a single “right” combination 
of return and risk. Some investors accept copious amounts of risk in 
search of higher returns, while others conscientiously shy away from such 
scenarios. Conceptually, the VRS is torn between the two. It is currently 
expected to earn at least 7% on its investments even while it also is 
expected to maintain liquidity and avoid investments that might impair 
its ability to meet its long-term obligations and require taxpayer bailouts. 
Lowering the assumed rate of return to 6.75% will alleviate some of the 
pressure on the VRS, but, as noted earlier, some economists believe that 
assumed rates of public pension systems should be substantially lower 
than 7%.
Other major state pension funds have reached different conclusions than 
the VRS concerning their ability to outperform the market by means of 
actively managed funds. The largest public pension fund in the United 
States, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), 
decided to back away from investments in hedge funds because of high fees 
and disappointing returns.32 Subsequently, the New York City Employees 
Retirement System (NYCERS) voted to end its $1.4 billion investment in 
hedge funds with the comment that “the funds charge enormous fees for 
high-risk investments yet yield tepid results.”33
One must assume that CalPERS and the NYCERS have the ability to hire 
very talented people to select their investments, yet their hedge funds 
underperformed as they have in the rest of the world. Clearly, these two 
well-situated pension systems do not appear to share the VRS’s optimism 
that they can “beat the market” over the long run in the area of public 
equities. Partially in defense of its stance, the VRS informed us that only 
10.8% of its portfolio was devoted to hedge fund investments in July 2018.34 
We believe this percentage should be even smaller.
32 Dan Fitzpatrick, “Calpers Pulls Back from Hedge Funds,” The Wall Street Journal (July 23, 2014), www.wsj.com/articles/calpers-pulls-back-from-hedge-funds-1406156915.
33 DC37, ASCME, AFL-CIO, “New York City’s Retirement System Pulls Out of Hedge Funds” (April 14, 2016), https://dc37blog.wordpress.com/2016/04/14/new-york-citys-retirement-system-pulls-out-of-hedge-funds.  
34  This statistic was contained in an exchange between the Old Dominion University Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy and the VRS in July 2018.
35 This demonstrates that diversification, per se, does not automatically reduce risk. Assets must have negative co-variances in order for them to reduce risk (as measured by volatility) in a portfolio.
This brings us to a critical, but unavoidable, question. Should we expect 
the VRS to outperform public equity market indexes – and to do so with 
less volatility than the market – over the next decade? And, at the same 
time, should we expect the VRS to maintain reasonable liquidity?  
If these are our expectations, then they present the VRS with a very 
demanding assignment. Our considered answer to these questions is: 
“Probably not.” Why not? Very few asset managers (active or not) exhibit 
the consistent ability to earn higher than average rates of return and do 
so at lower than average levels of risk. Indeed, portfolio theory suggests 
this is impossible unless one is lucky, has inside information or possesses 
a stylized trading advantage such as a superfast computer connection that 
may provide a millisecond advantage over competitors in the speed of 
completing trades.
VRS and JLARC data tell us that the VRS did not earn its target 7% 
rate of return between 2008 and 2018, but neither did most other state 
pension funds. This stimulated most pension funds nationally to consider 
investments in collections of assets that they believe will deliver higher 
expected returns. Included in these asset mixes have been land, businesses, 
currencies, commodities and options market activities. These portfolios 
often carry with them additional expected risk even though they deliver 
diversification.35 
We believe it is unreasonable to expect the VRS on a consistent 
basis to outperform some or all other pension funds, hedge funds in 
general, or the market as measured by indexes such as the S&P 500 
or Vanguard’s VTSMX. While it is entirely reasonable to expect the 
VRS to “beat the market” in a year or even over several years, the 
preponderance of evidence is that it is quite difficult to outperform the 
market in the long term. To assume otherwise is to potentially invite 
financial peril.
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The Code of Virginia, Section 51.1-124.30:1, requires the VRS to assess its 
sensitivity and vulnerabilities to a variety of possible economic scenarios 
including reductions in its rates of return, changing benefit levels, and so 
on. Reports of these test results are submitted to the General Assembly, 
the most recent one dated December 2018. These are complex, though 
quite valuable, documents because they pose a series of “What if?” 
scenarios involving both good and bad developments. Among these are 
negative scenarios that include reductions in the rates of return the VRS 
earns on its investments, and reduced contributions from the General 
Assembly. Matters such as the long-term savings that could be realized 
if more rapid paydown of VRS’s unfunded liabilities were undertaken 




36 Pew Charitable Trusts, “State Public Pension Funds Increase Use of Complex Investments” (April 2017).
37 Virginia Retirement System, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Year Ended June 30, 2018.
The Target Rate Of Return 
(Rate Of Discount): More
Pension funds must make some assumption about the rate of return they 
expect to earn on their invested funds in order to assess their financial 
viability. In 2017, the median assumed rate of return for state pension 
funds was 7.15%. Yet, from 2006 to 2016, the median rate of return was 
only 5.8%. The VRS target rate for this period was 7%, but data from the 
Pew Charitable Trusts suggest that the VRS’s actual return was 5.6%.36 
During a different 10-year period ending on Sept. 30, 2017, Virginia’s Joint 
Legislative Audit and Review Committee (JLARC) said the VRS earned 
only 4.9% on its asset portfolio. And, in yet another 10-year period, this 
one ending March 31, 2018, JLARC reported that the VRS earned a 5.9% 
rate of return on its invested assets. Another report, dated July 9, 2018, 
stated that the 5.9% rate of return exceeded the VRS’s benchmark return 
of 5.5% by 0.4%. Finally, the VRS reported a 6.1% rate of return on its 
total fund for the 10-year period ending June 30, 2018.37
A review of the publicly available data strongly suggests that a 7% rate of 
return target is overly optimistic. South Dakota, which is considered one 
of the more stable state pension systems, assumes a rate of return of 6.5%. 
The recent decision to lower VRS’s assumed rate of return to 6.75% will, 
if approved by the General Assembly and the governor, more closely align 
VRS’s assumptions with performance. However, it would also increase the 
present value of its future obligations. 
One can quibble with the categories and measurement criteria the VRS 
utilizes to evaluate its performance. The organization usually selects 
as benchmarks funds or groups of funds rather than indexes of entire 
markets against which to measure its performance.
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Since a decisive majority of hedge and actively managed funds have not 
done as well as the overall public equity market in recent years, the 
VRS can “beat the funds,” and beat benchmark performance metrics 
based upon the funds, even though it may not “beat the market” in the 
form of indexes such as VTSMX. It appears that some of the VRS’s 
benchmarks are not as demanding as they plausibly should be.
The VRS must array its future obligations and then discount them to find 
what these mean today (that is, find the “present value” of its anticipated 
future liabilities). In 2005, the VRS reduced its target rate of return to 
7.5%, and then again in 2010 to 7%. Higher target rates of return, when 
used as a rate of discount, diminish the estimated value of the VRS’s 
future financial obligations. When it decreased its target rate of return 
to 7%, this reflected financial reality (the rate of return the VRS could 
expect to earn), but simultaneously increased the present value of its 
future financial obligations. 
Following the statutory requirement which requires a pay-as-you-go 
methodology or contributions on a current disbursement basis, the VRS 
utilizes a lower rate of discount for its Line of Duty Act obligations, which 
relate to eligible survivors of individuals killed or disabled in the line of 
duty, or their survivors. In 2017, its liabilities were discounted at a 3.56% 
rate. However, these obligations account for less than 1% of the overall 
VRS obligation portfolio.
If state pension funds were held to the same accounting standard 
as private-sector pension funds, then the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB) says it would use what is termed a “blended 
rate” of discount that combines a risk-free local or U.S. government 
bond yield with higher-risk assets such as long-term corporate bonds.38 
38  Sheila Weinberg and Eileen Norcross, “GASB 67 and GASB 68: What the New Accounting Standards Mean for Public Pension Reporting,” Mercatus Center, George Mason University (June 15, 2017), www.mercatus.org/publications/
gasb-67-68-public-pension-reporting.
39 Alicia H. Mundell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, Joshua Hurwitz and Laura Quinby, “How Would GASB Proposals Affect State and Local Pension Reporting?” (June 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2316838.    
40 Alicia Mundell et al.
This could result in a discount rate as low as 4% and, in the case of the 
VRS, would substantially increase the present value of its future financial 
obligations. Alicia Mundell, a well-known pension expert at Boston 
College, and three of her colleagues modeled the impact of lower discount 
rates on 126 public pension plans using FY 2010 data. She found that even 
a modest decrease in discount rates would have caused the funds’ funding 
percentages to fall from 77% of anticipated future financial obligations to 
only 63%.39 There is consensus among economists that most public-sector 
pension funds understate their future financial obligations because they 
discount their future financial liabilities at unrealistically high rates.40
The recent VRS board decision to adopt a 6.75% assumed rate of return 
will more closely align expectations to performance but also increases the 
present value of the VRS’s future financial obligations. This illustrates the 
difficult position of VRS management. Unrealistic expectations lower the 
present value of future financial obligations and commitments from the 
Commonwealth’s budget, but also increase the risk that the VRS will fall 
short of the funds needed to meet future obligations. More closely aligning 
expectations with historical performance is a more prudent course of 
action and decreases future financial risk. However, lowering the rate of 
return has the immediate effect of increasing the present value of future 
obligations, making the VRS appear even more underfunded than it is 
now, and requires additional contributions from the Commonwealth’s 
budget.
We applaud the decision of the VRS board to lower the assumed 
rate of return to 6.75%. Undoubtedly, this decision will precipitate 
a realistic and lengthy discussion about the viability of the 
Commonwealth’s pension funds and the nature of the pensions offered 
to public-sector employees.
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Asset Mix
In order to moderate swings in the value of its asset portfolio, the VRS 
diversifies its holdings across many different asset classes, including 
equities, bonds, real estate, commodities and other assets. Like most 
informed investors, the VRS subscribes to the old maxim, “Don’t put 
all of your eggs in one basket.” In fact, the mathematics and economics 
associated with this important advice are complex, and economists 
Harry Markowitz and James Tobin won Nobel Prizes for providing and 
explaining it. For example, they clarified the principles illustrating how 
investors could minimize the risks associated with earning a rate of 
return such as 7%.41 Minimizing risk, of course, is not synonymous with 
eliminating risk.
The salient point to remember is that the higher the average rate of 
return one hopes to earn, ordinarily the higher the level of risk one must 
assume. The cost of earning a higher than average rate of return may be 
increased volatility and likely there would be some years when rates of 
return are negative. For example, in 2000, 2001 and 2002, the annual rates 
of return on the stocks in the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index were -9.03%, 
-11.85% and -21.97%, respectively.42  
Such extended declines in value exert great financial pressure on pension 
funds, which generate about 60% of their benefit payments from the 
dividends and capital gains produced by their investments. The 37.4% 
decline in equity values that occurred in 2000-2002 made it very difficult 
for any investor to generate capital gains and perhaps constitutes an 
argument in favor of asset diversification.  
These uncertainties can be compounded by pension funds’ exposure 
to fluctuations in foreign exchange rates for investments that may be 
denominated in currencies such as yen or euros.43 While the American 
economy accounts for about one-quarter of the value of the world’s 
economic activity, the most rapidly growing economies are located 
41  Markowitz and Tobin also showed how investors could maximize the rate of return they earned given whatever level of risk they were willing to tolerate. Harry M. Markowitz, “Portfolio Selection,” Journal of Finance, 7 (1952), 77-91. 
James Tobin, “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk,” Review of Economic Studies, 25 (1961), 65-86.
42 Robert Alan Schwartz, “Annual Returns of the SEP 500 From 1928 to 2015,” Seeking Alpha, https://seekingalpha.com/instablog/605212-robert-allan-schwartz/4831186-annual-returns-s-and-p-500-1928-2015. 
43  Any investor can sell such risks to others (essentially buy an insurance policy) by purchasing options. Most pension funds do so, but similar to insurance policies, there is a cost attached to such behavior. Of course, any investor also 
can choose to buy these risks as well, and this could result either in gains or losses.
elsewhere, and hence some of the world’s prime investment opportunities 
exist outside of the United States. Such opportunities titillate investors 
with the promise of higher returns, but often carry with them higher 
levels of risk.
Given these circumstances, and the uncertainties concerning life spans and 
the like, what’s a public pension fund portfolio manager to do? He or she 
needs to generate that 7% rate of return, but even this may turn out to be 
insufficient if the state fails to make the contributions to the pension fund 
for which it is obligated.  
Graph 6 reports how the VRS was deploying its $80.4 billion in assets on 
March 31, 2019. Conventional investments in equities (stocks) and fixed-
income instruments such as bonds accounted for 56% of the value of the 
VRS’s portfolio. What the VRS terms credit strategies accounted for 14% 
of its portfolio, while real assets claimed 14%, private equity, 11%, and 
what the VRS labels strategic opportunities, 3%.  
The VRS’s asset deployment is not unusual. Most public pension funds 
have responded to their funding and rate of return challenges by investing 
their asset portfolios more aggressively. They seek higher rates of 
return on their investments, but in order to obtain the promise of such, 
ordinarily they must accept higher risks. Nearly all pension funds (the 
VRS included) now invest funds in a broad variety of assets. These include 
actively managed funds that in turn invest in risky collections of assets 
(often with borrowed funds), private equity firms that are not publicly 
listed on a stock exchange, real assets such as real estate, and commodities 
that could range from pork bellies to aluminum. The VRS, however, 
reports that its commodities investments are minimal.
If a pension fund directs more dollars toward alternative assets, then 
usually this fund needs to hire more internal talent to conduct this 
business and also pay more to outsiders such as hedge fund managers, 
who it is believed have the ability to generate higher rates of return. The 
March 31, 2018, JLARC assessment of the VRS reported that the VRS 
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internally manages 100% of its fixed income investments and 40% of its 
public equity investments, but only 6% of its real asset investments. All 
other assets are managed by external experts whom the VRS must pay for 
their services.
In 2016, the Pew Charitable Trusts reported that median state pension 
plans expended $70.9 million on expenses to administer the pension 
system, significantly less than the $390.9 million in expenses for the VRS. 
However, this may be misleading, as Virginia has one system while other 
states have several systems. Taking this potential critique into account, 
we find that the VRS’s total investment expenses were 0.58% of its total 
investments. These costs were primarily driven by external management 
fees. The VRS’s external management expenses were 0.52% of its total 
investments, above the national median of 0.34%. While the VRS’s 
external management expenses are higher than the national median, its 
performance in this regard is significantly better than some other state 
pension funds. The Arizona Public Safety Personnel Retirement System, 
for example, had management fees equal to 2.23% of investment assets 
in 2016. On the other hand, Utah, which invests 42% of its portfolio in 
alternative investments (real estate, hedge funds, etc.), only paid external 
management expenses equal to 0.13% of its total investments. These data 
suggest that the VRS could lower its external management costs.
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GRAPH 6
VRS ASSET ALLOCATION BY CATEGORY, 
MARCH 31, 2019
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However, we must take care to note that the Pew data conflict with the 
VRS’s and JLARC’s assertions that the VRS’s investment expenses have 
been lower than the national average. The VRS has also expressed serious 
concern about Pew’s definitions and its findings. Reasonable people can 
disagree on these points.
It is not clear precisely how the VRS compensates its external fund 
managers. An industry standard, however, is “2 and 20,” which translates 
to annual fees that are 2% of all managed assets plus 20% of any profits 
generated after some minimum hurdle has been met. The New York 
Times labeled this a “Heads We Win, Tails You Lose” arrangement.44 
The VRS reported in July 2018 that it kept 80% of returns in excess of 
an 8% annualized return, with the remaining 20% paid to the external 
investment managers who generated the return. As of July 2018, these 
arrangements resulted in the VRS keeping $21.9 billion in excess returns 
and $3.8 billion being paid out to external managers “since inception.”45 
However, a consensus has emerged nationally that “reported fee data are 
often unreliable and complete fee information is unknown even to the 
pension fund.”46 Fee arrangements sometimes are amazingly Byzantine.47 
Thus, when a recent study of state pension funds by the American 
Federation of Teachers concluded that 12 large public employee pension 
funds could have saved $3.8 billion annually by reducing their reliance 
upon hedge and actively managed funds, one must treat such data as rough 
approximations.  
There is no disagreement, however, that the VRS’s investment 
management expenses have risen recently (JLARC says 48% between FY 
13 and FY 17),48 presumably for two reasons. First, the VRS has been 
investing greater proportions of its funds externally rather than in the 
public equities and fixed income instruments it manages internally,49 and 
44 As reported by the American Federation of Teachers, “The Big Squeeze” (2017), www.aft.org/sites/default/files/bigsqueeze_may2017.pdf.
45 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (July 2018). It is not clear from the report what time period or periods “since inception” comprises.
46 American Federation of Teachers. Pew agrees.
47 Gretchen Morgenson, “The Deal’s Done. But Not the Fees,” The New York Times (May 24, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/business/the-deals-done-but-not-the-fees.html.
48 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (December 2017), p. 7, http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt504.pdf.
49 The supposition of the American Federation of Teachers.  
50  Mark Perry, “More evidence that it’s very hard to ‘beat the market’ over time, 95% of finance professionals can’t do it,” AEI Ideas (March 20, 2018), http://www.aei.org/publication/more-evidence-that-its-very-hard-to-beat-the-
market-over-time-95-of-financial-professionals-cant-do-it.
51 www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/fidelity-by-numbers/corporate-statistics.
52 Fidelity 500 Index Fund, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/composition/315911206 (accessed April 9, 2018).   
this results in higher fee payments. Second, rising equity prices during this 
period may also have resulted in higher fee payments.  
An irony attached to this circumstance is that for a decade or more, the 
typical hedge or actively managed fund consistently has underperformed 
public equity markets overall. Put differently, a typical investor could have 
invested in an equity index fund marketed by a well-established provider 
such as Fidelity or Vanguard, then lapsed into a deep coma, and woken 
up a decade later to find that he or she consistently had outperformed 
the actively managed funds. In a typical year, 60% to 80% of hedge and 
actively managed funds do not perform as well as the S&P 500 average. 
In 2018, the average hedge fund lost 5.23%, while the S&P 500 fell only 
4.38%.  
Graph 7 reports similar annual information for the 2009-2018 period. 
Note the 10-year losing streak of hedge funds versus the S&P 500 Index. 
From 2002 to 2017, 92.33% of actively managed large cap funds failed 
to outperform the S&P 500; 94.81% of actively managed mid cap funds 
failed to outperform the S&P MidCap 400 Index; and 95.73% of actively 
managed small cap funds failed to outperform the S&P SmallCap 600 
Index.50 Fidelity, which on March 31, 2018, managed $2.09 trillion in 
mutual fund assets,51 offers its FUSEX 500 Index Fund, which is designed 
to replicate the equities in the S&P 500. FUSEX returned 9.42% annually 
over the past 10 years and its expense ratio was a miniscule .09%.52 This 
compares to the VRS’s 6.66% annual rate of return over the 2006-2015 
period (but 4.9% for the 10 years ending Sept. 30, 2017) and investment 
expenses of 0.55%. The VRS could have increased its rate of return by 
2.76% and reduced its expenses by .46% had it indexed its investments 
solely in public equities (not a strategy we would recommend for a variety 
of reasons, but an interesting comparison nonetheless).  
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The lesson is that most public pension funds have the potential to 
reduce their expenses if they opt to use indexed public equity funds 
rather than their own staff or external fund managers. We recognize 
moving in this direction is anathema to many at the VRS, but the 
potential savings command attention.  
There is an interesting analog to this discussion. University endowments 
bear some similarity to pension funds in terms of the return vs. risk 
dilemma, though they can more easily reduce payments to endowment 
account holders than can pension funds. In recent years, university 
foundations and endowments have engaged in many of the same 
investment strategies as pension funds. The results have been less than 
spectacular. Over the past decade, university endowments returned an 
average of 4.6% on their investments. This trailed the 5.3% rate of return 
that a simple 60/40 stock/bond index fund mix would have returned or 
the 5.4% rate of return that a simple 70/30 stock/bond index fund mix 
would have returned.53 That is, they could have done better by “indexing” 
(investing in funds that imitate entire markets or segments of markets 
rather than investing in specific stocks or bonds, to minimize their trading 
and offer much lower management costs as one consequence).     
Investment professionals who make their living from the fees they earn 
from actively investing funds on behalf of their clients often supply a 
blizzard of reasons why their services are valuable, if not irreplaceable. 
Some of their arguments do resonate. For example, whole market index 
funds such as those offered by Fidelity and Vanguard54 do not contain 
assets or companies that are new on the scene, or are not publicly traded, 
and thus one could miss potentially superb opportunities if one only 
indexes the public firms via a fund such as the FUSEX 500. 
Nevertheless, the arguments put forward by active investment 
professionals can tend to be self-serving. They make their living by 
convincing the VRS and other pension funds to hire them to manage their 
portfolios. Each is a master at explaining why they and their approach to 
investing are different – why they will succeed even while others rather 
consistently fall short.  
53 A nontechnical rendition of this situation may be found at James B. Steward, “College Endowments Opt for Alternative, and Less Lucrative, Route,” The New York Times (Feb. 22, 2018).
54  The VRS commented to us via email that “VRS provides index funds for cheaper than Fidelity because we are doing so with internal staff.” However, these individuals and their activities are not gratis. They have opportunity costs 
and hence the comparison with Fidelity and Vanguard is not apt.
55 “Vulture Capitalist,” Investopedia, www.investopedia.com/terms/vulturecapitalist.asp.
Ultimately, evidence should rule the day. Consider that a 10% reduction 
in annual investment costs for the VRS would translate to savings of 
approximately $45 million annually. A 0.1% increase in the rate of return 
the VRS realizes on its public equity investments similarly would add 
about $40 million to its coffers. These are possibilities that should not be 
ignored.
We do not argue that the VRS should index all its investments, or 
avoid all higher cost fund managers, though today it is possible 
to index nearly any significant asset – commodities, real estate, 
international assets and currencies in addition to equities and bonds. 
We agree that index investments don’t always outperform actively 
managed assets and some specific active investment strategies 
may exploit less well-known asset segments and possible market 
inefficiencies to outperform indexes. In addition, indexed investments 
could be more volatile than some actively managed investments. Again, 
the salient point is that a significant majority of actively managed 
funds fail to do as well as the market on a consistent basis. Hence, we 
recommend that the VRS index a larger proportion of its public equity 
portfolio and that it assess carefully the extent to which indexing might 
be useful in other asset classes as well.  
The VRS responded to this suggestion in a July 6, 2018, email: “Private 
equity has been great for VRS. Indexing these funds would adversely 
impact the plan.” We largely agree with this conclusion because data 
supplied by the VRS indicate that what it labels its “private equity” 
investments (as opposed to “public equity”) often have generated higher 
rates of return and exhibited lower variability than VRS’s public equity 
investments. Sound principles of diversification make some private equity 
investments a good idea for the VRS. We would insert a caveat, however. 
The VRS’s private equity investments may involve it investing in funds 
that purchase public firms, take them private, then disgorge many of their 
assets and ultimately lead them into bankruptcy. Some label this vulture 
capitalism,55 and decry it, but in recent years it often has been a profitable 
strategy.    
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Defined Benefit Versus 
Defined Contribution 
Pension Programs
Earlier, we sketched the differences between defined benefit, defined 
contribution and hybrid public pension programs. Historically, most public 
employee pension programs have been defined benefit rather than defined 
contribution in nature.  
Many public employees prefer defined benefit programs because such 
programs guarantee them a specific income for the remainder of their 
lives. Further, depending on the length of their service and their highest 
earning years, defined benefit programs may produce very respectable 
retirement incomes for them, especially if accompanied by cost-of-living 
escalators that usually are not present in defined contribution programs. 
Also, depending on how the funds in a defined contribution program 
are invested, a recipient’s income from that program could increase or 
decrease.   
Taxpayers and citizens find the problem with defined benefit retirement 
obligations is that they frequently become fiscally burdensome. Longer 
life spans mean that government pension obligations extend well beyond 
the time periods originally anticipated. Lower interest rates make it 
more difficult for pension funds to earn respectable rates of return on 
traditional low-risk assets such as U.S. government bonds. We have seen 
this has pushed pension funds into adopting riskier investment mixes 
involving more equities, commodities and real estate in an attempt to 
generate higher rates of return.    
Pension contributions account for increasing proportions of the budgets 
of state and local government units. States such as Illinois face disastrous 
fiscal situations, substantially because of their burgeoning public employee 
pension obligations. California’s Gov. Jerry Brown gained attention in 
early 2018 when he expressed his hope that California courts would rule 
56 Romy Varghese, “California’s Brown Raises Prospect of Pension Cuts in Downturn,” Bloomberg (Jan. 10, 2018), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-10/california-s-brown-raises-prospect-of-pension-cuts-in-downturn.
57 Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, VRS Oversight Report (July 2018).
58 Virginia Retirement System, Popular Annual Financial Report as of June 30, 2018.
that pension benefits promised to state employees could be rolled back by 
the state. His changing stance on this matter reflected fiscal reality: in FY 
2017, California spent double the amount on pensions as it spent in FY 
2009.56 It is worth noting that from the standpoint of taxpayers, Virginia’s 
plans are more modest than those of California.
The General Assembly has taken positive steps to extend the reach 
of hybrid retirement programs. Since Jan. 1, 2014, most new state 
employees, teachers and local employees enroll in a hybrid plan that 
combines defined benefit and defined contribution features. On March 
31, 2018, 24% of the total active VRS membership was participating in 
a hybrid plan.57  
A problem here is that 43% of hybrid plan participants do not make 
contributions other than those required of them.58 This means that they 
forfeit a generous matching contribution offered by the Commonwealth 
and damage their long-term financial status. 
The General Assembly can assist by continuing to mandate policy 
“nudges.” The Commonwealth’s hybrid plan currently contains an auto-
escalation feature whereby every three years, participants’ voluntary 
contributions are increased by 0.5% if they aren’t already contributing 
the maximum 4%. Those who contribute the 4% match receive a 2.5% 
contributory match from the Commonwealth. Thus, if they do not 
choose to contribute 4%, then they are leaving money on the table and 
diminishing their eventual retirement stipend. If VRS participants who 
are not contributing the 4% maximum use the internet to log into their 
VRS accounts, then they are politely informed that they are not serving 
themselves well and immediately provided with opportunities to increase 
their contributions so that they can capture the Commonwealth’s matching 
funds.
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The Commonwealth might, however, require more generous contributions 
from new participants at the start, but permit them to revoke this 
guidance after several years.59 Experience in other states suggests that 
large proportions of individuals who are so nudged become accustomed 
to the higher level of contributions and continue them even when they no 
longer are required to do so. In the long term, nudges stimulate what most 
authorities regard as optimal economic choices for participants, though 
they are not choices most participants initially make if they have the 
freedom to do otherwise. 
The Commonwealth’s long-term goal should be to move additional 
classes of employees entirely into defined contribution programs 
similar to those now available to faculty and to have all other 
employees enrolled in the hybrid plan. It should walk this path because 
this constitutes an important step toward guaranteeing that Virginia will 
avoid the public employee pension problems that have afflicted so many 
other states.60 
The experience of the federal government in this regard is instructive. 
Fiscal stress in the 1980s pushed the U.S. government in the direction 
of enrolling all new federal workers in Social Security if they were not 
already participants, diminishing the generosity of its existing defined 
benefit program, and creating a defined contribution program with 
matching employer/employee contributions. The now mandatory program 
has proved to be popular with federal employees and has controlled the 
expansion of the government’s future financial obligations (Gale et al. for 
Brookings, 2016).  
59 See Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Welfare and Happiness (New Haven: Yale, 2008).
60  Initially, this policy might be more expensive to Virginia than either the current hybrid program or a defined benefit program. If in the long term, however, it reduces the Commonwealth’s financial liabilities and eliminates the 
possibility that Virginia in the future might imitate states such as Illinois and Connecticut, then it will have been worthwhile. Numerous states have asserted that “it can’t happen here,” only to find that changing economic and 
political conditions have rendered their predictions null. Pew has reported that the public employee pension plans of the 50 states were underfunded by $1.4 billion in 2016. Pew Memorial Trusts, “The State Pension Funding Gap: 
2016,” www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/04/the-state-pension-funding-gap-2016.
61 Employees “vest” after five years of service credit.
Portability
The lack of portability of state pension funds is an area where the 
Commonwealth does not treat state employees as well as it should. 
Excepting those state employees who opt to participate in an alternative 
pension system such as TIAA-CREF, vested61 state employees who wish 
to “cash out” their Virginia retirement account (perhaps because they 
are moving to a job outside of state government) may receive back their 
contributions to the VRS plus interest, but not those contributions made 
by the Commonwealth. This assumes the departing employee has not 
become separated because of job performance or misconduct.
The alternative is for employees to leave their contributions with the 
VRS and to have their ultimate pension payment be based upon their 
current salary, which typically does not turn out to be an attractive choice. 
VRS credits only 4% of interest to withdrawn employee contributions, 
even though it assumes it is earning substantially higher rates of return. 
One well-positioned observer of this arrangement told us, “In a world 
of increasing labor mobility, such a system is disgraceful.” We agree. 
The Commonwealth should: (1) allow vested employees who leave state 
employment to retain the Commonwealth’s contributions; and (2) credit 
those contributions with a rate of return other than 4%, for example, a 
rate closer to the VRS’s long-term rate of return on its investments. If the 
VRS earns the 7% rate of return it currently assumes, then it still will 
have earned a surplus on this account that it is not returning to departing 
employees.   
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Summarizing Proposals 
For Change
We applaud the VRS for being a transparent, generally well-managed 
operation. Its quality stewardship has enabled Virginia to avoid the 
unfortunate pension experiences of many other states. Ronald E. 
Schmitz, VRS’s chief investment officer, reported recently that “the 
VRS investment staff continues to generate good performance” and in 
general, we agree.  
Our measured judgment is that the VRS is an intelligently managed 
operation that has avoided most of the problems that have afflicted 
public employee pension systems in other states. An even-handed view 
of the VRS leads to the conclusion that it deserves higher than average 
scores for its performance. However, careful, nonpolitical direction and 
the changes we outline here are needed to guide Virginia’s pension funds 
through the challenges of coming decades. With this in mind, we believe 
the General Assembly and the VRS should implement the following four 
changes in public employee pensions.
First, the VRS should index larger proportions of its asset portfolio 
and especially do so inside its domestic public equity portfolio, where 
approximately one-third of all its assets reside. The evidence in 
this area speaks loudly – indexed public equity funds consistently have 
outperformed most actively managed public equity funds; this has been 
true for the last 15 years. Further, if we lengthen our time horizon to 25 
years, Vanguard’s low-cost VTSMX indexed fund reflecting the entire 
U.S. stock market has generated a higher rate of return than the VRS has 
within its own public equity sphere and has achieved this with essentially 
the same Sharpe Ratio. We understand that managers of hedge funds 
and active investors persistently contend that they are exceptions to 
accumulated empirical evidence and therefore have the ability to produce 
both above-average returns and below-average volatility. Even though this 
might prove true for a certain period, it is unlikely to persist, and hence, 
following such advice is a bet Virginia would be wise to decline. 
62  Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee, VRS Overview Report (July 9, 2018), at p. 48, http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/oversight/VRS/2018_VRS-Pres.pdf.
Second, the Commonwealth should accelerate the movement of state 
employees from defined benefit programs into defined contribution 
and hybrid retirement programs. However, while doing so, the VRS 
needs to find more effective ways to increase the voluntary contributions 
that participants make to their personal hybrid programs. Additional 
statutory “nudges” should be considered. Enhanced participation would 
benefit VRS members and simultaneously reduce the Commonwealth’s 
future financial risks and exposure. With respect to this latter point, the 
VRS estimates that the hybrid retirement program would reduce risk to 
employers within the defined benefit program by about one-third.62
Third, gradually, perhaps over a period as long as 20 years, the VRS 
should reduce its target rate of return (rate of discount). This would 
result in larger estimates of the future pension fund financial obligations 
of the VRS but would be consistent with the way private firms are 
required to assess their portfolios and estimate their future financial 
obligations. Because this action would necessitate some combination 
of larger state and local government pension contributions, larger 
employee contributions or diminished benefits, it would require extensive 
conversations with the General Assembly. 
Fourth, the Commonwealth should improve the portability of the state 
employees’ VRS accounts. As things stand, vested employees who depart 
state employment receive only their own contributions (not those of the 
Commonwealth) plus a 4% rate of interest on their contributions. The 
alternative for these individuals is to leave their contributions with the 
VRS, which means that ultimately, they would receive pension payments 
based on what their salary was when they departed. Ordinarily, this is not 
an attractive choice. The Commonwealth can and should do better in an 
era characterized by high levels of employee mobility. 
Should the Commonwealth not move in these directions, then the 
probability increases that it will experience future public pension 
problems. By no means do we see disaster looming on the horizon; 
however, very few analysts foresaw the financial implosion of 2008-2009. 
Considered in this light, our recommendations represent fiscally prudent 




Virginia should decriminalize possession of 
small amounts of marijuana, address past 
convictions and start moving toward legal 
and regulated adult use. …  It is time for 
Virginia to embrace a better, smarter and 
fairer approach to cannabis.
–  Mark R. Herring, Attorney General for 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
June 15, 2019 
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O
n June 26, 2019, Gov. J.B. Pritzker of 
Illinois signed legislation making the   
state the 11th to legalize possession of 
30 grams or less (1.05 ounces) of marijuana 
for personal use. In the same month, Virginia 
Attorney General Mark Herring argued in 
an opinion piece published throughout the 
Commonwealth that legislators should remove 
criminal penalties for marijuana possession 
as a first step on the path toward legalization 
for personal use. Of the candidates for the 
2020 Democratic nomination for president of 
the United States, only Joe Biden and Tulsi 
Gabbard have not announced support of the 
legalization of recreational marijuana.2 Given 
the conversations taking place throughout 
Virginia and the United States about 
marijuana, many believe it is time to consider 
what a change in its legal status might look 
like, whom it might affect and how it might 
impact the Commonwealth of Virginia.
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Even though a majority of adult Americans have used marijuana in 
their lifetime and over a third of young adults in Virginia used it in the 
previous year, marijuana possession is almost always unlawful in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia.3 Section 18.2-250.1 of the Code of Virginia 
states: “It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess 
marijuana unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant 
to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the 
course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by 
the Drug Control Act.” A conviction of the violation of this section for the 
first offense can result in confinement of no more than 30 days, a fine of 
up to $500, or both. A second or subsequent conviction results in a Class 1 
misdemeanor, which could lead to maximum confinement of 12 months, a 
maximum fine of $2,500, or both. 
Haley Smith is a young resident of Virginia who suffers from Dravet 
syndrome, a rare form of epilepsy that causes frequent seizures that 
will continue for the duration of her life. In 2014, Haley suffered more 
than 1,000 life-threatening seizures. Her mother, Lisa, took up the 
fight for medical marijuana for her daughter by supporting legislation 
in Richmond. Lisa Smith, accompanied by fellow parents in the group 
Parents for Medical Marijuana, advocated for the legalization of 
marijuana for medical treatments. In a Jan. 28, 2015, story on WTKR-
TV, news anchor Barbara Ciara said, “Lisa doesn’t want her daughter’s 
legacy to be she took her last breath waiting on the slow wheels of 
legislation to legalize the medicine she needs to live.”4 In a similar vein, 
Stephanie Anderson of Richmond is considering cannabidiol (CBD) oil as 
an alternative treatment for her son’s ADHD. She wants her son to have 
safe and legal access to CBD products. “I’ve been hesitant to try CBD from 
online sources, so the idea of having in-state pharmaceutical processors 
puts my mind at ease.”5
Virginia has a limited qualification for the possession and personal use 
of marijuana. As a result of HB 1251 (2018) and SB 1B 1557 (2019), 
doctors, physician assistants and licensed nurse practitioners can issue a 




7  National Survey of Drug Use and Health, 2017 National Estimates. We follow the U.S. Census Bureau’s conventions with regard to race. Individuals choose to self-identify race and may self-identify more than one race. For more 
information, see: https://www.census.gov/topics/population/race/about.html.
written certification for oils that contain tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or 
cannabidiol. These oils can be found in a variety of products, potentially 
including (but not limited to) creams, baked goods and gummies. Each 
dispensed dose cannot exceed 10 milligrams of THC. Virginia’s law also 
only provides for an “affirmative defense.” The certification may not 
prevent an arrest for marijuana possession and can only be raised during 
a criminal prosecution.6
Marijuana use in Virginia falls below the national average. In the 2014-
2016 National Survey of Drug Use and Health, 6.7% of residents 18 
and older in Virginia reported using marijuana in the past month, two 
percentage points lower than the United States (8.7%). Adults in Virginia 
were also less likely to have used marijuana in the past year (11.5%) than 
adults nationwide (13.7%). Not surprisingly, marijuana use in Virginia 
was the highest among adults ages 18 to 25. Almost 20% of young adult 
Virginians have used marijuana in the past month and nearly a third have 
used it in the past year. 
While more than 50% of Virginians in recent surveys supported 
legalization of the personal use of small amounts of marijuana, the 
Code of Virginia is quite clear: possession of marijuana is illegal in 
almost every circumstance. A first offense for possession can result in 
an arrest that is resolved by either a court summons or confinement. 
From 2010 to 2018, there were nearly 200,000 marijuana possession 
arrests in Virginia. Over 80% of these arrests were for a single 
offense; that is, no other offense was charged at the time of arrest.
In 2018, there were 219.3 marijuana possession arrests per 
100,000 white residents and 771.9 arrests per 100,000 black or 
African American residents in Virginia.7 While some argue that 
decriminalization could reduce these inequities, evidence from 
decriminalized states suggests that these disparities may persist.
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Legalization, on the other hand, has dramatically reduced the number 
of possession arrests in several states but also has resulted in increases 
in the number of traffic accidents and emergency department visits.
In this chapter, we will look at how perceptions about marijuana have 
changed over time and who uses marijuana. We’ll consider who is arrested 
for possession, discuss the differences between decriminalization and 
legalization, and provide an estimate of the financial impact of marijuana 
legalization in Virginia. If change is coming, it’s best to be prepared. 
Marijuana And Hemp: 
A Primer
Marijuana (cannabis) and hemp plants look alike to the untrained eye.8 
Hemp has many uses, including for clothing, rope and livestock feed. 
Marijuana, on the other hand, is primarily a recreational substance. 
Both marijuana and hemp contain tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). It is the 
main psychoactive agent in marijuana. When ingested, THC stimulates 
the parts of the brain that respond to pleasure, leading to the release 
of dopamine.9 Hemp, however, must legally have a THC content of less 
than 0.3%, well below the 18.7% average THC level in marijuana sold for 
recreational purposes in Colorado.10 
Hemp, unlike marijuana, can be legally produced, processed, distributed 
and sold throughout the United States as of Jan. 1, 2019.11 The change 
in hemp’s legal status has allowed hemp growers access to banking, 
water rights and crop insurance, among other institutional rights and 
protections.12 Farmers can now grow hemp and sell to processors, which is 
potentially good news for a sector that has struggled recently in Virginia 
with the decline in the demand for tobacco products. 








While hemp is now legal, marijuana remains a subject of tension between 
the federal government and many state and local governments. As of July 
2019, 33 states (plus the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands) have legalized medical marijuana, 15 
states have decriminalized marijuana possession for personal use and 
11 states (plus the District of Columbia) have legalized marijuana for 
recreational purposes. There is not a common legal framework among 
the states.13
By July 2019, more than 800 hemp growers had registered with the 
Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Elaine 
Lidholm, director of communications for VDACS, noted that these farmers 
expect to plant 8,500 acres of hemp.14 One of the first to invest in the 
plant on a large scale is race car driver and cattle farmer, Matt Hagan, 
from Montgomery County. “They say we’re going to be one of the biggest 
in the state of Virginia and that means we’re taking one of the biggest 
risks in the state of Virginia. Everybody says, ‘You’re either going to be 
the biggest dummies on the block or we’ll be popping champagne bottles.’ 
I don’t know,” Hagan laughed. According to Hagan, a single hemp plant 
can cost the farmer anywhere from $3 to $6. To comply with federal and 
state laws, each plant must be inspected to ensure that the crop does not 
exceed legal THC limits.15 
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In some states, such as Colorado and California, where recreational 
marijuana possession is legal for adults, the production and sale are taxed 
and regulated, and there are medical marijuana laws. In other states, 
such as New Mexico and North Dakota, possession does not result in 
confinement and medical marijuana is provided for in the law. In some 
states, including North Carolina, possessing small amounts of marijuana 
may result in an arrest or fine. Virginia allows the prescription of cannabis 
oil products but not medical marijuana. Lastly, in certain states, such 
as Alabama, possession of marijuana in any form for almost any reason 
is illegal under state law. All of this, of course, can create confusion, as 
individuals may purchase marijuana legally in one state and travel to 
another state only to find they are now in violation of state law as well as 
federal law.16
With all this in mind, we must remember that the federal government 
considers marijuana an illegal substance. The U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug, with 
no currently accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse.17 
Marijuana is grouped together with heroin, lysergic acid diethylamide 
(LSD), 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (ecstasy), methaqualone 
(Quaaludes) and peyote. Marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I 
drug effectively outlaws most medical research on products with THC. 
Marijuana producers and dispensaries are also largely shut off from 
financial networks and, in many cases, must conduct business in cash.
We find marijuana’s classification curious, since the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) notes that a fatal overdose from marijuana 
is “unlikely.” An overdose, however, can lead to adverse reactions, 
including confusion, anxiety and paranoia.18 To place this into context, 
the CDC reported that there were 70,237 fatal overdoses in 2017 in the 
United States. Opioids were involved in 47,600 of the overdose deaths that 
year (67.8% of all drug overdose deaths).19 Fentanyl, which is a Schedule 
2 drug, accounted for 28.8% of the overdose deaths. Heroin (Schedule 1), 
cocaine (Schedule 2) and methamphetamine (Schedule 2) accounted for 
16 For more information, see the National Conference of State Legislatures and the Marijuana Policy Project.
17 U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. For more information, see https://www.dea.gov/drug-scheduling.
18 For more information, see https://www.cdc.gov/marijuana/faqs/overdose-bad-reaction.html.
19 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html.
20 Randi Melissa Schuster, Madeleine Fontaine, Emily Nip, Haiyue Zhang, Ailish Hanlya and A. Eden Evins, “Prolonged cannabis withdrawal in young adults with lifetime psychiatric illness,” Preventive Medicine 104 (2017).
25.1%, 17.8% and 10.6% of deaths, respectively. There were no reported 
deaths from marijuana overdose in 2017.
We must be careful to note that these observations focus on overdose 
fatalities. Marijuana use can cause impaired driving, and there is no 
widely accepted field test for marijuana intoxication. Prolonged substance 
abuse is also possible with marijuana. Withdrawal symptoms may be 
exacerbated in individuals with a mental illness;20 however, there continues 
to be fierce debate as to the impact of marijuana use on anxiety and 
depression. Many claims and counterclaims remain untested in the United 
States due to the federal government’s classification of marijuana as a 
Schedule 1 substance. 
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Cannabidiol (CBD)
Hemp and marijuana contain another active component that, unlike 
THC, has gained acceptance in recent years. Cannabidiol, or CBD, does 
not result in a “high” after ingesting or applying to the body. Claims that 
CBD reduces anxiety and seizures, and provides pain relief, have sparked 
interest in and usage of CBD products.21 CBD often comes in the form of 
oil but also can be found in creams, or even gummies. With the 2018 Farm 
Bill’s passage, if CBD products are derived from hemp under the THC 
guidelines contained in the law, these products can be consumed and are 
transportable nationwide. Any products derived from hemp or marijuana 
with THC levels greater than allowable limits remain illegal at the federal 
level. To say this creates confusion is an understatement. CBD products 
derived from hemp may have excess THC levels if quality controls are not 
sufficiently stringent.22 For now, the watchwords for CBD products are 
“buyer beware.” 
In 2018 and prior to the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill, Virginia legalized 
the production and use of CBD oils and set explicit guidelines for the 
cultivation and production of CBD-related products. The Commonwealth 
also created a framework for legal prescriptions, although CBD products 
(absent of THC) were already widely available without prescription.23 
Virginia has since passed a law conforming state regulation of hemp to 
federal guidelines regarding oversight and the THC content of hemp. The 
absence of previous legal oversight of hemp led to large variation in quality 
and active ingredients for products that may perhaps share the same 
names or labels.24
Owners and pharmacists at local drugstores in Williamsburg have become 
conscious of the rising demand for and curiosity surrounding CBD oil. 
Henry Ranger, a local business owner, learned of CBD oil while working 
for a larger chain pharmacy that didn’t stock the product. He was unable 
to begin exploring the growing industry until he opened his own business. 
Kelly Kale, another small-business owner, advises that consumers should 
understand the difference between pharmaceutical CBD and that sold 
by online shops because with the pharmaceuticals “we can guarantee 
from bottle to bottle and from batch to batch that it is exactly the 
same product.” While many Virginians have been thankful for remedies 
from CBD oils, it should be noted that these local business owners are 
aware of the paucity of research to validate their customers’ claims of 
effectiveness.25
Even though CBD is legal in Virginia, the production and distribution 
of CBD products is still in its infancy. The Virginia Board of Pharmacy 
selected five CBD distributors, one for each of the five health services 
areas (HSA) in Virginia, illustrated in Figure 1. The five distributors 
include Pharmacann (HSA I), Dalitso (HSA II), Dharma (HSA III), 
Green Leaf (HSA IV) and Columbia Care (HSA V).26 Columbia Care, 
a firm that already operates dispensaries in multiple states, produces 
products and services for patients who are part of a medical marijuana 
program.27, 28 At the time of this writing, the expectation is that Columbia 
Care will open its facility in Portsmouth in late 2019 (Table 1).
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FIGURE 1
HEALTH DISTRICTS AND HEALTH SERVICES AREAS OF VIRGINIA
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TABLE 1
MEDICAL MARIJUANA DISPENSARIES, VIRGINIA




HSA I Northwest PharmaCann Staunton End of 2019




Bristol End of 2019
HSA IV Central Green Leaf Medical Richmond End of 2019
HSA V Eastern Columbia Care Portsmouth Late 2019
Source: http://richmondfreepress.com/news/2019/apr/19/medical-marijuana-dispensaries-open-va/
Portsmouth businessman Johnny Garcia is working to be a part of the 
expanding CBD industry. He has invested in an industry that plans to 
plant more than just roots in Portsmouth. As noted previously, another 
company, Columbia Care, will open a medical marijuana facility in 
Portsmouth by the end of 2019 where the plants will be cultivated and 
processed into prescription pills. Garcia co-owns Cativa CBD, which will 
process and manufacture certain CBD products, including body cream and 
sublingual tablets. Garcia said the company he co-owns plans to build two 
facilities in Portsmouth. Construction was set to begin in October.29
29 https://www.pilotonline.com/business/vp-bz-cativa-cbd-portsmouth-20190909-dv6n3byg6fbfpiv5itbs4zq7ja-story.html.
30 https://poll.qu.edu/virginia/release-detail?ReleaseID=2451 (2017 VA poll).
31 https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/pilotonline.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/c/77/c77f8ee9-f7c3-5208-810e-5a45e762a3ee/5a7b20dfb8755.pdf.pdf.
From Hippie Culture To 
Culturally Acceptable
I didn’t inhale it, and never tried it again. – Bill Clinton
When I was a kid, I inhaled frequently. That was the point. 
– Barack Obama
Graph 1 illustrates how swiftly perceptions about marijuana have 
changed in the United States. In 1969, only 12% of those surveyed 
thought marijuana should be legalized. Even at the turn of the current 
century, only 31% of respondents were in favor of legalization. By 2013, 
a majority of respondents were in favor. And, in 2018, almost two-thirds 
of Americans reported they thought marijuana should be legalized. The 
most recent survey found broad support for legalization among millennials 
(74%), Gen Xers (63%) and baby boomers (54%).
Recent surveys of Virginians reflect the national data. Polls by Quinnipiac 
University in 2015 and 2017 found that a majority of Virginians supported 
adults being able to legally possess small amounts of marijuana. 
The 2017 Quinnipiac poll also found that an overwhelming 92% of 
Virginians supported marijuana use for medical purposes with a doctor’s 
prescription.30 A March 2018 Christopher Newport University poll 
revealed that 76% of Virginians favored decriminalizing possession of 
small amounts of marijuana.31 
Public perceptions of marijuana are changing because more Americans 
have used marijuana. The National Survey of Drug Use and Health 
(NSDUH) collects data at the national, state and sub-state level on 
drug use, abuse and mental health. The latest survey illustrates the rise 
in marijuana’s popularity relative to other drugs. The percentage of 
respondents who reported using marijuana in their lifetime increased from 
42.7% in 2002 to 48.2% in 2017 (Graph 2). Across the same time period, 
reported use of LSD declined while cocaine usage increased slightly. Usage 
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of crack cocaine remained unchanged. It appears that marijuana has 
reached a tipping point, where a majority of the population has tried it, 
supports its legalization for personal use and overwhelmingly supports its 
use for medical purposes. 
As marijuana use by adults has increased over time and is now legalized 
or decriminalized in a number of states, we compare its use in the 
previous month with two of the most popular legal substances: alcohol 
and cigarettes (Graph 3). Since 2002, while alcohol usage in the past 
month by Americans 18 and older has increased only at an average rate of 
0.1% a year, cigarette use has declined at an annual rate of 2.3% a year.32 
Reported marijuana use grew at a 3.4% annual rate over the period. The 
increasing acceptance of marijuana coincides with the decline of use of 
cigarettes and tobacco.
32 We estimate the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) to determine the average annual growth or decline in each substance over the period in question. CAGR is equal to (End Value/Start Value)^(1/Number of Periods) – 1.
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GRAPH 1
PEW RESEARCH POLL ON LEGALIZING MARIJUANA: 
UNITED STATES, 1969-2018




Pew Research Poll on Legalizing Marijuana: United States, 1969-2018 
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GRAPH 2
SELECTED TYPES OF ILLICIT DRUG USE IN LIFETIME AMONG PERSONS AGES 18 OR OLDER: 
UNITED STATES, 2002-2017




Selected Types of Illicit Drug Use in Lifetime Among Persons Ages 18 or Older: United States, 2002-2017 
 
 



































Marijuana Cocaine Crack LSD- - - -
103
GRAPH 3
USE OF ALCOHOL, CIGARETTES AND MARIJUANA IN THE PREVIOUS MONTH AMONG PERSONS AGES 18 OR OLDER: 
UNITED STATES, 2002-2017
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Diving into the national data, more than 53% of males and almost 44% of 
females reported having used marijuana at least once, with 18% of males 
and 12% of females reporting having used it in the past year. Examining 
respondents by race yields an interesting observation: Whites are more 
likely than African Americans or Hispanics to have used marijuana in 
their lifetime (Table 2). On the other hand, African Americans used 
marijuana in a slightly greater proportion in the past year and month than 
whites or Hispanics. 
TABLE 2
MARIJUANA USE BY RACE, AGES 18 AND OLDER: 
UNITED STATES, 2017
LIFETIME PAST YEAR PAST MONTH
White 53.8% 15.8% 10.1%
Black or African 
American
45.5% 17.9% 12.2%
American Indian 63.8% 24.2% 15.6%
Native Hawaiian 45.9% 11.7% 9.7%
Asian 20.6% 7.2% 3.8%
Two or More Races 59.9% 24.1% 16.7%
Hispanic or Latino 36.0% 13.1% 8.5%
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2017 National Survey of Drug Use and 
Health, Tables 1.32B, 1.33B and 1.34B
Marijuana use increases with education and falls with employment 
(Table 3). While some may believe marijuana is used predominantly by 
“slackers,” the survey evidence suggests that usage is highest among those 
who have attended some college. College graduates and those who did not 
graduate from high school report the same usage over the previous year, 
although college graduates have the lowest usage rates in the previous 
month. On the other hand, marijuana usage rates are the highest among 
the unemployed. It may be that continued marijuana use lowers 
employability, which, in turn, leads to increased use. However, 1 out 
of 10 full-time employed respondents reported using marijuana in the 
past month.
TABLE 3
MARIJUANA USE BY EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT, 
AGES 18 AND OLDER: UNITED STATES, 2017
LIFETIME PAST YEAR PAST MONTH
















Unemployed 53.3% 27.4% 17.6%
Other 36.7% 10.1% 6.8%
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2017 National Survey of Drug Use and 
Health, Tables 1.32B, 1.33B and 1.34B
Is Marijuana 
A Gateway Drug?
As an increasing number of Americans are using marijuana on a more 
frequent basis, the debate whether marijuana is a gateway drug continues 
to boil. A 2015 study examined the responses of 6,624 survey participants 
who used marijuana prior to any other drug.33 Almost 45% of individuals 
who had used marijuana in their lifetimes progressed, at some point, to 
other illegal substances. Other potential indicators of substance abuse 
include being male, living in an urban area, never being married, being 
separated or divorced, having a psychiatric disorder or a family history of 
substance abuse, and using marijuana at an early age.
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These findings echoed previous studies suggesting that a significant (but 
not dominant) proportion of marijuana users experimented with other 
illegal drugs at some point in their lives.34 There are several arguments 
why this progression from marijuana to other drugs may occur. First, 
marijuana users (in states where it is illegal) are exposed to other illegal 
drugs because the supply channels overlap. Second, marijuana provides a 
pleasurable experience that may encourage experimentation with other 
illegal substances. Marijuana use may also “condition” the brain to be 
more sensitive to the pleasurable effects of other drugs. Finally, if one is 
under the influence of marijuana, there is a potential loss of self-control 
and increased likelihood of experimentation with other drugs.35 However, 
the National Institute on Drug Abuse also recently noted that the majority 
of people who use marijuana do not go on to use other substances.36 While 
there is strong evidence that marijuana may act as a gateway drug for 
some users, the same also may be said about two legal substances, alcohol 
and tobacco. Cigarette use, for example, may increase the risk of cocaine 
addiction.37 A 2012 study of high school students found that alcohol, not 
marijuana, was the gateway drug. Alcohol use led to tobacco, marijuana 
and other substance use.38
An alternative to the gateway hypothesis is that people who are more 
likely to use drugs start with readily available substances (alcohol, 
marijuana, tobacco). A portion of these individuals then, whether 
through social interaction or “priming the brain,” then transition to 
other substances. If marijuana was not available, individuals would start 
elsewhere, and some would eventually transition to “harder” drugs. From 
this perspective, marijuana, by itself, is not a gateway drug. Individual 
characteristics and social conditions determine whether there is a 
transition path to other substances, not the use of marijuana.
Regardless of whether one accepts or rejects the argument that marijuana 
is a gateway drug, there is a degree of commonality among these 
arguments. At some point, some people will use marijuana along the path 
34  A. Agrawal, M.C. Neale, C.A. Prescott and K.S. Kendler, “A twin study of early cannabis use and subsequent use and abuse/dependence of other illicit drugs,” Psychological Medicine, 2004; 34(7):1227– 1237. K. Van Gundy and C.J. 
Rebellon, “A Life-course Perspective on the ‘Gateway Hypothesis,’” Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 2010; 51(3):244–259.
35  T.J. Dishion and L.D. Owen, “A longitudinal analysis of friendships and substance use: bidirectional influence from adolescence to adulthood,” Developmental Psychology, 2002; 38(4):480-491. M. Ellgren, S.M. Spano and Y.L. Hurd, 
“Adolescent cannabis exposure alters opiate intake and opioid limbic neuronal populations in adult rats,” Neuropsychopharmacology, March 2007; 32(3):607-15.
36  https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/marijuana/marijuana-gateway-drug.
37  A. Levine, Y. Huang, B. Drisaldi, et al., “Molecular mechanism for a gateway drug: epigenetic changes initiated by nicotine prime gene expression by cocaine,” Science Translational Medicine, 2011; 3(107):107ra109. doi:10.1126/
scitranslmed.3003062.
38 T. Kirby and A.E. Barry, (2012), “Alcohol as a Gateway Drug: A Study of US 12th Graders,” Journal of School Health, 82: 371-379. doi:10.1111/j.1746-1561.2012.00712.
toward using other drugs. Whether the starting point is alcohol, tobacco 
or marijuana, we need to recognize that awareness, intervention and 
treatment may be more effective earlier rather than later. For the majority 
of marijuana users, however, the evidence suggests that marijuana (for 
now) is not a door to harder drugs.
Who Uses Marijuana 
In Virginia? 
Given that the national survey data suggest more than 50% of Americans 
have used marijuana in their lifetimes and almost 10% in the previous 
month, how many residents of Virginia use marijuana? Since the 2002-
2004 survey, the percentage of those who used marijuana in Virginia in the 
previous year increased from 9.1% to 12.3% in 2012-2014 before falling to 
11.5% in the most recent survey available (Graph 4). Usage in the previous 
month also increased from 5.4% to 6.7%. The use of marijuana in Virginia, 
however, is well behind that of Colorado, where nearly 1 in 4 respondents 
18 and older used marijuana in the previous year.
We compare marijuana use across the health services areas within 
Virginia in Graph 5. Eastern Virginia (HSA 5) had the highest proportion 
of adults 18 and older who used marijuana in the past year and was only 
slightly behind HSA 4 (Central) in terms of usage in the previous month. 
Northern Virginia (HSA 2) had the lowest reported usage of marijuana in 
the Commonwealth.
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GRAPH 4
USAGE OF MARIJUANA IN PREVIOUS YEAR AND PREVIOUS MONTH, AGES 18 OR OLDER: 
VIRGINIA, 2002-2016
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GRAPH 5
MARIJUANA USE BY VIRGINIA HEALTH SERVICES AREA, 2017: 
18 YEARS AND OLDER
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Lastly, we examine usage of alcohol, tobacco and marijuana in Virginia by 
Health Services Area in Table 4. Alcohol is clearly the substance of choice, 
with 56% of adults replying that they had used alcohol in the previous 
month. Almost 27% of adults 18 and older replied that they had used some 
form of tobacco in the previous month. While alcohol and tobacco usage 
in Virginia mirrors the nation, marijuana usage falls below the national 
average. Nearly 8% of individuals ages 18 and older replied that they had 
used marijuana in the previous month in Virginia HSA 4, the highest rate 
in the state. All HSAs in Virginia have marijuana use percentages below 
the national average.
TABLE 4
USAGE OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND MARIJUANA IN THE PREVIOUS 
MONTH: AGE 18 AND OLDER, HSAs IN VIRGINIA, 2016
ALCOHOL TOBACCO MARIJUANA
United States 55.9% 26.1% 8.7%
Virginia 56.0% 26.6% 6.7%
Northwest (HSA I) 56.4% 27.1% 6.8%
Northern (HSA II) 60.6% 16.9% 5.2%
Southwestern (HSA III) 46.5% 37.2% 7.0%
Central (HSA IV) 56.9% 28.7% 7.7%
Eastern (HSA V) 56.4% 28.9% 7.6%
Source: National Survey of Drug Use and Health, 2014-2016 Substate Survey. Available at https://
www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHsubstateAgeGroupTabs2016/
NSDUHsubstateAgeGroupTabs2016.pdf.              
39  As noted by the Crime in Virginia Report (2018), “Although law enforcement arrest policies vary, particularly with respect to juveniles, agencies are instructed to count one arrest each time an individual is taken into custody for 
committing one or more offenses. A juvenile arrest is counted when an offense is committed and the circumstances are such that if the juvenile had been an adult, an arrest would have been made.” The Crime in Virginia data are 
publicly available at: https://va.beyond2020.com/.
Marijuana Possession 
And Arrests
Because marijuana possession is illegal in Virginia, the law requires that 
individuals in possession of marijuana, in almost every circumstance, 
be subject to a law enforcement action. The Virginia State Police (VSP) 
collects and makes publicly available crime data from law enforcement 
agencies within the state. In general, two types of data are captured: 
incident and arrest data. Since the VSP notes that arrest data are the 
primary measure of police activity as it relates to crime, we use arrest 
data in this section.39
This decade, law enforcement officers made almost 390,000 arrests 
for drug-related crimes in Virginia. Fifty-nine percent of these arrests 
from 2010 to 2018 were for marijuana-related crimes, and marijuana 
possession or concealment was the charge in a preponderance of the 
arrests. Graph 6 illustrates that for each year this decade, more than 
half of all drug arrests were for marijuana possession or concealment. 
A potential critique is that an individual could be arrested for multiple 
offenses – that is, assault and marijuana possession or theft and 
marijuana possession. The marijuana offense would be incidental, 
overshadowed by the more egregious crime. To examine whether this 
critique is valid, we filtered the data to exclude arrests where the 
number of offenses was two or more or where the arrest type was not 
for a drug or narcotics offense. Of the 198,388 arrests for marijuana 
possession or concealment from 2010 to 2018 in the Commonwealth, 
84.3% were for a single drug or narcotics offense. Marijuana 
possession was the primary driver of total drug arrests in Virginia.
Regardless of one’s opinion about the legal status of marijuana in the 
Commonwealth, the data clearly illustrate that the majority of drug 
arrests in Virginia this decade were for the possession or concealment of 
marijuana. Furthermore, the Virginia State Crime Commission (VSCC) 
also estimated that 84% of marijuana possession arrests from 2007 to 2016 
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were first-time arrests.40 Even though it is rare for an offender to receive 
confinement for a first-time offense, the VSCC found that on one day in July 
2017, 127 inmates were in jail solely for a marijuana charge. The estimated 
cost to taxpayers was more than $10,000 a day to incarcerate these inmates. 
In a recent opinion piece, Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring stated 
that marijuana enforcement costs amounted to at least $81 million a year.41 
This figure does not include the “opportunity costs” of enforcement – that 
is, the effort and attention that could be redirected to other crimes.
We now turn our attention to arrests in Virginia metropolitan areas. 
In Graph 7, we present the arrests per 100,000 residents for possession 
or concealment by racial group in Virginia metro areas. We divide the 
number of arrests by the population of each racial group to allow a direct 
comparison. We note that an individual could be arrested multiple times 
in a year for the same offense, so the arrests closely (but do not perfectly) 
correspond to the arrest rate for the population of each group.
We first remind the reader that national surveys do not show a stark 
difference in marijuana usage by race. For the most recent survey in 
2017, whites were about seven percentage points more likely than blacks 
or African Americans to have used marijuana in their lifetime. Blacks or 
African Americans, on the other hand, were about two percentage points 
more likely to have used marijuana in the previous year or month. In 2018, 
there were 219.3 arrests of individuals who identified as white per 100,000 
white residents and 771.9 arrests of individuals who identified as black or 
African American per 100,000 black or African American residents of the 
Commonwealth. Blacksburg had the largest racial disparity of marijuana 
arrests in 2018: arrests per 100,000 residents were 241.0 and 1,528.6 for 
whites and blacks or African Americans, respectively.
The disparity between white and African American arrests per 
100,000 residents is apparent for every metropolitan area in the 
Commonwealth. Even though arrests per 100,000 residents in 
Charlottesville and Lynchburg were well below the state average 
in 2018, the disparity between white and African American arrests 
relative to the population of each group was still prevalent. Relative 
40 Virginia State Crime Commission (2017), http://vscc.virginia.gov/reports.asp. The data may overrepresent the percentage of first-time arrests and should be viewed as an upper bound on first-time arrests.
41 https://www.dailypress.com/news/opinion/local-voices/dp-edt-oped-herring-decriminalize-marijuana-0616-story.html.
42 https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/03/15/black-drivers-in-america-face-discrimination-by-the-police.
to the population of each race in Charlottesville, for example, African 
American arrests per 100,000 were more than three times higher than 
white arrests per 100,000. In Hampton Roads, African American 
arrests per 100,000 were 5.4 times higher than white arrests per 
100,000. While the arrest rates may fluctuate from year to year, the 
disparities between the arrest rates of whites and African Americans 
are persistent over time.
There are several possible explanations for the disparities in arrests 
relative to the population of each racial group. First, the arrest data do 
not capture the residence of the offender. If a significant number of out-
of-state offenders were being arrested in Virginia or one of its metro 
areas, this possibly could bias the arrest data. However, the volume 
and persistence of the disparities across jurisdictions cast doubt on this 
argument. Second, explicit racial bias may occur, which would lead to a 
higher number of encounters for African Americans, and thus a higher 
number of arrests. However, the increasing prevalence of mobile phones, 
police body cameras and civil rights monitoring may cast doubt on this 
hypothesis. Third, unconscious racial bias may result in more frequent 
“chance” encounters that, in turn, lead to arrests. The argument, for 
example, that “driving while black” is a form of profiling continues to 
reverberate throughout popular culture and there is mounting empirical 
evidence that profiling occurs.42 Fourth, policing decisions may lead to 
the concentration of scarce resources in areas overrepresented with 
minority populations. More police presence to deter crime creates more 
contacts with residents, which, in turn, leads to more arrests. Fifth, there 
is a possibility (however remote) that marijuana usage rates in some of 
Virginia’s metro areas differ dramatically from the nation and thus the 
disparities in arrests reflect these differences in use. Finally, it is entirely 
possible that there is no single reason, and that the disparities are a 
result of many socioeconomic factors. While these debates are outside the 
scope of this chapter, we recognize these discussions are worth having to 
improve the Commonwealth. We must also recognize that these disparities 
are, in part, driving the discussion of what to do about marijuana in 
Virginia.
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GRAPH 6
ARRESTS FOR MARIJUANA POSSESSION OR CONCEALMENT: 
TOTALS AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL DRUG ARRESTS IN VIRGINIA, 2010-2018




Arrests for Marijuana Possession or Concealment: Totals and as a Percentage of All Drug Arrests in Virginia, 2010-2018 
 
 





















































ARRESTS FOR MARIJUANA POSSESSION OR CONCEALMENT PER 100,000 POPULATION: 
SELECTED VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN AREAS, 2018
Sources: Virginia State Police (2019), Crime in Virginia Microdata; U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates by Race (2018); and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. All possession and 
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Sources: Virginia State Police (2019), Crime in Virginia Microdata; U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates by Race (2018); and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. All 
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Decriminalization Versus 
Legalization
With a growing number of legislators and government officials calling 
for action to change the consequences of marijuana possession or the 
legal status of marijuana possession for personal use in Virginia, we 
briefly review the differences between the two broad policy actions: 
decriminalization and legalization.43 There are significant legal and policy 
differences between legalization and decriminalization, including the 
amount of marijuana in question, which may vary from an ounce (in most 
legalized states) or less (in most decriminalized states). Furthermore, 
either of these actions would occur in an environment where the federal 
government still classifies marijuana as a Schedule 1 substance.
DECRIMINALIZATION: 
DIPPING A TOE INTO THE LEGALIZATION POOL
Decriminalization reduces or eliminates the criminal penalties for 
possessing small amounts of marijuana for personal use. Marijuana 
possession is typically punished with a civil or criminal fine for the first 
offense. Subsequent offenses may result in the same fine, an increased 
fine or an increased fine and confinement. Subsequent offenses may 
remain civil (noncriminal) or result in a criminal offense. As illustrated in 
Table 5, the penalties for a first offense of the possession of recreational 
amounts of marijuana vary from $50 in New Mexico to $300 in Minnesota 
and Nebraska. Of those states that have decriminalized possession 
of recreational amounts of marijuana, North Carolina’s approach is 
considered among the most punitive, as the offender may be issued a 
summons or arrested. A recent investigation in Charlotte found that 
African Americans are more prone than whites to be arrested than cited 
for possession.44
43  We do not include a discussion of removing the jail sentence for possession of marijuana. The Virginia State Crime Commission noted in 2017 that jail time is rarely imposed for many possession charges. Furthermore, removing the 
prospect of jail time would remove the right of indigent defendants to counsel.
44  https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article60170981.html.
45  As a person may be arrested multiple times a year, the arrest data do not show the number of individuals arrested, but rather the number of times individuals are arrested. 
What is common among the states that have decriminalized marijuana is 
that it remains illegal to consume it in public, to cultivate it for personal 
use, or to distribute or sell recreational amounts of marijuana. If one is in 
possession of more marijuana than allowed in the statute, penalties can 
range from a criminal misdemeanor to a felony. In Delaware, for example, 
possession of more than one ounce is punishable by up to three months in 
jail and a $575 fine. In Connecticut, possession of more than half an ounce 
is punishable by up to one year in jail and a $2,000 fine. 
One motivation for decriminalization is that it (generally) removes the 
criminal penalty for first-offense marijuana possession for personal use. 
Lowering the penalty for possession not only should benefit the individual, 
but also should lower the number of arrests and thus the expenditure 
of resources for enforcing marijuana laws. Examining data collected by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), we compare arrest rates for 
marijuana possession per 100,000 residents for Virginia and selected 
decriminalized states for 2010 and 2017 (Graph 8).45 
Among the states in Graph 8, Connecticut and Maryland recently changed 
the penalty for the first offense for marijuana possession for personal 
use. Since 2011, possession of a half-ounce or less in Connecticut is a civil 
violation. Arrests for possession fell from 8,322 in 2010 to 1,946 in 2017, 
a decline of 76%. Maryland decriminalized possession of 10 grams or less 
of marijuana in 2014. Arrests for possession dropped from 23,390 in 2010 
to 15,170 in 2017, a decline of 35%. It is worth noting that Maryland’s 
arrest rate per 100,000 residents for marijuana possession in 2017 remains 
among the highest among decriminalized states. Decriminalization has 
reduced arrests but not as dramatically as proponents would argue.
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TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF STATE DECRIMINALIZATION LAWS AS OF JUNE 2019
STATE AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA





Connecticut 0.5 ounce or less Civil $150 fine $200 to $500 fine
Delaware One ounce or less Civil $100 civil fine if 18 or older
Same as first offense for 21 and older, 
$100 criminal fine for ages 18-20
Hawaii Up to 3 grams (0.105 oz.) Civil Up to $130 fine Same as first offense
Maine
2.5 ounces or less 
Six plants
Civil
No penalty for 21 and older 
Under 21: $350 to $1,000 fine
Same as first offense
Maryland 10 grams (0.35 oz.) or less Civil $100 fine 
Second offense: $250 fine 
Subsequent: $500 fine
Minnesota 42.5 grams (1.5 oz.) or less Criminal misdemeanor $300 fine Same as first offense
Mississippi 30 grams (1.06 oz.) or less Civil $100 to $250 fine
Within two years - $250 fine and 5 to 60 days 
in jail
Missouri 10 grams (0.35 oz.) or less Criminal misdemeanor $250 to $1,000 fine Up to one year in jail and a fine up to $2,000
Nebraska One ounce or less Civil $300 fine
Second offense: $400 fine, up to 5 days in jail 
Third offense: $500, up to 7 days in jail
New Hampshire 0.75 ounce or less Civil Adults: $100 fine
Second offense: $100 fine; Third offense: $300 
fine; Fourth offense within 3 years: up to 
$1,200 criminal fine
New Mexico 0.5 ounce or less Civil $50 fine Same as first penalty
New York One ounce Civil $50 fine Same as first penalty
North Carolina 0.5 ounce or less Criminal misdemeanor
Up to $200 fine, possible 
suspended sentence
Second to fifth offense: up to $200 fine, 
0-15 days in jail, suspended
Ohio 100 grams (3.5 oz.) or less Civil $50 fine Same as first penalty
Rhode Island One ounce or less Civil 18 or older: $150 fine
Third conviction within 18 months – 
misdemeanor punishable by $200 to $500 
fine and/or six months in jail
Sources: Marijuana Policy Project (2019) and the Virginia State Crime Commission (2017), various state laws (2019). Information current as of June 2019. https://www.mpp.org/issues/decriminalization/state-laws-with-alternatives-
to-incarceration-for-marijuana-possession/.
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GRAPH 8
NUMBER OF MARIJUANA POSSESSION ARRESTS PER 100,000 RESIDENTS: 
SELECTED DECRIMINALIZED STATES AND VIRGINIA, 2010 AND 2017
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Even if decriminalization reduced arrests by the same proportion as in 
Connecticut, two problems would remain: the disproportionate burden 
of the civil penalties relative to income and the lack of public defense for 
indigent offenders. And, even if the civil fine is relatively low, there are 
additional court costs to consider (as anyone who has had to appear in 
court for a traffic ticket can attest). Failure to pay could lead to other 
fines and even jail time. As a percentage of income, the civil penalties 
would be the greatest burden on those with the least means to pay 
them.
Another concern is that the shift from criminal to civil penalties 
removes the obligation for the state to provide counsel to defendants 
who otherwise could not afford a legal defense. We interviewed Gregory 
Underwood, commonwealth’s attorney for the city of Norfolk, who 
directed his prosecutors to dismiss all marijuana-possession cases. He 
noted, “Decriminalizing marijuana possession would strip the poor of 
the right to be appointed lawyers who could test the constitutional basis 
for their citations and the sufficiency of the evidence against them. In a 
decriminalized system, the wealthy could afford to hire lawyers to defend 
them. The poor would be on their own, and they would face an even higher 
comparative rate of conviction than they do now.”  
LEGALIZATION: JUMPING IN WITH BOTH FEET?
Table 6 lists the 11 states (and the District of Columbia) that have 
legalized the possession of marijuana for personal use. Legalization 
completely removes the civil and criminal penalties for marijuana 
possession for personal use in one’s private residence. Legalization, 
however, typically does not entirely remove the penalties for public 
consumption. Possession of amounts that are greater than the legal 
limit may result in a fine, arrest, or both. The sale and distribution of 
marijuana is typically tightly regulated by the state and is only allowed in 
state-licensed dispensaries. Person-to-person private transactions are, in 
general, subject to a criminal charge, ranging from a misdemeanor to a 
felony, depending on the amount being sold.




Proponents of legalization argue that it is more equitable than 
decriminalization, frees up more law enforcement and judicial resources 
and brings a shadow economy into the light. Legalization at the state level 
allows the state to regulate the production and sale of marijuana within 
its boundaries. Legalization also allows states and local governments 
to levy taxes on the production and sale of marijuana and marijuana-
infused products. The Colorado Department of Revenue, for example, has 
recorded more than $6 billion in marijuana sales since January 2014 and 
has collected over $1 billion in revenue from taxes, licenses and fees since 
February 2014.46 
Unlike decriminalization, where the supply side of the market remains 
illegal, legalization removes the risk of arrest from legal growers, 
processors and retailers. Transparency in supply and competition among 
suppliers increases, enhancing the potency and dropping the price of 
marijuana. According to the Colorado Department of Revenue, the 
average retail price of a pound of marijuana fell from $1,876 in January 
2014 to $850 in July 2019, a decline of nearly 50 percent.47 According to 
Beau Kilmer, director of the RAND Drug Policy Research Center, the fall 
in prices in Washington and Colorado means that the cost of getting high 
by using marijuana is less than a couple of dollars, significantly less than 
the cost of the amount of alcohol to achieve a similar effect.48
To provide an equal comparison with the decriminalized states, we 
examine the change in marijuana possession arrests from 2010 to 2017 
for states that have legalized the possession of marijuana for personal use 
(Graph 9). To say that the declines in arrests have been dramatic might be 
an understatement. California, which reported 55,911 possession arrests 
in 2010, had only 3,741 arrests in 2017. Shaun Rundle, deputy director for 
the California Peace Officers’ Association, argued that legalization might 
factor into police behavior. “If someone is going to be out of jail [in] six 
months and back on the streets – and six months is even unlikely these 
days – then the agencies need to divert their time and resources to the 
most dangerous and violent crime prevention.”49
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TABLE 6




AGE LEGAL AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA PUBLIC CONSUMPTION
Alaska 2014 21 years or older 1-4 ounces, six plants in private Civil violation, $100 fine
California 2016 21 years or older Up to 1 ounce, six plants
Criminal misdemeanor to loiter 
in public with intent to commit 
marijuana offenses
Colorado 2012 21 years or older Up to 1 ounce, six plants
Civil violation to display or use more 
than 2 ounces, $100 fine
District of Columbia 2014 21 years or older Up to 2 ounces, six plants
Criminal misdemeanor, citation and 
release
Illinois 2019 21 years or older 10 grams (0.35 oz.) or less Civil violation, $200 fine 
Maine 2016 21 years or older Up to 2.5 ounces, three plants Civil infraction, $100 fine
Massachusetts 2016 21 years or older
Up to 10 ounces in private, 
up to 1 ounce in public, six plants
Civil infraction, $100 fine
Michigan 2018 21 years or older
Up to 10 ounces in private, up to 2.5 
ounces in public, fewer than 12 plants
Civil infraction, $100 fine
Nevada 2016 21 years or older Up to 1 ounce, six plants Criminal misdemeanor, $600 fine
Oregon 2014 21 years or older
Up to 1 ounce in public, up to 
8 ounces in private, four plants
No fine or penalty for up to 
1 ounce in public
Vermont 2018 21 years or older Up to 1 ounce, six plants Civil violation, $100 fine
Washington 2012 21 years or older 1 ounce or less for private consumption
Civil penalty, 1 ounce or less, 
$100 fine
Sources: National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (2019), various state laws (2019). Information current as of June 2019, https://norml.org/legal/legalization. Vermont Marijuana Laws (2019),  https://statelaws.
findlaw.com/vermont-law/vermont-marijuana-laws.html. National Conference of State Legislatures (2019), Marijuana Overview (2019). Information current as of May 2019, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/
marijuana-overview.aspx. Illinois laws become effective in 2020.
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GRAPH 9
PERCENT DECLINE IN MARIJUANA ARRESTS: 
SELECTED LEGALIZATION STATES, 2010-2017




Percent Decline in Marijuana Arrests:Selected Legalization States, 2010-2017 
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Would Legalization Be 
A Revenue Windfall For 
Virginia Cities And Counties?
If Virginia decided to legalize marijuana for personal use, the state 
would likely be able to tax its production and sale. Marijuana legalization 
would also likely reduce the number of arrests for possession; however, 
we reasonably would expect that law enforcement resources would be 
reallocated to deal with other crimes. Let’s take a quick look at what the 
revenue impact might be from marijuana legalization.
We assume that adults in Virginia would respond to legalization by 
consuming more marijuana. The question is: How much? We use the 
responses of adults in Colorado and Oregon to arrive at our low and high 
estimates (Table 7). Legalization likely would result in approximately 9% 
to 11% of the adult population in Virginia using marijuana on a monthly 
basis.
What might legalization in the Commonwealth look like? Virginia House 
Bill 2371, introduced earlier in 2019, proposed to legalize recreational 
marijuana. The proposed excise tax in Virginia would have been 9.7% 
(combined with the 5.3% normal sales tax levy, it would total 15%) with an 
additional 5% local excise tax option. Although the bill failed in committee, 
we use it as a framework to estimate the potential tax revenues for the 
state.50
While we do not have data on how much Virginia residents currently 
spend on marijuana, we do have survey data on how much marijuana 
consumers in other states spend. Headset Inc., a Seattle-based cannabis 
market intelligence firm, recently estimated that the average marijuana 
consumer spends about $645 a year, or approximately $54 a month.51 
After legalization and assuming that residents of Virginia respond like 
those in Colorado or Oregon, Table 8 estimates that marijuana sales could 
approach $360 million to $450 million a year, resulting in approximately 
$55 million to $67 million in excise tax revenues for the state. Of course, 
50 https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?191+sum+HB2371.
51 https://www.headset.io/blog/what-does-the-average-cannabis-consumer-look-like.
our estimate does not include jobs that would be created to produce, 
distribute and sell marijuana for personal use. Our estimates also do 
not factor in the costs to society, to include the potential for increases in 
car accidents, hospitalizations and absenteeism. Our estimates suggest 
that marijuana legalization would generate a modicum of additional 




CHANGE IN MARIJUANA USE IN THE PAST MONTH FOR ADULTS 








LOW             HIGH 
RESPONSE    RESPONSE
Before 
legalization
12.9% 12.6% 7.6% 7.6%
After 
legalization
16.6% 20.0% 9.8% 12.1%
Percent 
change
28.7% 58.7% 28.7% 58.7%
Source: National Survey of Drug Use and Health. Colorado liberalization went into effect in January 2014 and 
Oregon in July 2015. Comparison is between the last full year with data available prior to change versus the 
next full year post liberalization. Colorado is 2012-2013 and 2015-2016. Oregon is 2013-2014 and 2016-2017. 
Virginia usage for preliberalization is from 2014-2016. 
TABLE 8
EXCISE TAX REVENUE ESTIMATES FOR THE LEGALIZATION OF 
MARIJUANA, VIRGINIA
LOW ESTIMATE HIGH ESTIMATE
Estimated Annual Tax 
Revenue
$54,963,877 $66,967,482
Population 18 and 
Older
6.5 million 6.5 million















Source: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University (2019)
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Final Thoughts
The decision of whether to maintain the status quo, decriminalize or 
legalize the personal possession of marijuana will reverberate throughout 
the state’s economy. Maintaining the status quo is a policy choice under 
increasing pressure at the state and local levels. The attempts of the 
commonwealth’s attorneys of Norfolk and Portsmouth to dismiss some 
(Portsmouth) or all (Norfolk) misdemeanor possession cases are a sign 
that the region is moving from conversation toward action on marijuana.
If, as evidenced by the increasing number of states decriminalizing and 
legalizing the personal use of marijuana, change does come to Virginia, 
what would it mean? First, marijuana is not a cure for the ills of the 
state’s budget. While Colorado has generated $1 billion in marijuana 
taxes, fees and licenses, this was over almost five years. It’s an additional 
revenue source, not a replacement for income or other taxes.
Second, many of the claims about marijuana and CBD-infused 
products are unproven and research will take time to investigate them. 
CBD-infused products do appear to have some medicinal benefits for pain 
relief. Whether or not these products have benefits for anxiety, depression, 
gout, weight loss, weight gain and a host of other physical ailments 
remains to be seen. The rush of CBD-based products to markets appears 
to follow similar fads of the past. As for marijuana, the health benefits 
are also mixed, with some studies showing benefits, others not. Claims 
that marijuana use reduces opioid overdoses, for example, are promising 
and intriguing, but require further research to determine whether the 
relationship exists.
Third, marijuana decriminalization or legalization does not eliminate 
the black market for marijuana. When marijuana is decriminalized, 
there are still no legal outlets for consumers to purchase it, so the black 
market may grow as penalties for consumers decrease. When marijuana 
is legalized, the legal dispensaries are taxed and regulated, and the 
quality of marijuana increases relative to what is available on the black 
market.52 Most consumers are willing to pay more, but not too much more, 
52 Michael Armlung, Derek Reed, Vanessa Morris, Elizabeth Aston, Jane Metrik and James MacKilop (2018), “Price elasticity of illegal versus legal cannabis: a behavioral economic substitutability analysis,” Addiction 114 (1), 112-118.
53 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29609916.
and some consumers may find legal prices are too high when compared 
to the black market. Part of the problem is the federal classification 
of marijuana, which presents significant barriers to the operation of 
marijuana businesses. Another is that the black market is not taxed like 
the legal market, so it can offer cheaper (but riskier) prices. If the federal 
government were to change its position on marijuana, some of these 
barriers might go away. Increased competition within and among states 
would lower prices and reduce the size of the black market.
Fourth, the Commonwealth’s interdependence with the federal 
government and the military means that many residents have a 
job that requires a drug test, security clearance, or both. Even if 
marijuana were completely legalized for personal use in the U.S., the 
military and individuals working for or with the federal government in 
sensitive positions would likely continue to face restrictions on the use 
of marijuana. Transportation industries, to include airlines, rail and 
trucking, would undoubtedly have restrictions on marijuana similar to 
the current restrictions on alcohol consumption. As more than 60% of 
traffic through the Port of Virginia moves by truck and another 30% by 
rail, marijuana decriminalization or legalization could potentially have far-
ranging impacts on the availability of truck drivers and public safety.
Fifth, while marijuana legalization does not appear to increase the 
rate of use by minors, there is strong evidence that marijuana potency 
increases with legalization. Emergency department and urgent care 
visits by minors for adverse reactions to marijuana increased almost 
three-fold in Colorado after legalization.53 Even though minors may not 
legally consume marijuana, a resale market exists, creating the increased 
likelihood of adverse reactions or prolonged substance abuse. Care must 
be taken to recognize that sales competition would likely lead to increased 
THC content. Illinois, which recently signed marijuana legalization 
into law, has a unique tax structure where the tax rate on marijuana is 
dependent upon THC content, perhaps attenuating future demand for 
high-THC marijuana.
Sixth, decriminalization or legalization will create new burdens on law 
enforcement. A 2018 study by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 
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and the Highway Loss Data Institute found that car crashes increased 
by as much as 6% in Colorado, Nevada, Oregon and Washington after 
these states legalized marijuana for recreational use.54 Adults 18 to 20 
still can be cited in legalized states and the prevention of sales to minors 
is an obvious concern. New law enforcement training, procedures and 
equipment would be needed to adapt to a new normal.
Lastly, marijuana legalization is likely to be more efficient than 
decriminalization in addressing inequities in enforcement. The 
racial and socioeconomic disparities in arrests for marijuana possession 
in Virginia are troubling and worthy of discussion. Evidence from 
decriminalized states, however, suggests that these disparities persist even 
after decriminalization. Furthermore, because civil fines do not graduate 
with income, the burden of civil penalties is higher on those with lower 
incomes. Decriminalization removes the provision of a legal defense from 
those least able to afford one, which may increase disparities in judicial 
outcomes. Decriminalization should not equate “punishable by fine” with 
“legal for people with means.”
Marijuana is coming (and it’s already here). The exact date is unknown, 
but the momentum is clear. We should not shy away from discussing what 
may occur and keep in mind that challenge and opportunity are two sides 
of the same coin. In the words of Winston Churchill, “To improve is to 
change; to be perfect is to change often.”
54 https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/crashes-rise-in-first-states-to-begin-legalized-retail-sales-of-recreational-marijuana.
FEDERAL SPENDING IN 
THE COMMONWEALTH: 
A PRIMER 
Republicans know that government spending 
creates jobs. They just want that spending 
to be funneled to their projects and districts 
… and they certainly don’t want to say it out 
loud.
–  Former Gov. Jennifer Granholm, 
D-Michigan  
The idea that more taxes and more 
government spending is the best way to help 
hardworking middle-class taxpayers - that’s 
an old idea that’s failed every time it’s been 
tried.
– Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Florida 
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I
t should be no surprise that federal 
spending plays a significant role in the 
performance of the Virginia economy. In 
2016, contractors in the Northern Virginia 
cities and counties of the Washington, D.C.-
Arlington-Alexandria Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA) accounted for almost 52% of 
procurement spending for the entire metro 
area.1 Meanwhile, more than 81,000 military 
service members and almost 60,000 federal 
civilian employees worked in the Virginia 
Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA (Hampton 
Roads) in 2017. In fiscal year (FY) 2018, 
federal government awards in Virginia totaled 
$109 billion,2 or $12,866 per Virginian – among 
the highest in the nation. The Commonwealth 
economy is fueled, in part, by spending 
decisions in the halls of Congress and the 
White House.
Federal spending impacts the lives of many 
Virginians on a daily basis. Federal dollars flow 
into the Commonwealth as direct payments 
to retirees, veterans and the disabled. Federal 
grants pay for research on everything from the 
impact of the opioid crisis to how to plan for 
sea level rise. Federal funds may even pay part 
of the costs for the construction of sidewalks 
in low-income neighborhoods in Lynchburg.3 
1  Keith Waters, (2017), “Federal procurement spending in the 
Washington Region: 2008-2016,” Report, The Stephen S. Fuller 
Institute, George Mason University.
2  An award is money the federal government has promised to pay 
a recipient. Funding may be awarded to a company, organization, 
government entity or individual. It may be obligated (promised) in 
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In many cases, the most visible expenditures of federal funds in Virginia 
are the purchase of products and services from the private sector, ranging 
from the building of ships in Newport News to contracts for information 
technology services in Arlington.
How dependent is Virginia on federal dollars? The answer depends on the 
measure. In FY 2018, for example, California received $311.7 billion in 
federal awards, Pennsylvania $209.1 billion, Texas $206.4 billion, Virginia 
$109 billion and Kentucky $89.6 billion. Absolutely, other states received 
significantly more in federal awards than the Commonwealth. However, 
if we adjust for population, Kentucky received $20,126 per capita, 
Pennsylvania $16,333, Virginia $12,866, California $7,885 and Texas 
$7,293.
While comparing the size of federal spending across states provides 
a measure of its magnitude, this does not convey the share of overall 
economic activity that arises from such spending. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) is a broad measure of economic activity that provides an estimate 
of the final value of goods and services in an area over a specific period of 
time. In 2017, Virginia’s nominal GDP was $510.4 billion, of which $31.6 
billion (6.2%) was attributed to federal civilian activity and $19.1 billion 
(3.7%) to military activity.4 In other words, the economic activity of the 
military and federal civilian sectors directly contributed approximately 
9.9% to Virginia’s GDP that year.
In 2017, Virginia ranked fourth among U.S. states in the share of GDP 
attributed to military and federal civilian activity. Only Maryland, 
New Mexico and Hawaii had a higher share of GDP from these 
sources. To put this into perspective, the average for the nation for 
military and federal civilian activity as a percentage of GDP was 3.9% 
in 2017. Regardless of the measure, Virginia ranks among the top 
states in terms of total federal spending.
What makes the Commonwealth different is how federal spending flows 
into the state. As a percentage of federal awards in 2018, for example, 
4  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table SAGDP2N Gross domestic product (GDP) by state, 2017. Data for 2018 were not available for the federal civilian and military sectors as of October 2019.
5  Our measure of federal procurement spending is based on the individual federal procurement contracts from USAspending.gov. Some large federal contracts take place across fiscal years, therefore we use the original contract 
awards and subsequent modifications in conjunction with the starting and ending date to create a spending path for each contract. Each contract-spending path is constructed by allocating the award equally over the relevant time 
frame. 
6  We define Hampton Roads as the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC, metropolitan statistical area, and Northern Virginia as consisting of the following independent counties and cities: the counties of Arlington, Clarke, 
Culpeper, Fairfax, Fauquier, Loudoun, Madison, Prince William, Rappahannock, Spotsylvania, Stafford and Warren; and the cities of Alexandria, Fairfax, Falls Church, Fredericksburg and Manassas Park. 
contract awards were only 8.1% of total federal awards for Pennsylvania, 
18.5% for California and 22.7% for Texas. Contracts were 53.6% of all 
awards for Virginia. Virginia’s federal fortunes are more directly tied to 
the ebb and flow of federal contract spending than many other states. 
Federal procurement spending,5 that is, the purchase of goods and services 
from private-sector firms, flows throughout the Commonwealth. Even 
though the majority of federal procurement spending is concentrated in 
Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia,6 nine of Virginia’s metropolitan 
areas had federal procurement spending over $500 per capita in FY 
2017. To examine how changes in federal spending affect the economies 
of Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia, we focus on the impact of the 
Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) on Department of Defense (DOD) 
spending. These two metro areas account for the majority of federal 
procurement spending in the Commonwealth and were significantly 
impacted by the BCA and its subsequent modifications. 
We estimate that defense procurement spending declined by $1.5 
billion in the Hampton Roads metropolitan area, from FY 2011 to FY 
2014, due to the BCA. GDP in Hampton Roads was approximately 
3% lower than it would have been in the absence of the cuts in defense 
spending. In Northern Virginia, defense procurement spending 
declined 29% from 2011 to 2017. The decline in spending lowered 
economic activity in the region by over 4%. These declines explain, in 
part, the tepid performance of Virginia’s economy in the first half of 
the current decade.
Understanding how changes in procurement spending affect economic 
activity in Virginia is key to improving our economic resiliency. The 
federal government’s fiscal position is unsustainable in the long term and 
defense spending is the largest discretionary component of the federal 
budget. Preparing for possible reductions in defense spending is not 
inviting disaster; it is recognizing that what has come before may happen 
again.
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Not Just Northern Virginia 
And Hampton Roads: 
Federal Spending Across 
Virginia
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, federal government 
consumption and investment expenditures accounted for 6.6% of U.S. 
GDP in 2017, while federal civilian and military activities contributed 
9.2% of Virginia’s GDP in 2017. Table 1 illustrates the contribution of 
federal spending to GDP, by selected categories, for each of Virginia’s 
metropolitan areas in 2017.
Total federal spending ranged from a low of 0.1% of metro GDP in 
the Winchester MSA to a high of 26.7% of metro GDP for Northern 
Virginia. A number of metropolitan areas had nontrivial amounts of 
federal procurement spending, illustrating how the impact of the federal 
government is spread across the Commonwealth. As one might expect, 
federal civilian wages were highest in Northern Virginia, while military 
wages were highest in Hampton Roads. 
It’s easy to lose sight in those large headline numbers for Northern 
Virginia and Hampton Roads that federal spending is an important 
driver of economic activity in other regions. For example, the Richmond, 
Charlottesville and Roanoke metro areas had 4% or more of their GDP 
coming from federal spending in 2017. However, the spending originates 
from different sources, with Charlottesville’s coming from overall 
procurement spending, while Richmond and Roanoke get approximately 
2.5% of GDP from federal civilian wages. With over 10% of economic 
activity in 2017 associated with federal government procurement 
contracts, Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads’ economic fortunes 
wax and wane, to some extent, on federal government spending and, in 
particular, DOD procurement spending.
TABLE 1
CATEGORIES OF FEDERAL SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP: 













United States 4.2% 1.8% 1.7% 0.7%
Virginia 18.2% 10.5% 5.2% 2.5%
Blacksburg 3.4% 2.5% 0.6% 0.4%
Charlottesville 4.5% 2.4% 1.3% 0.7%
Harrisonburg 1.5% 1.0% 0.4% 0.2%
Lynchburg 3.0% 2.2% 0.5% 0.3%
Richmond 5.0% 1.3% 2.4% 1.3%
Roanoke 4.0% 1.0% 2.7% 0.2%
Staunton 0.7% 0.0% 0.5% 0.2%
Hampton 
Roads
25.3% 10.3% 6.9% 8.1%
Northern 
Virginia
26.7% 14.0% 11.5% 1.2%
Winchester 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Sources: USA Spending (2019); Bureau of Economic Analysis (2019); and the Dragas Center for Economic 
Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University 
Graph 1 displays the ratio of military and federal civilian jobs to total 
nonfarm jobs for Virginia’s metropolitan areas in 2017. Hampton Roads 
and Northern Virginia had the highest percentages of nonfarm payrolls 
associated with the federal government that year, followed by Richmond 
and Roanoke. 
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GRAPH 1
RATIO OF MILITARY AND FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES TO TOTAL NONFARM EMPLOYEES: 
METROPOLITAN AREAS IN VIRGINIA, 2017
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
 1 
GRAPH 1 
Ratio of Military and Federal Civilian Employees to Total Nonfarm Employees: Metropolitan Areas in Virginia, 2017 
 
 





















































































Federal Civilians to Total Nonfarm Employees Ratio Military to Total Nonfarm Employees Ratio■ 
127
Graph 2 illustrates the composition of federal procurement contracts in 
Virginia in FY 2017. Federal agencies negotiated more than $53 billion in 
procurement contract spending with private-sector firms. To put this into 
context, that is approximately 75% of the total 2017 GDP for the state 
of West Virginia. The Department of Defense accounted for almost two-
thirds of all federal procurement contracts, almost 10 times higher than 
the next department or agency. This illustrates the distinctive relationship 
between the Commonwealth and the DOD; not only is Virginia home to 
the world’s largest Navy base, but a majority of federal funds flowing into 
the Commonwealth are for contracts for goods and services, followed by 
transfer payments to individuals.
Table 2 presents federal procurement contract spending awards per 
capita for FY 2017 for Virginia’s metropolitan areas, Virginia and the 
United States. Northern Virginia had the highest level of procurement 
spending per capita, over two times that of the next metro area, Hampton 
Roads. The separation between Hampton Roads and the next metro area 
illustrates the disparity in federal procurement spending. In Hampton 
Roads, procurement spending per capita was four times that of the 
Charlottesville MSA. 
Of particular interest is the degree of dependency on DOD procurement 
spending. While Northern Virginia had the highest procurement spending 
per capita, this spending was almost evenly split between DOD and non-
DOD sources. In FY 2017, 57% of procurement spending in Northern 
Virginia originated from the DOD. For Hampton Roads, on the other 
hand, 90% of procurement spending in FY 2017 flowed from DOD sources. 
The differences suggest that future changes in DOD and non-DOD 
procurement spending would have different impacts in these metro areas.
TABLE 2
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT CONTRACT AWARDS PER CAPITA: 














United States $755 $341 $1,096




Hampton Roads $5,260 $561 $5,821
Charlottesville $1,085 $343 $1,428
Blacksburg $831 $161 $992
Richmond $687 $182 $869
Lynchburg $794 $57 $851
Bristol $747 $25 $772
Harrisonburg $487 $116 $603
Roanoke $328 $194 $522
Staunton $6 $12 $18
Winchester $0 $0 $0.6 
Sources: USA Spending (2019); Bureau of Economic Analysis (2019); and the Dragas Center for Economic 
Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 2
PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS BY DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY: 
VIRGINIA, FISCAL YEAR 2017
Sources: USA Spending (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 2 
Percentage of Federal Procurement Contracts by Department and Agency: 
Virginia, Fiscal Year 2017 
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What Do Federal Contracts 
Buy In Virginia?
Firms in Virginia provide products and services for almost all of 
the U.S. federal agencies. However, many of these agencies receive a 
relatively small proportion of the overall procurement spending in the 
Commonwealth. The DOD is the Commonwealth’s largest customer and 
accounted for 64% of the federal government’s procurement purchases in 
Virginia in 2017. 
Graph 3 shows the assortment of goods and services the DOD procured 
in Virginia in FY 2011, 2015 and 2017. The categories ranged from 
the construction of ships, small crafts, pontoons and floating docks to 
high-tech research and development services. The composition of the 
expenditures in these categories has stayed relatively constant over the 
last decade. 
There is a clear distinction in DOD procurement patterns between 
metropolitan areas in Virginia. Hampton Roads, for example, has military 
ship construction roots that date back to the early 1800s and the region’s 
forte has been to maintain, train and assemble forces and systems. Naval 
Air Station Oceana is the Navy’s East Coast master jet base, home to F/A-
18 Hornets and Super Hornets. The base, including Dam Neck Annex, has 
about 10,500 active Navy personnel, as well as 10,000 family members and 
4,500 civilian personnel.7 Hampton Roads’ active-duty forces primarily 
focus on being prepared to support the nation’s military objectives.
Private-sector firms with DOD procurement contracts in Hampton Roads 
focus on assembling, maintaining and supporting the operations of people 
and weapons systems. Shipbuilding, along with maintenance, repair and 
rebuilding of equipment (often related to ships), almost exclusively takes 
place in Hampton Roads. Huntington Ingalls Industries in Newport News 
is far and away the largest firm in these categories and in procurement 
contracts as a whole in the region. The Newport News facility is the 
nation’s sole designer, builder and refueler of nuclear-powered aircraft 
7 https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrma/installations/nas_oceana.html.
carriers and one of only two shipyards with the ability to design and build 
nuclear-powered submarines.
Three different major DOD spending categories – automated data 
processing services, automated data processing equipment and 
software, and professional, administrative and management support 
– all have strong footholds in Northern Virginia. These largely 
technology-based service industries do have spending sprinkled in other 
places. Hampton Roads, for example, accounts for approximately 13% of 
the spending in these areas. Companies in this technology-based industry 
service government contracts and conduct business with other private-
sector firms. In general, Northern Virginia focuses more on services, while 
Hampton Roads concentrates more on products.
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GRAPH 3
BREAKDOWN OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTS BY CATEGORY, 
FISCAL YEARS 2011, 2015 AND 2017
Sources: USA Spending (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 3 
Breakdown of Virginia Department of Defense Contracts by Category, Fiscal Years 2011, 2015 and 2017 
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A Shift In People And 
Money: 1983-2008
To understand how changes in Department of Defense procurement 
spending influence economic activity in Virginia, we need to look 
at how DOD spending has evolved over time in the Commonwealth. 
From 1983 to 2008, there was a shift in how federal funds flowed into 
Virginia. Graph 4 illustrates how federal civilian and military employment 
changed over this period. The number of military personnel stationed in 
the Commonwealth peaked at almost 214,000 service members in 1989, 
declining steadily to approximately 161,000 in 2008. From 1983 to 2008, 
the number of military personnel in Virginia fell by almost 25%.
The number of federal civilian employees in Virginia climbed from 
approximately 170,000 in 1983 to slightly over 192,000 in 1992. By 2001, 
the number of federal civilian employees had fallen 18.3% to approximately 
157,000. The number of employees then steadily increased, eclipsing 
176,000 in 2008. Even with the increase after 2001, the total number of 
federal civilian employees in Virginia was 8.2% below the peak of 1992.
While the number of federal personnel (military and civilian) was well 
below the historical peak in 2008, procurement spending continued to rise 
in Virginia from 1983 to 2008. Graph 5 displays the 156% increase in DOD 
procurement and 700% increase in non-DOD procurement spending in the 
Commonwealth over this period. Graphs 4 and 5 reveal a stark contrast 
in the evolution of federal spending from 1983 to 2008: fewer military 
personnel and civilian employees, more contracts. 
The rise in federal procurement contracts reflected a philosophical 
change to the question of whether the federal government should produce 
goods and services or contract with the private sector to produce goods 
and services. Debates over outsourcing were largely settled in favor of 
proponents of the argument, and an increasing number of functions were 
contracted out to the private sector. What began with janitorial and food 
service functions evolved to encompass what was once considered core 
functions of the federal government, to include intelligence and asset 
protection.
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GRAPH 4
TOTAL FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EMPLOYMENT: 
VIRGINIA, 1983-2008
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019 
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GRAPH 4 
Total Federal Civilian and Military Employment: Virginia, 1983-2008 
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GRAPH 5
DOD AND NON-DOD PROCUREMENT SPENDING: 
VIRGINIA, 1983-2008
Sources: Consolidated Federal Funds Report, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Procurement spending is adjusted for inflation to 2000 dollars with the BLS Urban Consumer Price Index.
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GRAPH 5 
DOD and Non-DOD Procurement Spending: Virginia, 1983-2008 
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The Budget Control 
Act Of 2011
Each non-exempt account within a category shall be reduced by a dollar 
amount calculated by multiplying the enacted level of sequestrable 
budgetary resources in that account at that time by the uniform percentage 
necessary to eliminate a breach within that category.
–  Section 101 of the Budget Control Act of 2011 modifying 
Section 251(a)(2) of Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985 
The Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads metropolitan area economies 
were (and remain) the most dependent in the Commonwealth on 
federal spending. In this section, we examine how declines in federal 
spending from the Budget Control Act of 2011 impacted the economies 
of these metros. While the threat of sequestration has receded for 
now, understanding how declines in federal spending might impact the 
Commonwealth in the future is important to address concerns about 
economic resiliency.
The BCA stemmed from a showdown between members of Congress on 
raising the debt ceiling. The political debate centered on the appropriate 
level of government spending and the size of the national debt. The 
passage of the BCA averted the debt ceiling crisis but also brought the 
word “sequestration” back into the American lexicon. Sequestration 
entails removing, or “sequestering,” funds that have been approved by 
Congress and otherwise would have been spent. The modern notion of 
sequestration dates back to the mid-1980s. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act of 1985 (revised in 1987 and again in 1990) was the most recent 
incarnation of sequestration prior to the passage of the BCA.
The BCA set statutory limits on defense discretionary and nondefense 
discretionary spending for FY 2012 to FY 2021. Table 3 illustrates the 
initial limits on discretionary defense spending. The BCA also established 
the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, which was charged with 
coming to an agreement to reduce the deficit by $1.2 trillion over the 
10-year period. Failing an agreement, the BCA contained a provision to 
automatically impose reductions to the discretionary spending limits for 
each year through FY 2021. Furthermore, the BCA required the automatic 
sequestration of nonexempt mandatory spending programs if discretionary 
spending appropriations exceeded the spending limits it established.
Table 3 illustrates the initial BCA limits on defense discretionary spending 
and the subsequent reduction in January 2012, when the Joint Select 
Committee failed to reach an agreement on how to reduce the deficit. 
While the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 delayed the FY 2013 
sequester from January 2013 to March 2013, the Department of Defense 
faced a sequester of appropriations in FY 2013. To say this was disruptive 
would be an understatement. The delay in the start of the sequester meant 
that many civilian employees were furloughed, maintenance was delayed 
and operations were slowed significantly in some areas.
The BCA focused on discretionary defense and nondefense federal 
spending. Thus, Social Security and Medicaid were exempt from the 
spending caps. However, the BCA included a 2% limit on any reductions in 
spending for Medicare and certain health care programs in the nondefense 
spending cap. Furthermore, the BCA excluded military personnel pay 
from the discretionary defense spending limit. This created important 
differences in how the BCA caps impacted the DOD and all nondefense 
agencies. 
Table 3 also shows the modifications of the BCA spending caps this decade. 
The most recent change, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019, increased the 
discretionary defense cap by $90 billion for FY 2020 and $81 billion for 
FY 2021. Under current law, there are no caps for defense and nondefense 
discretionary spending past FY 2021. Congress can return to regular order 
for the budget process, although recent practice suggests that the process 
is neither regular nor orderly.
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TABLE 3
DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY LIMITS UNDER THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT (AS AMENDED), 
AUGUST 2011 – CURRENT
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
BCA Aug 2011 $555 $546 $556 $566 $577 $590 $603 $616 $630 $644
BCA 
Sequester
Jan 2012 $555 $492 $501 $511 $522 $535 $548 $561 $575 $589
ATRA Jan 2013 $555 $518 $497 $511 $522 $535 $548 $561 $575 $589
BBA 2013 Dec 2013 $555 $518 $520 $521 $522 $536 $549 $562 $576 $590
BBA 2015 Nov 2015 $555 $518 $520 $521 $548 $551 $549 $562 $576 $590
BBA 2018 Feb 2018 $555 $518 $520 $521 $548 $551 $629 $647 $576 $590
BBA 2019 Aug 2019 $555 $518 $520 $521 $548 $551 $629 $647 $667 $672
Source: Congressional Research Service, “The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions. Updated Oct. 1, 2019,” CRS Report, R44874
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Examining The BCA’s 
Impact On Virginia
Graph 6 shows how the Budget Control Act and the subsequent 
modifications impacted federal personnel in Virginia. Military personnel 
continued to decline, falling to slightly more than 137,000 in 2017. The 11% 
decline in military personnel from 2009 to 2017 was primarily the result 
of a smaller force structure in Hampton Roads. On the other hand, the 
federal civilian workforce grew by almost 15,000 employees (8%) over the 
same period. Overall, federal civilian and military employment declined by 
approximately 2,500 from 2009 to 2017.
Graph 7 illustrates the dramatic impact of the Budget Control Act 
on Department of Defense procurement spending in Virginia. DOD 
procurement spending peaked at $49.4 billion in FY 2011 and 
subsequently declined to $34.6 billion in FY 2017. Even though non-
DOD procurement spending increased by about $1.0 billion from FY 
2011 to FY 2017, DOD procurement spending declined by $14.9 billion 
over the same period. The net loss of approximately $13.8 billion in 
DOD procurement spending undoubtedly took some of the wind out of 
the Commonwealth’s economic sails.
Table 4 further breaks these categories down between products, 
services, and research and development (R&D) for fiscal years 2011, 
2014 and 2017. Between FY 2011 and FY 2017, DOD product spending 
declined by 27.1% (-$3.7 billion), while DOD services plummeted 
33.9% ($-10.8 billion). DOD R&D fell 11.7% and non-DOD R&D 
dropped 37.9%, a troubling development given Virginia’s desire to 
engage in innovation and research. There are two small measures of 
good news, however, which can be seen in Table 4. Non-DOD product 
purchases increased by 12.2% ($309 million) and non-DOD service 
spending increased by 7.6% ($1.0 billion) over the same period.
TABLE 4
VIRGINIA PROCUREMENT SPENDING BY PRODUCTS, SERVICES, 
AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 
FISCAL YEARS 2011, 2014 AND 2017 











Products DOD $13,717 $10,280 $9,995 -25.1% -27.1%
Products 
Non-DOD
$2,527 $2,736 $2,836 +8.3% +12.2%
Services DOD $31,818 $23,384 $21,044 -26.5% -33.9%
Services 
Non-DOD








$1,099 $812 $683 -26.1% -37.9%
Sources: USA Spending and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019 
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GRAPH 7
DOD AND NON-DOD PROCUREMENT SPENDING: 
VIRGINIA, FISCAL YEARS 2009-2017
Sources: Consolidated Federal Funds Report, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Bureau of Labor Statistics. Procurement spending is adjusted for inflation to 2000 dollars with the Urban Consumer Price Index from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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GRAPH 7 
DOD and Non-DOD Procurement Spending: Virginia, Fiscal Years 2009-2017 
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A Primer On Economic 
Impact Analysis
To estimate the impact of sequestration and the subsequent caps on 
federal spending, we quantify the direct, indirect and induced economic 
impacts. We focus our analysis on changes in defense procurement 
spending from the Budget Control Act for Hampton Roads and Northern 
Virginia.
To understand our approach, it is helpful to imagine a pebble dropped 
into a puddle of water to visualize how the economy reacts to a change 
in procurement contracts. The impact represents the initial round of 
economic activity on output, earnings and employment. The initial round 
of economic activity ripples through the rest of the economy like the waves 
moving through the puddle. These ripples represent the indirect and 
induced impacts that come about through the interconnectedness of the 
local economy. The indirect economic impact comes from economic activity 
by suppliers to firms that have won Department of Defense procurement 
contracts. On the other hand, the induced impact comes from income 
and employment in industries directly and indirectly affected by direct 
procurement contracts.
These spillovers can create a total economic impact from DOD spending 
that is much larger than the direct impact on a firm that wins a contract. 
The notion of an economic multiplier summarizes the total economic 
impact of a change in economic activity. For example, if a firm wins a 
$1 million DOD contract (direct impact) that generates $300,00 in indirect 
economic impacts and $200,00 in induced economic impacts, then the 
economic impact multiplier effect is ($1,000,000 + $300,000 + $200,000) / 
$1,000,000 = 1.5. 
There are two important considerations when evaluating economic 
multipliers. First, the size of the multiplier inherently depends on how 
much of the economic activity continues to recycle within the region. If, 
for example, shipbuilding and repair firms source most of their materials 
from outside of the region (a “leakage”), then the actual multiplier effect 
will necessarily be smaller. Second, the multiplier effect, where spending 
spills over to a variety of other sectors, is great when the direct impact is 
positive, however; it is equally painful when there is a reduction in direct 
economic activity.
To estimate the impact from DOD procurement spending on employment 
and output in the Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia metropolitan 
areas, we use defense-spending data from USAspending.gov and the 
JobsEQ software developed by Chmura Economics and Analytics. The 
JobsEQ software uses regional input-output tables to measure the 
connectedness of economic activity in the region.
The Economic Impact Of The 
BCA On Hampton Roads
As Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia received the lion’s share of 
Department of Defense contracts prior to the passage of the Budget 
Control Act, we focus our analysis on the BCA’s economic impact on these 
two metropolitan areas. First, we start with estimates of how the BCA 
impacted the Hampton Roads economy. Federal spending in Hampton 
Roads is concentrated in the manufacturing sector with the construction 
and maintenance of ships. Manufacturing procurement contracts 
comprised 56% of DOD contracts in 2011 and 52% in 2017. Graph 8 depicts 
the total economic impact of DOD spending on output in Hampton Roads, 
while Graph 9 shows the impact on employment. In 2011, the $10.4 billion 
in direct DOD procurement spending created a total output of $15 billion. 
This level plummeted in 2014. 
As illustrated in Graph 8, direct DOD procurement spending declined 
from approximately $10.4 billion in FY 2011 to about $8.6 billion in 
FY 2014. As a result, the estimated economic impact of DOD spending 
in Hampton Roads declined from $15 billion in FY 2011 to $12.3 
billion in FY 2014, an economic loss of $2.7 billion. In other words, 
the impact of the BCA equaled about 3% of the region’s annual GDP.
Furthermore, the defense sector rebounded only slightly by 2017, 
with direct defense spending reaching about $8.9 billion. The total 
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economic impact of DOD spending increased from a low of $12.3 
billion in FY 2014 to $12.8 billion in FY 2017.
Graph 9 shows a similar detrimental employment effect from 2011 to 
2014 and 2017. Overall, total employment from DOD procurement 
spending declined by 13,000 private-sector jobs from 2011 to 
2014. By 2017, the total estimated employment loss had declined to 
approximately 8,000 jobs. If there is good news to report, it is that the 
increases in DOD spending in fiscal years 2018 and 2019 should raise 
the DOD’s overall economic impact in Hampton Roads. Whether the 
DOD’s overall contribution returns to the peak observed prior to the 
BCA remains an unanswered question.
The Economic Impact Of The 
BCA On Northern Virginia
Northern Virginia had 61% of its procurement spending on professional, 
scientific and technical services in FY 2011. Graph 10 shows the 
total economic impact on output in Northern Virginia from declining 
Departmentof Defense spending, while Graph 11 shows the labor market 
impact. The headline numbers are even starker in Northern Virginia 
than they are in Hampton Roads. Direct DOD procurement spending 
declined by $9.1 billion, leading overall output to decline between 
2011 and 2017 by $14 billion, a 29% drop. This represented a drop of 
approximately 4.5% from Northern Virginia’s GDP. By the same token, 
total employment declined by 28%, or 58,000 jobs. 
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GRAPH 8
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT SPENDING ON OUTPUT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 
FISCAL YEARS 2011, 2014 AND 2017
Sources: USA Spending, JobsEQ and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 8 
Estimated Economic Impact of Defense Spending on Output in Hampton Roads, 
Fiscal Years 201 , 2014 and 2017 
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GRAPH 9
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT SPENDING ON EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 
FISCAL YEARS 2011, 2014 AND 2017
Sources: USA Spending, JobsEQ and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 9 
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GRAPH 10
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT SPENDING ON OUTPUT IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
FISCAL YEARS 2011, 2014 AND 2017
Sources: USA Spending, JobsEQ and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
 2 
GRAPH 10 
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GRAPH 11
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT SPENDING ON EMPLOYMENT IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 
FISCAL YEARS 2011, 2014 AND 2017
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Final Thoughts
Federal contracting is big business in the Commonwealth, particularly 
for the metropolitan areas of Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads. 
While aircraft carriers and the Pentagon are highly visible, many federal 
contracts are outside the media spotlight and only capture public attention 
when something goes wrong. We would be wrong to conclude that only 
Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads benefit from federal government 
procurement spending. Each metro area in Virginia has a hand in the 
federal cookie jar to some degree.  
One unfortunate consequence of the Commonwealth’s dependence 
on federal spending is that it can get its hand caught in the cookie 
jar. The BCA, sequestration and subsequent spending caps revealed 
Virginia’s vulnerability to a slowdown in federal, and in particular, DOD, 
procurement spending. Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads both have 
experienced double-digit declines in output and employment related to 
DOD spending. Only recently, with increases in DOD spending, have we 
seen economic activity rebound in Hampton Roads. Northern Virginia, 
which has a more economically diverse economy, has grown more robustly 
but still has struggled at times this decade.
It is clear that changes in fiscal policy in Washington have the power 
to create a recession in some of Virginia’s metropolitan areas. This 
dependence on federal spending could hurt the economies of Hampton 
Roads and Northern Virginia more in the future if decreases in federal 
spending continue. Even though the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 
increased the caps for discretionary spending for defense and nondefense 
purposes, with the rising nominal national debt, the choice to increase the 
debt or start to cut discretionary spending is near. The eventual decision 
to curtail discretionary spending will undoubtably hurt Virginia, due to 
defense being the largest discretionary spending option to cut.
While the ailment is the same for Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads, 
nevertheless the treatment is likely different for the two regions. Northern 
Virginia is making strides diversifying its workforce, with Amazon HQ2 in 
Arlington as a prime example. In contrast, Hampton Roads still has work 
to do in alleviating some of the structural challenges it faces, such as sea 
level rise, and dealing with its reliance on DOD spending. Taking steps 
to reduce its reliance on defense spending would be highly beneficial, due 
primarily to the predicted decrease in discretionary defense spending over 
the next decade. Hampton Roads would benefit from promoting policies 
that encourage innovation and an entrepreneurial spirit. This would help 
the region leverage the idea of dual-use products and services. Hampton 
Roads already has experience and expertise in procuring government 
contracts. However, firms would also benefit by looking for outlets for 
their products in the private sector. For example, a company working on 
the next generation of marine propulsion equipment might have developed 
its technology initially for the military, yet this technology could also have 
valuable private-sector applications. The military-to-civilian transition is 
important also for private firms, business lines and spurring innovation.
Regardless of one’s view of the size and scope of the federal 
government, we must deal with the stark reality that federal 
government spending provides fuel for the economic engine that 
drives the Commonwealth. Over the last two decades, the federal 
government’s share in Virginia’s GDP has declined, but the federal 
government still accounted for approximately 1 out of every 5 dollars 
of economic activity in our state in 2018. Virginia’s distinctive 
relationship with the DOD is a strength in times of increasing budgets, 
and a challenge in times of increasing uncertainty, or constrained 
DOD budgets. Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia illustrate how 
DOD spending, to paraphrase the Book of Job, gives and takes away. 
The challenge of the coming decade is to recognize that no budget can 
increase forever and that a downturn in DOD spending will eventually 
come again. Investments in creating a skilled workforce, making 
infrastructure improvements and remaining friendly to businesses 
constitute a wise course of action. These policies not only complement 
Virginia’s relationship with the federal government, but also improve 
the Commonwealth’s attractiveness to private investment and job 
creation.
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